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The purpose of this study is to give a critical exposition of the
theological and ethical thought of H. Richard Niebuhr (1894-1962). After a
brief introduction to "the man and his work" (Chapter I) the theoretical
structure of his thought is set forth. A relational theory of value center¬
ing on the concept of "the center of value" (Chapter II) and a relational
theory of action centering on the concept of "responsibility" (Chapter III)
are distinguished and described. Two main criticisms of the relational theory
of value are offered. First, it is argued that an unexceptionally relational
theory of value is incompatible with Niebuhr's primary theological interest
in maintaining the absolute priority and independence of the being and value
of God to all contingent being and value. Second, it is argued that Niebuhr's
radically monotheistic value theory need not entail (as he thinks it does)
the complete relativity of all finite values and value systems. There is
nothing in his relational theory as such that requires the prohibition of
normative ethical principles so necessary for providing guidance for moral
decision making. Furthermore, this prohibition seems to be contradicted by
other statements made by Niebuhr, and it is also inconsistent with his advocacy
of such principles for the construction of a viable Protestant ethic.
Niebuhr developed his relational theory of moral agency—the theory of
"responsibility"—by way of comparative analysis of teleologlcal and deontolo-
gical ethics. His chief dissatisfaction with these two traditional ways of
conceiving human moral agency lay at the point of the view of man which each
presupposes. Both theories accept a view of man that is too individualistic,
non-historical and intellectualistic. The theory of responsibility accredits
itself as a more adequate conceptual scheme insofar as it embodies a view of
man that avoids these defects. Beyond this, according to Niebufr, both teleo-
logical and deontological theorists understand the primary moral relation to
be between the self-as-will and previously cognized moral principles, rules
or demands. For the ethics of responsibility, on the other hand, the rightness
or wrongness of specific moral actions is not determined by universal moral
principles or norms, but by the self's "interpretation" of the objective moral
character of that infinite Being upon which the self and all finite beings
are absolutely dependent.
Both Niebuhr's relational theory of value and of action deny any place
for general moral principles or rules in a theological ethic. The absence of
such rules or principles is directly related to, and in part occasioned by,
his understanding of the limitations imposed on all knowledge of God by his
acceptance of 1) a modified version of Kant's distinction between theoretical
and practical reason and of 2) the historically relative character of all
knowledge (Chapter IV).
In the final chapter two theological principles are identified which
structure Niebuhr's ethics. The principle of "radical monotheism" and the
principle of "transformation" or "conversion" represent Niebuhr's positive
answer to two questions that must be asked and answered by any ethic that
makes a serious claim to be a theological ethic. First, "How is God known,
and what may be known of him?" Second, "What are the consequences of this
knowledge for understanding and ordering moral experience and action?" Both
questions are explored further by means of a critical analysis of an important
essay in which Niebuhr deals with each. The answer which he gives to the first
question raises two other critical issues. First, it is argued that Niebuhr
fails to maintain the priority of the being and value of God to all human being
and value—a failure which he himself argued was the major weakness of all
post-Kantian liberal theologies—so long as he also maintains that a sufficient
criterion for distinguishing experience of God from experience of any other
being is the satisfaction of the constitutive human need to know that life is
worth living. When Niebuhr stresses the relational and valuational aspects of
his religious epistemology, his description of knowledge of God is anthropo¬
morphic. On the other hand, when he addresses himself to the question of what
it means to affirm that God reveals himself in historical events, he so stresses
the objectivity and otherness of God that his description of knowledge of God
is agnostic. If this is the case, then the legitimacy, or at least the
adequacy of the "personal-encounter" model of revelation is called in question.
Finally, attention is given to Niebuhr's description of the transforma¬
tion that all our natural religion and morality undergo as a result of receiv¬
ing the gift of radical faith in the one God present in all events. Revelation
is that event through which the self is given a new image of God as an absolute
unity of power and goodness by means of which it is enabled progressively to
reinterpret all the events of its individual and social existence, past,





I. H. RICHARD NIEBUHR: THE MAN AND HIS WORK 1
A Brief Sketch of His Life 3
H. Richard Nlebuhr: Christian Thinker, Teacher and Writer. 9
II. THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF VALUE 24
Objective Relativism 26
Relative Centers of Value 39
"Value Theory and Theology" 44
The Absolute Center of Value 50
Objective Relativism and Radical Monotheism 56
Toward a Constructive Ethic: An Inconsistency 61
III. THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF-EXISTENCE AND ACTION .... 72
Introduction: Value and Selfhood 72
The Meaning of Responsibility 77
The Social Self 95
The Social Self and Conscience 103
The Social Self and History Ill
The Dependent Self 115
Teleology, Deontology and Responsibility 125
IV. HISTORICAL RELATIVISM AND THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL
KNOWLEDGE 135
Historical Relativism 140
Theoretical and Practical Knowledge 151
V. FAITH IN GOD AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF NATURAL RELIGION
AND MORALITY 167
Introduction 167
"Faith 1n Gods and 1n God" 176
-ii-
Page
God and the Meaning of Human Existence 201
God and the Meaning of Revelation 211





CC Christ and Culture
CE Christian Ethics: Sources of the Living Tradition
CV "The Center of Value"
FE Faith and Ethics
FG6 "Faith 1n Gods and 1n God"
KGA The K1 ngdotn of God 1n America
MR The Meaning of Revelation
PCM The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry
RMWC Radical Monotheism and Western Culture
RS The Responsible Self: an Essay 1m Christian Moral
Philosophy
SSD The Social Sources of Denominationalism
VTT "Value Theory and Theology"
- 1v-
CHAPTER I
H. RICHARD NIEBUHR: THE MAN AND HIS WORK
Helmut Richard Nlebuhr (1894-1962) was In many ways simply one more
unobtrusive and hardworking academic who went about his work as a teacher and
writer 1n a manner little different from that of the best among his peers.
Calm, meditative, even reticent by nature, he led no crusade, started no school
of thought, but worked unostentatiously from 1931 until shortly before his
death as a professor of Christian ethics at Yale University. But during this
period the careful, subtle and searching character of his thought came In¬
creasingly to be recognized. Ethics, broadly defined as the relation between
Christian faith and culture, was his chief theoretical Interest. He was a self-
conscious Protestant moralist and all his work was sustained by a deep personal
faith 1n the sovereignty of God and was motivated by a corresponding concern
for an Immediate, radical and continuous reformation of the faith and action of
the Christian churchJ
It was 1n fact the comprehensiveness of his vision combined with an
original, versatile yet disciplined approach to the task of Christian ethics
that in large measure defines his Importance for modem Christian thought. He
was, for example, one of the first English-speaking Protestant moralists to
*H. Richard Nlebuhr, "Reformation: Continuing Imperative," Christian
Century, LXXVII (1960), 248-251. The essay 1s a description of Nlebuhr's
"theoToglcal pilgrimage" (p. 248), the fifth 1n a series of articles by lead¬
ing theologians published under the general theme, "How My M1nd Has Changed."
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recognlze the value of the new researches of the developing social sciences
(Into Individual motivation and action* and Into the dynamics and structures
of society) for understanding the Church's situation as a human community and
Institution. Furthermore* this comprehensiveness and versatility may be seen
in the fact that while he was not a trained sociologist his first work, The
Social Sources of Denominationalism written 1n 1929, 1s still regarded by
1
sociologists as a modal piece of soc1o-h1stor1cal analysts. He was not a
dogmatic theologian, yet one prominent theologian described The Kingdom of God
America (1937) as "still the most profound theological Interpretation of
2
Protestantism 1n America." And Paul Ttlllch pronounced The Meaning of Revela-
tlon (1941) to be "the Introduction to existential thinking In present American
3
theology." Nor, furthermore, was he a professional church historian, but 1n
the opinion of Professor J. H. Nichols who 1s, "one might Indeed do worse than
to read the story of the best American thinking on church history 1n this
generation In the passage from The Social Sources of Denomlnationalism (1929)
through The Kingdom of Sod ini America (1937) to Christ and Culture (1951).h4
in the following sociological
ed. John Milton Ylnger (New
"3-
*Extracts from this work are to be found
readers: Religion, Society, and the Individual,
York: MaciTn^l957}, pp. 451-587 Igloo, Culture and Society,
ed. Louis Schneider (New York: John Wiley and" Sons, 1964), pp. T71T-180, 20'
219, 466-471.
2
Claude Welch, "Theology," Religion, ed. Paul Ramsey (Englewood CUffs,
New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1965), p. 264. This volume 1s one in a series en¬
titled Humanistic Scholarship in America: The Princeton Studies, general
editor, Richard ScKTatter. These volumes cover roughlythe years 1930-1960.
3
In a review article "Existential Thinking 1n American Theology,"
Religion in Life X (1941), p. 455.
*"The History of Christianity," Religion, ed. Paul Ramsey (Englewood
CUffs, New Jersey; Prentice Hall, 1965TTpp. 209-210.
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A Brief Sketch of His Life
H. Richard Niebuhr was bom at Wright City, Missouri In 1894, the son
of a minister 1n what was then known as the Evangelical and Reformed ChurchJ
The elder Niebuhr, 1n a manner characteristic of the best 1n German Protestant
piety, early Introduced his children to theology ar.d music. Relnhold Niebuhr,
Richard's older brother, recalls that their father "combined a vital piety with
complete freedom 1n his theological studies. He Introduced his sons and daughter
to the thought of Harnack without fully sharing the liberal convictions of that
theologian.There can be little doubt that the Interest shared by both
In 1S57 the Evangelical and Reformed Church joined with the Congrega¬
tional Christian Churches (Itself the result of a previous union} to form the
United Church of Christ. The Evangelical and Reformed Church also, as the name
suggests, was the product of a prior union 1n 1934 of two bodies of Swiss and
German background who shared a similar doctrinal, governmental and cultural
understanding. Nlebuhr's heritage Is rooted 1n the younger of these two groups
—the Evangelical Synod of North America. This group, too, had resulted from
an amalgamation of a number of German speaking "evangelical synods" established
by immigrant peoples 1n the frontier communities of the Mississippi Valley. The
first of these, the Klrchenvereln des Western, originated at Gravols Settlement
near St. Louis 1n 18'4fl Cf. Frank A. fiea3T"Kandbook of Denomlnations 1n the
United States, Second Revised Edition (New Ybrl(7~At>TngdonVI96TJ,PP« 213-?23;
C. E. Schneider, The German Church on the American Frontier (St. Louis: Eden
Publishing House, 1939)T~MTh"e GenTus "of the ReforSTed'Thurch 1n the United States:
A Genetic Appraisal of her Union With the Evangelical Synod of North America,"
The Journal of Religion XV (1935), 26-41. Schneider points out that the
evangelical Synod "was conceived In the spirit of the Evangelical Union of 1817
1n Germany, which sought to bring the Reformed and Lutheran branches of German
Protestantism together." Ibid., p. 26. It 1$ Interesting to note in this
connection how elements of Reformed and Lutheran thinking in theology and ethics
appear in the thought of both Nlebuhrs with the Lutheran approach predominant
in Relnhold Nlebuhr's work and the Reformed in Richard Niebubr's. While Relnhold
put primary stress on the doctrine of man and sin and developed an essentially
ouallstlc ethic, Richard emphasized grace and the sovereignty of God and
developed a monistic ethic. On the other hand common to both Is the Lutheran
accent on justification by faith through grace alone and an Interest 1n the
subjective aspect of salvation.
^Relnhold Niebuhr, "Intellectual Biography," 1n Relnhold Niebuhr: H1j_
Religious, Social and Political Thought, eds. Charles W."Regley~and Robert 07"*
Bretall (New York: The Ma^TTTan Company, 1956), p. 3.
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brothers in the mutual Interpretation of Christian faith and cultural life
received Its first vital Impetus in a home that combined in an easy and wholly
spontaneous manner "vital piety" and "complete freedom" in theological think¬
ing.
He received his first higher education at the small college (Elmhurst
College) and seminary (Eden Theological Seminary) of his denomination. Follow¬
ing the completion of his course at the latter he was ordained end for a short
time (1916-1918) was minister to a congregation 1n St, Louis, Missouri. The
denominational schools apparently had not fully satisfied him for he continued
his formal studies at Washington University (St. Louis). Upon receiving the
M.A. degree he accepted an Invitation to Join the faculty of Eden Theological
Seminary. But this, too, proved to be only a short pause, for now as a mature
student he travelled east to New Haven, Connecticut and entered the Divinity
School of Yale University.
At Yale, Frank Chamberlain Porter, the Professor of New Testament and
Douglas Clyde Macintosh, Professor of Theology and Philosophy of Religion,
exercized the greatest Influence on his thought which was now rapidly forming
Its own distinctive mold.^ Professor Macintosh together with Henry Nelson
Wleman of Chicago were the leading "liberal" theologians 1n America at the
time. The former gave close attention to the problem of religious knowledge
and attempted to develop an empirical theology by applying the full rigor of
2
strictly scientific procedures to theological Inquiry. Nlebuhr, 1t appears,
^H. Richard Nlebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation (New York: Macmman,
1941, Paper edition, 1960), pp. 1x~k. Hereinafter cited as MR. The book 1s
dedicated to these "two great theologians and teachers."
2
Among Macintosh's many books, Theology as an Empirical Science (New
York: Macmillan, 1919) 1s perhaps most typical. t?T especially pp. Wff.
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was more convinced by the powerful and Incisive arguments his teacher mounted
against other views than the ultimate success of his own positive theological
construction,'
In 1924 he submitted as his doctoral dissertation a detailed and
closely reasoned exposition of "The Religious Philosophy of Ernst Troeltsch,"
The great German philosopher, church historian and Influential theologian of
the Reliqlonsgeschlchtl1cheschule had died the year previously. One must con¬
cur wholeheartedly with the Judgment of Nlsbuhr's Yale colleague, Sidney
Ahlstrom, that
. , . though never published, this thesis Is 1n one sense the
most Important thing he ever wrote, for 1t focused Interests
that must have been forming for a decade and set the general
direction of his career as a theologian, historian and moral
philosopher. His best known works all bear at least some of
the marks of this Influence,2
Though he was by now just thirty years old his church evidenced their
high regard for him by Inviting him to become the president of the college from
which h® had graduated as a youth. It did not last. Three years later he
crossed over to Join his old colleagues at the theological seminary. No useful
purpose would be gained by Inquiring Into the reasons for this; but 1t 1s
significant that even In later years when he enjoyed high esteem on all sides
he resisted all offers to head prestigious Institutions and elected to remain
'cf. Nlebuhr's essay, "Value Theory and Theology," 1n The Nature of
Religious Experience: Essays in Honor of Douglas Clyde Mac1ntoiWredlted
by Julius S. Blxler, Robert L. Calhoun, and H. Richard Nlebuhr (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1937), pp. 93-116. Hereinafter cited as VTT.
2
"H. Richard Nlebuhr's Place 1n American Thouqht," Christianity and




During these years he was at work on his first book. It Is altogether
typical of Nlebuhr as a man and as a teacher that his first published work
should arise from the meeting of practical and theoretical concerns. On the
theoretical side The Social Sources of Denominationalism follows directly from
his dissertation 1n that here he utilized the best Insights of Troeltsch 1n
exposing the extent to which the denomlnational pattern of the Institutional
church 1n America was Influenced by the nation's pluralistic cultural develop¬
ment. On the practical and existential side 1t was his "ninety-five theses"
nailed to the door of a Protestantism that had become a complaisant partner to
the pluralistic social forces in American culture. More immediately, 1t was
simply the outcome of a young teacher's struggles to teach a course 1n
"Symbolics"'2
But Nlebuhr was destined to serve the church outside the boundaries of
the denomination he had until then served with such distinction. In 1332, he
was called to be an associate of Professor Macintosh at Yale where he remained
until his retirement in 1960. The previous year had been spent In Europe, and
while Nlebuhr has not made public any personal reflections on this experience,
there is indirect evidence that he was deeply moved by what he witnessed. As
1s well known, Europe was experiencing tumultuous days. While it is true that
the Great Crash of 1929 had shocked and sobered an America inebriated by the
\lston Pope, HH. Richard Nlebuhr: A Personal Appreciation," Faith
•nd Ethics: The Theology of H. Richard Nlebuhr. edited by Paul Ramsay (New"
York: Harper A Row, 1957.Taper edition, 1965), p. 7f. Hereinafter cited as
FE.
2
H. Richard Niabuhr, The Social Sources of Denominational1sm (New York:
Henry Holt, 1929; Reprinted wTth new preface, HamHienT Connectlcit: The Shoe
String Press, 1954; Hew York: Meridian Books, 1957, Meridian paper edition,
1957), p. v1i. Hereinafter cited as SSD,
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wealth of its own new wine, it roust have seemed almost mild compared with the
political frenzy threatening the life of Europe. The mild socialism and hesi¬
tant internationalism of Roosevelt's Hew Deal and the fanatical nationalism of
Hitler's Fascism that were to change the face of both nations down to the
1
present, were just ahead. But the "signs of the tiroes" had not been lost on
the young theologian. Evidence of his extraordinary sensitivity to the cul¬
tural and religious situation of his time is seen in the fact that as a result
of this visit, Hiebuhr did not immediately begin a new work of his own but
Introduced to the English speaking world a translation of what was in his
opinion one of "the roost important of wany attempts which were made 1n .modern
Germany to achieve the orientation of thought and life in the new world of the
2
twentieth century." This was a time for listening and of repentant reflection
by the church. Thus, when Nlebuhr next spoke to and about the church in his
3
own land the results of a "Turner!ebnls of justification by faith" 1n his own
4
life and thought are unmistakable.
Hhe significance of a comparison between the two leaders 1s heightened
by the fact that the years of their power are exactly parallel—1933 to 1945.
2
"Translator's Preface," to The Religious Situation by Paul TilUch,
translated by H. Richard Nlebuhr (NevTTork: HenrylloltTTCompany, 1932; New
York: Meridian Books, paper edition, 1956), p. 9. While the ostensible
purpose of this short essay was to prepare the English reader, by clarifying
key ideas in T1l11ch*s thought, it was at the same time a statement of Hlebuhr's
own reaction to TiWch's interpretation of contemporary culture and religion
and throws considerable light on the process of rethinking Niebuhr was under¬
going at the time,
3
The phrase was used by Nlebuhr about himself. Cf. Ahlstrom,
Christianity and Crisis XXIII (1963), p. 215.
4I refer in particular to "The Question of the Church" and "Towards
the Independence of the Church" in The Church Against the World by H. Richard
Nlebuhr, Uilhelm Pauck and T. P. MlTTeV^CFTfcago, New York: Willet, Clark &
Co., 1935), 1-13 and 123-156; The Kingdom of God in America (Chicago, New
-Q-
In 1954 Richard Nlebuhr accepted an invitation by the American Associa¬
tion of Theological Schools to direct a "Study of Theological Education in the
United States and Canada." This was 1n many ways a fitting climax to his
distinguished career for here he was provided with a unique opportunity to test
across a wide front his methodological combination of sociological analysis
and philosophical and theological reflection which was the distinctive mark
of his approach to ethical understanding. Dialogue at the level of personal
relations and dialectic at the level of thought were the means Nlebuhr used
to bring together these separate disciplines. He believed that in the process
of reckoning with each other the truth and significance of the church's situa¬
tion would be revealed. Nlebuhr sought to generate such a dialogue at every
level of the church's life. If he did not see self-criticism both In the
Individual and the church as synonymous with its reformation and renewal, he
did regard It as a necessary pre-requisite. Thus, the three-volume study report
does more than list statistics, reports and make recommendations for the
1
bettering of education for the ministry. For hare Richard Nlebuhr presented
his mature reflections on the nature and purpose of the church and Its minis¬
try ; reflections which had arisen out of his life-long participation 1n
York: Willet, Clark, 1937; Reprinted with a new preface, Hamden, Connecticut:
The Shoe String Press, 1956; New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1959), The 1959
paper edition will be quoted and hereinafter cited as KGA. The former 1s
something of a "manifesto" presaging the new theological orientation of Nlebuhr
which was to result in his radically different approach to understanding the
course of Christ**n1ty 1n America contained In the latter.
Richard Nlebuhr and Daniel Day Williams (eds.), The Ministry 1n
Historical Perspective (New York: Harper, 1S56). Also, H. lOchard Nlebuhr,
Daniel" Day Williams and James M. Gustafson (eds.), The Advancement of Theologj-
cal_ Education (New York: Harper, 1S57).
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theological education.*
tjU Richard Njebuhr: Christian Thinker, Teacher and Writer
A concern for the renewal and right ordering of the Church and Its
ministry was an Important practical Interest of Nlebuhr's but 1t by no means
defined the scope of his thought. His mind encompassed a variety of Interests
and all his writings evidenced the same wide knowledge and Incisive grasp of the
subject combined with a fine critical ability and sense of proportion. His
doctoral dissertation clearly shows that by his thirtieth year he had a not un¬
critical mastery of the intricacies of much German philosophical and theological
thought since Kant. This Is particularly true of what Paul Tllllch has called
2
"the Kant-R1tsch1-Harnack line of thought which led to Troeltsch." He was,
however, just as keenly aware of the philosophical and theological thinking of
his own country. We might, to take a particular instance, point to Mlebuhr's
use of the term "objective relativism" in his theory of religious knowledge and
value.** It was his aim to combine the objective interest of "new realism" and
the subjective Interest of "critical realism": positions which had developed
in epistemologlcal discussion 1n America during the first three decades of the
\l. Richard Nfebuhr, The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry, reflec¬
tions on the alms of theologlcaT education, 1rt collaboration with Daniel Day
WilllafTis and James M. Gustafson (Hew York: Harper, 1957). Hereinafter cited
as PCH,
2
Paul TilUch, Perspectives on Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Protes¬
tant Theology, edited b^rarTr:~Braneh~*aonTo^ Press, M7J, p. 215. "
3HR, pp. 10, 18f, 22; VTT, pp. 113ff. "The Center of Value," 1n Moral
Principles of Action, edited by R. N. Anshen (Mew York: Harper, 1952), pp. 17T2-
T/5, revised and" reprinted as a "Supplementary Essay," 1n Radical Monotheism and
Western Culture (New York: Harper, 1960; London: Fabcr andTaberTT^T)^pp.
100-TTJ." Hereinafter cited as RMWC.
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twentletb centuryJ "Objective relativism" and Its theological surrogates,
"theo-centric or theological relativism" became central concepts in his theology
and ethics.
But 1f, quite naturally, he was influenced more directly by contempor¬
ary thought both inside and outside America, he did not neglect the past. Indeed,
perhaps more than any other prominent American Protestant theologian of his time
he moved confidently and critically within the greater part of Western theologi¬
cal and philosophical thought and combined in a quite unostentatious fashion a
scholar's knowledge with a thinker's creativity. Furthermore, he was convinced
that genuine cross-cultural and 1nter-d1sc1pl1nary communication would do much
to prevent the narrow provincial and one-sided development of theology and
ethics that afflicted much academic thinking on these subjects in both Europe
2
and America. His sympathetic and clear-headed understanding of new departures
being made in European theology, particularly the early work of Karl Bartb and
Paul Tilllch, provided him with a perspective from which he could critically
appraise the domestic theological scene of the 1930's. At this time Niebuhr
believed that German "religious realism" was more "real" than American "religious
realism," but he did not think the latter had nothing to say to the former.
Cf. William Pepperell Montague, "The Story of American Realism" in
Philosophy, XII (April, 1937), pp. 1-22; Herbert W. Schneider, A History of
kTeri'can Philosophy, second edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962)
artcf Sources of Contemporary Philosophical Realism (Indianapolis and New York:
The I~obbs-MerrlTl~ Company, Inc. , 1964) . "the Tatter volume contains the relevant
sections of Schneider's larger History as well as a shortened version of Montague's
essay.
2
Cf. "Can German and American Christians Understand Each Other?," Chris¬
tian Century, XLVII (1930), pp. 914-916; "Religious Realism 1n the Twentieth"
Century" in Religious Realism, edited by D. C. Macintosh (New York: Macmillan,
1931), pp. 413-428; Niebuhr's preface to his translation of Paul TilHch, The
Religious Situation, 1931: Also, The Kingdom of God in America has been trans¬
lated iTito "German as Der Gedanke des GottesrelchsTn Amerikanischen Chris ten turn,
(Hew York: Church WorTd Service,~T948)^
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Ultlmately the difference between German and American
religious realism root 1n a divergent employment of criticism In
the analysis of religious and moral experience. This divergence
leads to a host of consequences which Involve German theology 1n
dualism, agnosticism, pessimism and dogmatism and American theology
in optimism, monism, and rationalism. It Is easy for the American
to point out that German theology has pressed Its critical princi¬
ple to the point where 1t must choose between agnosticism and
dogmatism and has, In fact, made a dogma out of the critical
principle Itself. On the other hand there Is justice 1n the
German criticism of the optimism and anthropocratlc tendency in
Aeierlcan religious thought.1
As one of his Interpreters has noted, his own work was "a genuinely Intercul-
2
tural activity to a degree rarely achieved in present-day Protestant theology."
Here again we observe his concern for dialogue and communication which became on
3
a theoretical plane a primary model for the explication of his ethical theory.
Furthermore, something of Nlebuhr's desire to attain a comprehensive
understanding of a variety of theological and philosophical traditions 1s seen
1n the Influence on his own thought of a quite diverse group of thinkers. Out¬
side America thinkers as different as F. Schlelermacher, A. Ritschl, S. Kierke¬
gaard, t. Cassirer, H. Bergson, A. £. Taylor, A. N. Whitehead and F. D. Maurice
have contributed more or less directly to the style and direction of his
thougnt. liven more Important are Inmanuel Kant, Martin Buber, Karl Barth, Paul
TilUch and above all Ernst Troeltsch. A less Impressive company, but certainly
'"Religious Realism In the Twentieth Century," op. cit., pp. 427-428.
'"Hans Fre1, "Niebuhr's Theological Background," Faith and Ethics, edited
by Paul Ramsey (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, p. 12."
3The Responsible Self: an Essay 1n Christian Moral Philosophy, with
an Introduction by James M. GustaTson (New~Vork: Harper an"d"WwV"l963), pp.
56-60, 149-160 passim. Hereinafter cited as RS. This posthumously published
volume contains the~1i>bertson Lectures for 1960 delivered at Glasgow University
and 1n an appendix excerpts from the Earl Lectures at the Pacific School of
Religion in 1962. It also Includes a preface by his son, Professor Richard
ft. Niebuhr, and a long Introduction by Professor James M. Gustafson, Niebuhr's
successor to the Chair of Christian Ethics at Yale,
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not less Important 1n their influence on H1ebuhrTwere such American scholars as
Walter Rausehenbusch, Frank C. Porter, Robert L. Calhoun, Joslah Royce, G. H.
Head, u. C. Macintosh and above all Jonathan Edwards. It is neither possible,
nor desirable to indicate separately the precise nature of the Impact of all of
these scholars on the development of Mlebuhr's thought. But I have tried to take
account of those elements in the thought of the most important of then which,
in judgment, help to clarify aspects of Nlebuhr's own views.
Colleagues and students alike have spoken of the way 1n which he had
helped them to see old problems 1n a new light by employing new terms, drawn
from various disciplines,as Integral parts of a lucid, consistent and highly
sophisticated structure of thought.' None of his lecture courses were required;
yet the challenge and intellectual excitement generated by them drew large num¬
bers of students. It is one thing to have combined incisive analysis with an
impressive ability for existential communication 1n the relatively personal
situation of the classroom,but a far more difficult task to accomplish this
through the medium of the printed page. The extent to which Niebuhr achieved
the latter is Indeed remarkable and it raises the question whether an existential
posture was the sole reason for this. Wa might point to the fact that most of
his published works were first given as lectures, but there are other more basic
factors at work which are closely related to Ms existentialist posture and may
be understood as 1mpl1cations of it—although not in any necessary sense.
^Cf. Listen Pope, oj>. cit., Faith and Ethics, pp. 4-6; Hans Frei,
"Nlebuhr's Theological Background," ibid., p. 15f; D. D. Williams, "A Personal
and Theological Memoir, Christianity and Crisis, XXIII (November 25, 1963), pp.
209-213; Joseph L. Allen",1 "A Dec1s1ve~Tnfluence on Protestant Ethics," ibid.,
p. 217; E. J. Beker, "The Sovereignty of God 1n the Thought of H. Richard™"
Niebuhr" in Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrlft, XV (I960), p. 108; Charles C.
West In his review of H. R. Hiebuhr; The Responsible Self (New York; Harper &
Row, 1963) in Theology Today XXI (196?J7 pp. 519f.
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The difficulty encountered in all attempts at employing the highly per¬
sonal and "singular" categories of existentialism in theoretical work has often
been commented onJ Language,by Its very nature,1s 1n one sense of the word
essentialist because it uses unlversals. In an effort to avoid dissipating the
"subjectivity" of truth by employing ordinary descriptive language, existential¬
ist thinkers (both theological and otherwise), Influenced by Kierkegaard,have
resorted to the language of paradox. For Kierkegaard, however, in distinction
from most of his followers including Nlebuhr, the use of such language was de¬
manded at the level of knowing 1n conformity to the actual Paradox (Incarnation)
constitutive of Christianity at the level of being, and therefore was not, 1n
the first place, a special Instance of the difficulty Inherent in thinking and
2
speaking about the unique or unusual in human experience. These are Important
matters, but I am not at this point concerned with his theological method or the
type of language he employed In speaking about God, but with the structure of
his thought generally. What then are those features of his thought which pre¬
served his existentialism from being simply an interesting, but rather undisci¬
plined collection of personal observations and reflections?
There are at least two prominent features of Niebuhr's work as an author
which have disciplined, without extinguishing, the living quality of his thought
Vor an admirable attempt to deal with "the logic of the singular" 1n a
manner both philosophically rigorous and theologically adequate see J. V. L.
Casserley, The Christian Philosophy (London: Faber and Faber, 1949), esp.
Part II, 1 and 2.
%oren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments. Translated from the Danish
with Introduction and notes by David F1. Swenson (London: Oxford University
Press, New York: American-Scandinavian Foundation, 1936), chapters III-V, and
Concluding Unscientific Postscript translated from the Danish by David F. Swenson
and Walter Lowrle (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, London:
Oxford University Press, 1941), pp. 505-519.
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and which did 1n fact strengthen and sharpen the cutting edge of his existential
mode of theological and ethical reasoning. The first 1s his wide, sympathetic,
and In the main, Incisive understanding of the past life and thought of the
Church, and more particularly, the interwoven course of philosophy and theology
In Europe since the Reformation and 1n America since the beginning.^ As a young
professor at Yale he turned back with many of his generation to what has been
called the "Great Tradition* In theology. "Edwards, Pascal, Luther, Calvin,
2
Thomas, and Augustine became important." If Nlebuhr qualified much of the
content of their theologies, this 1s because he heard them 1n relation to his
acceptance of theological and ethical questions formulated by more immediate
theological and philosophical mentors, and not because he came behind 1n giving
serious and sustained attention to their thought. In all his writings one 1s
conscious that this critically loyal conversation with the past 1s going on.
It may often have been assimilated to the more Immediate concern of explicating
his own views, but 1t is nevertheless present.
3
His most widely read books are essentially historical studies. Much of
their appeal and Intrinsic value derives from the skill with which the author
was able to etch with such economy the main lineaments of a quite astonishing
range of men, movements and periods. Such mastery was not gained without the
painstaking labor of becoming directly acquainted with the details of his
"subject," but like all true art or science, depended upon this very knowledge.
1
Cf. Hans Frel, 0£. c1t., pp. 10-40.
2
"Reformation: Continuing Imperative," 0£. c1t., p. 249.
3
I refer to The Social Sources, of DenominationalIsm (1929), The Kingdom
of God in Amarlca (1937) and Christ and Culture (1951)7
^Perhaps the best example of this is Niebuhr's beautiful evocation of the
message and mission of the man to whom his own thought owed so much. See his
essay on "Soran Kierkegaard" 1n Christianity and the Existentialists, ed. Carl
D. Michalson (New York: Scrlbners, 1956), pp7~T3-4~£.
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Furthermore, like most historians whose works are read widely, his actual prac¬
tice Indicates that he did not subscribe wholeheartedly to the dogma that history
should be studied for its own sake, or that the first law of historical writing
(which after all 1s something quite different from historical research) is utter
objectivity. Niebuhr has 1n fact stated very clearly the reason for his interest
in the past.
All attempts to interpret the past are Indirect attempts to
understand the present and the future. Men try to remember the
road they have traveled 1n order that they may gain some knowledge
of the direction in which 1t is leading, for their stories are
begun without prevenient knowledge of the end. . . . What is
true of historical Interpretations in general 1s particularly true of
attempts, such as the one we are undertaking, which set out frankly
to find meaninn in the past rather than describe the details cf
what happened.'
There are, of course, dangers in such an approach which Niebuhr did not
wholly succeed in avoiding: but they do not outweigh the quality of the results
he obtained. Here it is important to distinguish between the freedom of any
thinker to adopt and adapt for his own use single concepts or even a whole
philosophy (with due acknowledgment) from the literary legacy of the past; and
the conscious fidelity demanded of an interpreter toward the thought of anyone
whom he would seek to re-present. He exercised the former freedom in Impressive
fashion: ideas and thinkers as different as the concept of loyalty developed
by Joslah Royce; or the idea of the social self propounded by George Herbert
Mead; or Henri Bergson's epistemological notion of duration (duree) and his
sociological distinction of "open" over against "closed" societies, were tailored
to fit into a consistent pattern of thought. With respect to the latter, he
sometimes tended to speak only of that which agreed with his own thought and
perhaps did not take sufficiently into account those elements which were different
^KGA, p. 1 (italics added).
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or even opposed. Particularly 1s this true of those to whom his own thought
was most Indebted. The long process of sympathetic hearing and Intellectual and
spiritual penetration seems to have become, within limits, so complete,that even
the language which he employed to represent their thought and that which he used
to set forth his own position became almost Indistinguishable.^
Inseparable from this historical awareness, and ministering more directly
to the existential quality of his work, was Ms vivid consciousness that a Chris¬
tian moralist does not theorize 1n Isolation,but within a specific theological
community whose special vocation 1t 1s to serve as an "Intellectual center of the
2
Church's life.' This does not mean that the theological community serves only
the Church, but that 1t does first recognize Itself as Church,that 1t might under
God lead the churches to understand their own faith and conduct. A particularly
important part of the moral theologian's task Is, therefore, to work at hauling
the beam from the Church's own eye that 1t might see properly to pick the speck
3
from the eye of other cultural movements and institutions. This Intellectual
service rendered to the Church by the theologian and theological community is,
according to Niebuhr, twofold. First, "it 1s that place or occasion where the
Church exercises its Intellectual love of God and neighbor" by putting aside,
*Cf, particularly Mebuhr's account of Jonathan Edwards In Christian
Ethics: Sources of the living Tradition, edited with introductions'"by Waldo
Beach and H. Richard"ri'lehuhr (Mew York: The Ronald Press Company, 1955), Ch. 13,
pp. 3S0-389, hereinafter abbreviated as CE; KGA, pp. 113-119. These two passages
on Edwards contain most of the key ideas 1n the theological foundation of Nlebuhr's
own ethics as set forth in Radical Monotheism and Western Culture, pp. 11-48.
The same 1s true to a less marked "degree™of his account ofTutHer and Calvin's
teachings, beach and Nlebuhr, 0£. clt., esp. pp. 229-245, 269-274 respectively.
^PCM, p. 107. Cf. "Toward a Definition of the Church," ibid.. pp. 19-27.
3
Cf. H. Richard Nlebuhr, "Theology—Hot Queen But Servant," The Journal
of Religion, XXXX (1955), p. 5. Reprinted with minor revisions 1n RMWC as a
"supplifflentary essay entitled, "Theology in the University," pp. 93-99.
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after the fashion of pure science, "all extraneous, private and personal Inter¬
ests while 1t concentrates on Its objects for their own sake only."^ Second,
It 1s that community which brings "reflection and criticism to bear on worship,
preaching, teaching and the care of souls," that Is, on the whole of the Church's
2
witness and service 1n the world.
While the special vocation of a theological school 1s Intellectual, 1t
1s never exclusively so. In the first place Nlebuhr's anthropological doctrine
of the "social self" not only denies that there can be any self-knowledge apart
from the presence to the self of other selves,^ but 1t also denies that the self
can ever be considered as existing or acting at any moment as a purely cognitive,
4
deliberative or emotive self. But quite apart from the fact that men are more
than their minds, the primary objects of study 1n the Church are not Ideas (much
less can the word "object" here be confused with a thing), but persons and the
g
"fundamental indestructible relations between persons." To be sure, theology
1n common with all other intellectual activity directed toward other objects In
human experience, employs the mind In abstracting, conceptualizing, comparing
and testing ideas about God and roan, sovereignty and mercy, law and gospel, et
cetera. This is Its proper work.
]PCM, pp. 110 and 109. Cf. RMWC, p. 87f.
2PCM, p. 110. Cf. pp. 110-116.
3
H. Richard Nlebuhr, "The Ego-Alter Dialectic and the Conscience," The
Journal of Philosophy, XLII (1945), p. 353; Christ and Culture (New York: Harper
and Row, Publishers, 1951, Harper Torchbook ed1t1on,~T956), pp. 241-249. Here¬
inafter cited as CC.
4Ib1d., p. 352f; RS, p. 109-111.
5MR, p. 143.
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Because Intellectual work requires such attention to the Im¬
personal, therefore 1t Is necessary that 1t be constantly corrected
anc made serviceable by activities of another sort, especially by
the worship of God, the hearing of his Word, and direct service
of the neighbor.'
Our primary relation to God 1s not by way of thought but by faith and worship.
Our primary relation to our neighbor Is not mental but moral, a relationship
of love and service.
Hence while a community which centers In worship 1s not a theo¬
logical school, a theological school In which worship Is not a
part of the dally and weekly rhythm of activity cannot remain a
center of Intellectual activity directed toward God. Preaching
and hearing the proclamation 1s not theological study; but 1f
students of theology, In all their degrees of immaturity and
maturity, do not attend to the Word addressed to them as selves
their study represents flight from God and self. A community
of service to men is not as such a theological center; but a
school that only studies man-before-God and men 1n relation
to neighbor without the accompaniment of frequent, direct en¬
counters with human Thou's, serving and being served, has become
too Irresponsible to rTeighbors to be called a divinity school.2
1 have quoted this passage from the conclusion of Niebuhr's personal reflection
on "the idea of a theological school" because it Illustrates so well how he
sought to maintain a balance between theory and practice, reflection and action.
He was convinced that much needless debate and confusion ensued in theo¬
logical work (especially in America) due to inadequate theories of the relation
between theory and practice. He rejected "the Intellectualist theory" according
to which "all human action begins with theory, with an understanding of Ideas
presented to the mind; the movement is from Idea to action, from thought to
voluntary deed."3 This is one reason why he rejected both the telecloglcal and
deontological patterns of thinking in ethics—he regarded them both, especially
4






pragmatlsts, developed principally by American philosophers, he regarded as
equally erroneous. Here theoretical activity 1s thought of as "an affair of
rationalizations, essentially irrelevant to practice."^ Practice tends to be
regarded as 1n itself sufficient or at least "success" tends to be understood as
the criterion for the determination of valid theory. Both are wrong 1n Nlebuhr's
view because they violate his basic understandlng of what constitutes valid
reasoning generally and moral reasoning 1n particular. And 1t 1s here that we
catch sight of that mode of reasoning by means of which Nlebuhr endeavored to
reduplicate 1n the mind of his readers the Inescapable alternation between re¬
flection and action which 1s at every moment an essential characteristic of
huftwin existence. Hlebuhr rejected these two theories precisely because the rela¬
tion between thought and action was conceived as moving 1n one direction only,
from thought to action (Intellectuallsm) or from action to thought (pragmatlsm).
A more adequate position according to Nlebuhr must embrace both in a back and
forth dialectic.
Reflection Is never the first action, though 1n personal and
communal life we can never go back to a moment 1n which action
has been unmodified by reflection. . . . Reflection precedes,
accompanies and follows action but this does not make it the
source or end of action. Reflection as a necessary ingredient
1n all activity 1s neither prior nor subservient to other motions
of the soul. ... It serves them In Its own way by abstracting
and relating, by discerning pattern and idea, by criticism and
comparison. It 1s served by a will that disciplines, a love that
guides, by perception of Incarnate being, by hope of fulfil Intent.*1
If it 1s kept In mind that Hlebuhr made these observations 1n the context of
personal and rather tentative thoughts about the nature and purpose of theologi¬
cal education, then fuller justification for then will not be expected. Without
doubt they stand 1n need of further explanation. But 1t 1s not without value
]PCM, p. 127 2Ib1d., p. 127f.
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as an Introductory' statement of the type of reasoning he was to develop In
greater detail later In dealing with moral experience, decision and action.^
The sum of his published work 1s not great—seven si 1m volumes, only
two of which exceed 200 pages. There are 1n addition a moderate number of essays
?
scattered about In various symposia and less than 50 articles. Some of these
shorter pieces embody original, profound and provacatlve thinking on more
3
specialized topics. Each of his books 1s quite different from the others, not
merely 1n the obvious change of subject matter, but because he did not long re¬
main satisfied with his previous results and wished to explore new ways of think¬
ing about what were essentially the same theological and ethical problems. In
this respect Nlebuhr's thought bears comparison with that of Troeltsch to whom
he owed so much. Troeltsch once remarked that,unlike most German theologians
and philosophers,he had achieved no systematic presentation, but he supposed
that the progression of thought traced by the chronological order of his book
might be considered a sort of system.
*Cf. Chapter III below.
2
For a complete bibliography of his published works see "A Bibliography
of H. Richard Nlebuhr's Writings," compiled by Raymond P. Morris, 1957, revised
1964, Faith and Ethics, pp. 291-306.
Particularly Important are the following: "Religious Realism In the
Twentieth Century," Religious Realism, edited by D. C. Macintosh (Hew York:
Macmlllan, 1931), ppT"413-428; "Evangel1cal and Protestant Ethics," The Heritage
of the Reformation: Essays Coamiemoratlng the Centennial of Eden Theological
Seminary, edited by E. J. F. Arndt (New York: Richard R. Smith, 1950), pp. 211-
219; "The Center of Value," Moral Principles of Action: Man's Ethical Imperative,
edited by R. N. Anshen (flew York: Harper, 195?), pp. 162-175; "On the Nature
of Faith," Religious experience and Trutfc: A Symposium, edited by Sidney Hook
(Mew York: "Mew York University PressTT^l), pp. 93-102; "The Mature and Exis¬
tence of God: A Protestant View," Motive IV (1943), pp. 13-15, 43-46; "The Ego-
Alter Dialectic and the Conscience," Journal of Philosophy, ILII (1945), pp. 352-
359; "The Idea of Covenant and American Democracy," Churcn History XXIII (1954),
pp. 126-135; "The Protestant Movement and Democracy ih~"th"e UhTted States,"
Religion In American Life, Vol. I: The Shaping of American Religion, ed1ted by
James Ward Smith and A. Leiand Jamison (hrlnceton, New Jersey: Princeton Univer¬
sity Press, 1961), pp. 20-71.
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I have no original system, and 1n that I am different from
most other German philosophers. To be sure, I have such 1n the
background, but only that 1t may be corrected constantly as a
result of the Individual project. Consequently, I am not able
to display the system 1n such an unfinished condition, but only
explain 1t by the sequence of my books—which, In the case of.
the systematically oriented person, 1s also a kind of system.
Nlebuhr could very well have described the course of his own thinking 1n a simi¬
lar manner. There is a system, but as Troeltsch remarked of himself, "It Is 1n
the background" and was "corrected constantly as a result of the Individual
project." For the same reason the wholeness of Nlebuhr's thinking does not come
to view 1n any one book. It would not be too much to say that the notion of
dialogue or response which is such a prominent feature of his ethical theory
1s exemplified 1n the progress of his own thought. Each "Individual project"
1s a response to what had gone before.
In the presentation of his thought, Niebuhr gave to all his work, even
his more ephemeral occasional pieces, the same meticulous attention to struc¬
ture and wording. In his review of the first volume of Paul TllUch's Systematic
Theology he observed that the author "has not spared himself the final pain of
seeking the exact formulation his thought requires."2 This must surely be seen
as a confession of the rigorous standard he had set for himself. He set forth
his position in carefully balanced and elegantl/ tailored sentences which
carried forward a well organized and tightly controlled argument. Reading his
work 1s like looking at a well proportioned structure. One 1s never conscious
of the framework. The prose 1s a delight to read for he was not afraid to use
colorful non-technical language to convey what were often quite complex and
^Ernst Troeltsch, "Heine Biicher," Gesammelte Schriften (Tublnqen: J. C. B.
Mohr, 1925), IV, p. 3.
^Theology. LVI (1953), p. 227.
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dlfflcult patterns of thought. And he knew how to relieve the pressure of sus¬
tained exposition or argument by coining arresting aphorisms, or by introducing
a simple example, or by drawing an analogy from some well known historical or
cultural source.
The literary merit of Hiebuhr's writing is a delightful "work of super¬
erogation" not always found in philosophers or Protestant theologians. The
elegant, colorful and imaginative manner 1n which he presented his thought makes
persuasive, perhaps too persuasive, arguments that involve highly sophisticated
and subtly Interwoven philosophical and theological Ideas; arguments and ideas
which must here be somewhat rudely unclothed and exposed to charitable, careful,
yet critical scrutiny; a procedure which we may be sure Nlebuhr himself would
have been the first to encourage.
In his unpublished dissertation of 1924 Hiebuhr had observed that
"Troeltsch did not live to write a systematic exposition of his philosophy of
religion, as he had purposed to do. His final large work, The Historical
Standpoint and Its Problems (1922), of which he was able to finish only the first
part, appears to be largely 1n the nature of a prolegomena."^ It 1s a rather
striking fact that the same general judgment mutatis mutandis should now be made
of Hiebuhr's own work, he, too, did not live to write a systematic exposition
2
of his Christian ethics, as he had purposed. Furthermore, his final small essay
Hi. Richard Nlebuhr, Ernst Troeltsch's Philosophy of Religion, p. 10.
2
James M. Gustafson points out 1n his "introduction" to The Responsible
Self (pp. 6-41) that "the present book does not contain materials that woul"3"~
naturally have appeared in a second volume dealing with 'The Principles of
Christian Action,' and a third, 'Christian Responsibility In Common life,'
dealing with the interpretation of marriage and family, politics and economics,
war and International relations 1n the light of the Idea of responsibility and
the theological principles." Ibid., p. 9. Cf. also the "Preface" by his son,
Professor Richard R. Nlebuhr.
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The Responsible Self (1963) 1s also, on his own accounting, largely 1n the nature
of a prolegomena to Christian ethics.* "I shall attempt," he told his audience
at Glasgow University,
to present to you in these lectures a summation and an ordering
of some of the reflections on the moral life that have developed
1n ayy mind during a long period of teaching in the field of
Christian ethics. In what I shall set before you 1n the way of
an analysis of the responsibility of selfhood I shall be dealing
not with the subject of Christian ethics proper but with an Intro¬
duction to that subject.2
Furthermore, 1t must be acknowledged as his son, Professor Richard R. Nlebuhr,
among others has pointed out, that "while all of his books, from the time of
The Social Sources of Denominational ism onward, bespeak themes and problems
that were integral to his heart and mind, none of them directly Incorporates
the fundamental architectonic Ideas of the discipline of systematic ethics Into
which he had poured the largest part of his energies. If this Is so then we
must ask whether the purpose of this study—the attempt to give analytical ex¬
position of Klebubr's theological ethics—1s really possible?^ It 1s my con¬
tention that 1t is; and that while 1t must be regretted that we are denied
Nlebuhr's own mature statement of the systematic theological ethics which he
had taught and reflected on over many years, that nevertheless, what he has
wr1tten invites critical appraisal and provides sufficient material from which
a relatively clear understanding may be gained of the basis, method and scope
of his ethics, and of the principles and patterns of analysis which Informed 1t.
1Ib1d., p. 86. 2Ib1d., p. 4.
3Ibid., p. 1.
4Cf. Gustafson's earlier judgment: "Until his theological ethics are
systematically reduced by him to print and paper no one can adequately or
accurately deal with Nlebuhr's ethics and its Implications." "Christian Ethics
and Social Policy," Faith and Ethics, p. 120.
CHAPTER II
THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF VALUE
Two different patterns of analysis and Interpretation have been devel¬
oped by H. Richard Nlebuhr 1n the course of his critical reflections on the
character of moral experience and action. In the first scheme he developed a
relational theory of value around the concept of "the center of value." Here
he was led to reflect 1) on the plurality and relativity of values; 2) on the
many different centers of value 1n relation to which judgments about what
counts as good or evil, right or wrong are made; 3) on the possibility, or
better, the necessity of finding some ultimate regulative center of value that
would unify without denying the relativity of all penultimate values. The
second scheme 1s a relational theory of action centered on the concept of
"responsibility." Here he attempted to develop a theory of human moral exper¬
ience and action—based on a distinctive Image of man as "a responsible self."
He believed that this was an alternative to the Images of man which are pre¬
supposed by teleologlcal {goal oriented) or deontologlcal (law oriented)
theories. Nlebuhr argued that this theory 1s not only more compatible with
what he saw as a developing "anthropological consensus" among modern social
scientists,but 1s also Important hermeneutlcally for understanding the Biblical
ethos generally and the place and function of Jesus Christ 1n Christian ethics
1n particular.^ This chapter will seek to set forth the first of these




The relational value theory of H. Richard Niebuhr is contained prlncl-
1 2
pally in two essays, "Value Theory and Theology" and "The Center of Value."
This Is not to depy that in the broadest sense all of Niebuhr's writings—
which have as their object a constructive account of the relations between
man and God and other men—are concerned with values. But It is chiefly 1n
these two essays that Niebuhr has given a sustained and explicit description
3
of, and justification for, the theory of value which everywhere structures
4
his theological ethics. The procedure adopted here will be to take "The
Center of Value" as the primary document and to use "Value Theory and Theology",
and other sources, Insofar as they corroborate or further elucidate the exposi¬
tion given there. The latter essay has as Its primary objective to expose the
chief common weaknesses of most types of value theologies developed by theolo¬
gians since Kant. Only in a brief section at the close of the essay does
1VTT, pp. 93-116.
2
An essay 1n Moral Principles of Action, ed. R. N. Anshen (New York:
Harper and Row, 1952), pp. 162-175. Revised and reprinted as a supplementary
essay In Radical Monotheism and Western Culture (London: Faber and Faber,
1961), pp. 100-llJI Revised version hereinafter cited as CV (1961); original
cited as CV (1952).
3
A "theory of value" is ordinarily understood to be an attempt to iso¬
late that generic feature of value which is common to moral, aesthetic,
religious or other types of value.
4
The importance of Niebuhr's theory of value for understanding his
thought was not missed by the most perceptive writers who contributed to the
Festschrift. Faith and Ethics, ed. Paul Ramsey (New York: Harper, 1957).
Cf. especially Hans WT~Fre1, "The Theology of H. Richard Niebuhr," pp. 65-116;
Paul Ramsey, "The Transformation of Ethics," pp. 140-172; George Schrader,
"Value and Valuation," pp. 173-204. In his autobiographical essay, "Reforma¬
tion: Continuing Imperative," Christian Century. LXXVII (1960), p. 248,
Niebuhr observes that he has ". . . workecf considerably at the problem of the
nature and meaning of 'value* and at efforts to understand the basic rela¬
tion of the self to that on which 1t 1s absolutely dependent."
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j&Hebuhr suggest his alternative position which is given a much clearer and more
detailed treatment in "The Center of Value."
Niebuhr's relational theory of value consists of three principal theses.
First, value is a function of any relation between two or more "existent
beings." Secondly, a value system exists wherever any being functions as a
"center of value" for an Indeterminate number of other beings. This being 1s
properly described as a "center of value" because it exists as the final or
ultimate value and only in relation to it is it possible to construct a con¬
sistent system of value judgments. Thirdly, there 1s only one adequate ulti¬
mate "center of value" and that is the God of "radical monotheism." Only this
being, the One beyond all the many rather than one of the many, is the absolute
center of value in relation to which all other finite beings have value and
are constituted one realm of being.
Each of these theses will now be examined separately. The transition
from the exposition of thesis two to thesis three will be effected by a dis¬
cussion of Niebuhr's critique of the value theory characteristically employed
1n the liberal Protestant theological tradition. In two final sections a pro¬
hibition (disallowing discrimination between the relative value of finite
value systems), which Niebuhr believed to be necessarily entailed by the
acceptance of a monotheistic value theory, is discussed in the light of other
statements or arguments of his which appear to be Inconsistent with it.
Objective Relativism
The first important objective of Niebuhr's value theory 1s to establish
the claim that value is a quality of the relations which obtain between
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ex1stent beings. This means negatively that he does not seek to define value
as a property of any entity either actual or Ideal, nor does he define It
as some relation said to exist between two entitles. He does not think that
value can be defined. Rather, he Is concerned with the more cautious task of
describing the conditions under which values appear. "Its [relational value
theory] fundamental observation 1s this: that value 1s present whenever one
existent being with capacities and potentialities confronts another existence
that limits or completes or complements 1t."^ Values are relational by virtue
of the fact that they are coextensive with, and dependent on,the relational
structure of existence.
In "The Center of Value" Nlebuhr develops this theory 1n two ways.
First,he analyzes various value theorists' views and attempts to show that
whatever their position 1s theoretically as "objectlvlsts" or "subjectlvlsts,"
when they deal with substantive moral problems, they operate with a relational
theory of value "which defines good by reference to a being for which other
o
beings are good.""* Nlebuhr then goes on to argue that 1f this 1s the case then
relational value thinking 1s really a third theory of value which needs to be
made explicit,and argued as a theory 1n Its own right "without reference to
3
these [objectlvlst and subjectlvlst] complicating strains of thought."
CV (1961), p. 103 (Italics added). As Schrader has noted, Nlebuhr's
position Is unexceptionally relational and the above statement should be
qualified by'Tome such phrase as "value 1s present only under these condi¬
tions." "Value and Valuation," FE, p. 176.
2Ib1d., p. 100. Cf. pp. 100-103.
3Ibid., p. 103. Cf. pp. 103-109.
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Among objectivistsJ 6. E. Moore, for example, has argued that "good"
1s the name of a simple, non-natural, unanalyzable property known Intuitively
2
u1n abstraction from every relation." The "objectivity" of "goodness" rests,
for Moore,upon a direct private unmediated awareness of intrinsic value. But,
says Niebuhr, when Moore turns to a discussion of the practical problem of
identifying those things which possess intrinsic goodness and asserts that
"the pleasures of human Intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiful objects are
3
by far the most valuable things which we can know or Imagine," he has shifted
his ground from a purely objective theory of intrinsic value to a relational
theory, for "he has posited a being with consciousness and sodality as that
for which these things are good, not as desired, but as desirable, as neces-
4
sarlly complementary to its existence." There 1s,then,an inconsistency
between Moore's meta-ethlcal theory of the meaning and justification of the
term "good" and his normative theory of what Is good for man.
A similar inconsistency shows up 1n the thinking of "subjectlvlst"
theorists. According to Niebuhr, a transition from subjective relativism to
5
objective relativism can be observed in the thinking of Moritz SchUck. On
^Cf. Alasdair Maclntyre's remark that "Moore himself staked everything
on the appeal to objectivity." A Short History of Ethics (London: Rout!edge
and Kegan Paul, 1967), p. 257.
2CV (1961), p. 100.
^Ibid. Quoted but not cited by Niebuhr.
4Ibid.
Problems of Ethics, translated by David Ripun from the original German
ed1t1on,"~Fragen der Ethik, Vienna, 1930 (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, 1939; Paper edition, New York: Dover Publications, 1962). Schllck's
study is perhaps the most sustained and perceptive work 1n ethics from a
member of the school of logical positivists. His significance lies in the
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the one hand he asserts that the Idea of something being valuable or desirable
for Its own sake Is meaningless. A theory of value must concern Itself solely
with the question of describing what 1s desired for Its own sake. "Value 1s
nothing but a name for the dormant pleasure possibilities of the valuable
object."1 But when Schllck, too, addresses himself to the question as to
which things are good, he chooses "kindness" as that good which corresponds to
man's capacity for happiness, not because it 1s desired by all men, but because
2
1t is "1n conformity with human nature." Though Schllck began by making value
wholly relative to desire, he did not stop at simply recommending kindness as
an object of desire but declared it to be valuable for all men.
The point of Niebuhr's interpretation of these representatives of
"objective" and "subjective" theories of value seems to be that while, 1n
their theories about the meaning and nature of value as such, each denies that
value Is a function of the relation of one existent to another, when they turn
to the specifically ethical question of identifying what is good for man they
inconsistently, but rightly, employ a relational theory. The objectlvist 1s
right Insofar as he denies the subjectivist's identification of value with that
which 1s desired by any being. The subject!vist is right insofar as he denies
the objectlvlst's contention that value Is some kind of self-subslstent entity.
fact that unlike his fellow logical pos1t1v1sts Relchenbach or Carnap, he did
not view ethics as a non-sc1ent1f1c study. "... the book may be called
scientific, for . . . true judgments may be systematized; they constitute a
part of science ... the scientific field to which they belong 1s psychology."
Ibid., pp. xx-xx1.
^Ibld., p. 102. Quoted but not cited by Nlebuhr 1n CV (1961), p. 102.
2CV (1961), p. 102. Cf. Ibid., p. 105; Schllck, Problems of Ethics,
pp. 202-209.
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From the point of view of a relational value theory 1t is necessary to deny
that value 1s relative to the desires, rather than the needs,or capacities, or
potentialities of any being; but this kind of relational objectivity 1s not
what the objectlvists have in mind when they introduce the distinction
between essence and existence, the mental and the material, and identify
1
value with the former and deny it to the latter. Furthermore, according to
the relational value theorist,it 1s just as important to deny that value is
some ideal entity or essence and so not understood as grounded in the inter¬
relation of being with being; but this kind of relational objectivity is not
what subjectivists mean when they declare value to be the function of non-
2
rational desire and deny that 1t 1s present to other kinds of relations.
These very different attempts of objectivlsts and subjectivists to
analyze and justify their claims that value Is a "property" of something should
not obscure a fatal consequence which both theories share. They both end with
an essentially non-rational definition of value: The first because value 1s
made the object of an Ineffable Intuition, the second because it 1s made the
object of Irrational desire. Thus,both positions make coramunlcation about the
meaning of any value, and the analysis and assessment of value-relations
3
between existents impossible. But a relational value theory, while 1t does
not define values 1n the sense of making them Identical with some psychological
state or some "non-natural" property, does define the conditions under which
anything may be said to have value.




Niebuhr is, then,offering a general theory of value which is not
limited solely to moral good or to human good,but embraces every situation In
which value Is being realized or denied.^ The value term "good" is applicable
to any situation in which the needs of a being are fulfilled. This would
include, for example, the goodness of Ideas for minds, the adjustment of living
organisms to their environment, as well as the relations between a self and
other selves. Furthermore, "truth," "beauty," "goodness" or "god" are neither
real nor valuable simply as abstract Ideas. "The question about value as a
question of tire valuing mind or of the needful organism is always a question
2
about being having value." A consistently relational theory of value insists
on the inseparability of being and value and on the priority of being over
value both in the wqy in which values are,and are known.
The following paragraph is the clearest statement of the first thesis
of Niebuhr's theory, and will serve as a summary of what has been said thus
far and prepare the way for further analysis.
Relational value theory understands that being and value are
inseparably connected but that value cannot be Identified with a
certain mode of being or any being considered in isolation,
whether 1t be Ideal or actual. Value is present wherever being
confronts being, wherever there 1s becoming 1n the midst of plural
Interdependent, and Interacting existences. It 1s not a function
of being as such but of being In relation to being. It 1s there¬
fore universal, co-extensive with the realm of being, and yet
not identifiable with any being, even universal being. For if
anything existed simply 1n itself and by itself, value would not
be present. Value 1s the good-for-ness of being for being in
their reciprocity, their animosity, and their mutual aid. Value
cannot be defined or Intuited 1n Itself for 1t has no existence
1n itself; and nothing is valuable 1n Itself, but everything has
value, positive or negative, 1n Its relations. Thus value IS3
not a relation but arises In the relations of being to being.
W, pp. 113-114.
3CV (1961), p. 107.
2Ib1d., p. 114
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This statement makes It plain that Niebuhr Intends to develop a theory
of value that 1s both relational and objective. His analysis of representa¬
tive "objectlvlst" and "subjectlvlst" theories doubtless suggested to him the
possibility of a third theory which would Include what he judged to be the
strengths, while avoiding the weaknesses, of each. Relational value thinking
only comss to expression among these theorists 1n the determination of practi¬
cal affairs but Niebuhr proposes 1t as a general theory in Its own right. The
theory which results he has called "objective relativism."* An adequate theory
will insist that values are relational by virtue of the fact that they are 1n
every case dependent upon the relational structure of existence. The value,
positive or negative, of any being 1s not a function of that being's desire
but of Its relation to the needs, capacities and potentialities of another
being. "Good 1s a term which not only can but which . . . must be applied to
that which meets the needs, which fits the capacity, which corresponds to the
p
potentialities of an existent being." Value 1s relative to the being in ques¬
tion, but to its organic,or structural, or constitutive needs, rather than to
its desires or consciousness of needs. For example, judgments about whether
or not a particular food or poison 1s of positive value to an Individual's
survival cannot be accurately determined by knowledge of that being's desire
^Ibid., p. 113. Cf. "A more adequate value-theory would recognize,
first of all, the relativity of values without prejudice to their objectivity.
The Interpretation of values as relative to structure and organic needs,
rather than to desire and consciousness, provides for such an objective
relativism." VTT, p. 113 et passim (Italics added).
2
CV (1961), p. 103. Cf. VTT, pp. 106-107. "An act or a person 1s
valued as good not because It or he possesses goodness as such but because
loyalty to a standard and a system of preferences corresponding to actual needs
are discovered." Ibid., p. 114.
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for one or the other. "What Is fitting, useful, and complementary to an exist¬
ent can be determined only If disinterestedness, or abstraction from desire 1s
practised and the nature and tendency of the being 1n question are studied."^
The exposition of Nlebuhr's relational value theory has to this point
been concerned exclusively with value as a function of an external relation
between two or more beings and their ability to fulfil or deny the objective
needs constitutive to the existence of the other. But such existent beings,
he recognizes, are also 1n a state of becoming such that there 1s a relation
between being and becoming, or 1n Aristotelian terms, the actuality and the
potentiality of any being. Having recognized these two kinds of relations—
the external relation between one existent being and another and the Internal
relation between actual and potential states of the same being—1t might be
thought that Niebuhr would recognize that a being may have value for Itself
quite apart from any value or disvalue it may have for another. In this way
Nlabuhr would consistently maintain the relativity and objectivity of all
values 1n the only senses In which he was concerned to defend these terms, while
at the same time denying that value is any kind of Ideal essence or property
of any kind. He does not, in fact, say this. Rather, he Insists that the
values which arise for a being between present and future states of Itself are
themselves grounded exclusively 1n that being's value for another being. He
everywhere Insists that every being Is always either good-for or bad-for other
beings, and has value for Itself solely by virtue of Its relation to other
^Ibid.., Cf. VTT, pp. 113-114. It was precisely this failure to practice
the disinterested method of the modern sciences which has, according to Niebuhr,
been the chief error common to much Protestant theology and ethics since
Kant. Ibid., pp. 97-101.
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belngs. There 1s no value present 1n the relation between actual and potential
states of any being which 1s Independent of the value which that being has for
some other being.
In this situation of being, 1n process of becoming itself
(always as social self) and among others becoming themselves (also
as social), value appears 1n many relations of which two may be
particularly distinguished. On the one hand, that 1s good for a
being which, separate from Itself, assists 1t In Its realization
of its potentialities. On the other hand, the state of realization
(the excellent or virtuous state) 1s good. This latter good 1s
also a "good-for-ness," not primarily as a good for the becoming
self but as a good for other beings 1n Its whole community, and
then secondarily, In.the endless Interactions of self and others,
a good-for-the-self.1
The above passage contains the first four sentences of the most ex¬
tensively revised paragraph In the republished version of "The Center of Value"
(1961). Nlebuhr acknowledges that the most Important revisions were made
in response to an Incisive critique of the essay, as originally published, by
a Yale colleague, Professor George Schrader. Schrader had Interpreted Nlebuhr
as arguing that value does not depend "exclusively upon the relation between
two or more beings, for a being may be self-related . . . a being may have
2
value for Itself or for another being." Nlebuhr had,however. Intended to argue
that a]X value 1s grounded 1n external relations and that any value realized
In self-relatedness 1s derivative and everywhere dependent on that being's
relations with other beings. In an Important note to the paragraph being dis¬
cussed Nlebuhr makes this clear.
In an excellent critique of this essay as originally published,
Professor George Schrader seems to have missed the point I am
trying to make here and so to have been misled elsewhere 1n
(1961), p. 104.
2"Value and Valuation," FE, p. 178. Cf. especially pp. 179-191.
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1nterpret1ng my thought. . . . Since others may encounter dif¬
ficulties 1n understanding what I am trying to say I shall point
out I do not wish to maintain that there is value 1n the self's
relation to Itself (or to Its potential self) apart from Its
relation to others . . . the basis of this relational value
theory is not the.relation of existence to essence, 1t 1s that
of self to other.
2
He did, however, also make the judgment that his own statement was "Inadequate."
It might be more accurate to say that while the over-all thrust of his essay
does emphasize the primacy of external value relations there are a few explicit
statements which provide credible support for the line of Interpretation taken
by Schrader. That this 1s so,may readily be shown by placing alongside of the
passage quoted above the same passage from the earlier version (1952).
In this situation of being, 1n process of becoming Itself
(always as social self) and among others becoming themselves (also
as social), value appears In many relations of which two may be
particularly distinguished. On the one hand, that 1s good for a
being which, separate from Itself, assists 1t In Its realization
of Its potentialities. On the other hand, the state of realiza¬
tion (the excellent or virtuous state) 1s good. This latter good
is also a "good-for-ness," not primarily as a good for the
becoming self but as a good for other beings 1n Its whole com¬
munity, and then secondarily, In the endless Interactions of self
and others, a gocd-for-the-self.
In this situation of being, 1n process of becoming Itself,
among other beings similarly Involved 1n becoming themselves,
value appears 1n at least two dimensions. On the one hand,
that 1s good for a being which, separate from Itself, assists
1t 1n Its realization of Its potentialities. On the other hand,
the state of realization, the essence which the being tends to
realize In Its existence. 1s Its goo?.3
The Italicized sentence Is the one seized upon by Schrader 1n support of his
(1961), p. 105, n. 1.
2Ib1d.
3Ib1d., p. 104.
4CV (1952), p. 166. (Italics added.)
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interpretatlon. This sentence 1s omitted 1n the later version (1961) and the
fourth sentence 1n this version did not appear at all 1n the earlier version
(1952). Nlebuhr does not assert that the "good-for-the-self" 1s a separate
and distinct kind of good arising as a function of the relation between
existence and essence, as Schrader was understandably encouraged to believe.
Value 1s, Nlebuhr insists, grounded solely In the relation between beingsJ
Schrader was not unaware of this emphasis—1t could hardly be overlooked—
2
but he sees It as an unfortunate contradiction Into which Nlebuhr had fallen.
His further contention that Nlebuhr seeks to resolve this Inconsistency by
"allowing self-relatedness to count as an Instance of the relation of being
3
to being" Is, so far as I can determine, without any clear support.
Nlebuhr 1s critical of what he calls the "Aristotelian form of rela¬
tional value theory" precisely because there the realization of the self's
potentiality (the virtuous state) is declared to be a greater value than the
value which the self has for other selves. This cannot be the case Nlebuhr
argues, because the fulfillment of the self's potentiality 1s at every point
dependent on Its being good for others. His theory 1s opposed to all con¬
sciously self-rea!1zat1on1st ethics. We may say, to paraphrase a biblical
passage which Nlebuhr was fond of quoting, seek first to be good-for the being
^Nlebuhr's effort at self-correction Is well seen 1n the following
Illustration of this point:
CV (1952) p. 166. ". . . education 1s good for the child 1n Its move¬
ment toward the realization of Its capacities;"
CV (1961) p. 104. ". . . education Is good for the child 1n Its move¬
ment toward the realization of Its capacities for activities beneficial to
human society, other selves, and other beings 1n general;"
2Schrader, "Value and Valuation," FE, p. 186.
3Ib1d.
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who Is other than yourself and the realization of the potentialities of your
own being will be added to 1t. The realization of our own potentialities 1s
Important but they should never be pursued as ends 1n themselves. He does not
deny that virtues like honesty, Integrity or kindness, are goods for the self,
I.e., virtues. The real Issue concerns the ground of their goodness and this
ground 1s not the self's relationship to some future state of Itself but 1t
1s grounded 1n Its relationship to others. In a note appended to the revision
of this essay he states this position In categorical fashion.
The theory of value I am seeking to present 1s through and through
social; I know of no self-relatedness apart from other-relatedness
or self-al1enat1on apart from alienation from the other. Poten¬
tiality 1n the whole realm of being 1s an Important component 1n
the situation 1n which there Is value but the basis of this rela¬
tional value theory Is not the relation of existence to essence,
1t 1s that of self to other.'
In the original text, hov/ever, he had not expressed himself so categorically
and therefore he allowed for, or even encouraged, the idea that he in fact
sought to ground value 1n both the relations of a being to one or more beings
and in self-relatedness.
Nlebuhr's determination to ground value exclusively in external rela¬
tions entails the rejection,or at least a serious modification of, the tradi¬
tional distinction between Intrinsic and Instrumental value. In ordinary
usage intrinsic value 1s that which belongs to the real, Inherent,or essential
nature of a thing independent of any external circumstance or relation.
CV (1961), p. 105, n. 1. Here Nlebuhr draws attention to the fact
that his relational theory of value 1s consistent with his relational theory
of selfhood. His theory of value 1s "through and through social" because his
notion of selfhood 1s Itself relational. Self-existence depends upon the
mediation of other selves. How this Is so and the implications of Nlebuhr's
concept of the self must be developed 1n more detail later. Cf. especially
his essay, "Ego-Alter Dialectic and the Conscience," Journal of Philosophy
XLII ,(1945), pp. 352-359.
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Instruroental value on the other hand,1s not Intrinsic but extrinsic,or
mediated,and derives Its value Insofar as 1t 1s a means to the attainment of
some further Instrumental or Intrinsic value. What application does this have
to the present question of the value which 1s present 1n the relation between
present and future states of the same being? Any being that aids another 1n
the realization of Its own essential possibilities has Instrumental value,
while the state of realization 1s an Intrinsic value. That the distinction
between Intrinsic and instrumental value is useful for analytical purposes,
Nlebuhr allows, but he declares that "these designations are misleading" when
they are employed 1n the Interest of "a conscious flnalism for which some
goods may be designated as Intrinsic goods, others as Instrumental."^ Niebuhr
cannot allow that there are some goods which are Intrinsic and some goods merely
instrumental*because he 1s not arguing that some, or most, but alj[ value is
present as a function of relations. In one sense the distinction 1s Inappli¬
cable, since there 1s no such thing as any being having only intrinsic value;
nor 1s there any such thing as a being having merely instrumental value.
2
In another sense "every good 1s an end and every good a means." Every
existent 1s 1n a state of becoming, but the value which 1s consequent upon
the realization of any being's potentialities 1s not 1n the first Instance a
1Ib1d., p. 104.
2
Ibid.. p. 105. It will be recalled that among philosophers John
Dewey In Reconstruction 1n Philosophy (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1948) enlarged
edition, had urged similar criticisms. "Olalectlcally, the distinction 1s
interesting and seems harmless. But carried Into practice 1t has an Import
that is tragic. Historically, 1t has been the source and justification of hard
and fast differences between Ideal goods on the one side and material goods on
the other." Ibid., p. 170. Both Nletuhrand Dewey argue that all values are
both means and ends and nothing ever has value solely as means or end.
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good for that being but 1s first a good for all other existent beings and only
by "Indirection" or reflexlvely, Is 1t a good for that being.1 Self-realization
1s a sort of by-product of a being existing as good-for some being external
to Itself.
Relat1ve Centers of Value
The first thesis which Miebuhr advanced declares values to be a func¬
tion of the relation between beings. All values are therefore "relative,"
dependent on the relational structure of existence. But they are relative In
more than one sense of that slippery word. Nlebuhr eschews the kind of
psychological relativism for which nothing is either good or bad, but think-
1ng (or desiring or willing, and so on) makes it so. Values are objectively
relativlstic in the sense that value 1s present to, or may be predicated of,
only those situations 1n which one or more beings are related, such that they
either fulfil or deny, meet or do not meet, the needs, capacities and poten¬
tialities of the other. But values are relativlstic in another sense. Value
judgments about what 1s good or bad, right or wrong are always made from the
standpoint of a self which consciously or unconsciously accepts some other
being as a center of value. In this sense values are "dogmatically relativlstic"
in that "1t 1s necessary to take one's standpoint with or 1n some being
accepted as the center of value 1f one Is to construct anything like a consls-
-J
tent system of value Judgments and determinations of what 1s right.
1nSelf-states are goods first of all for other selves, or other beings
and only by Indirection goods-for-self." CV (1961), p. 105.
2CV (1961), p. Ill; VTT, p. 106.
3CV (1961), p. 109; Cf. VTT, pp. 105-106. The term "dogmatic" here
does not refer to a conclusion asserted on the basis of little or no evidence.
But 1t 1s used in Its pristine sense of referring to a "given," a presupposi¬
tion accepted as true, from which all reasoning proceeds.
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A11 relational theories of value operate with some "center of value,"
some being or beings 1n relation to which all judgments about goodness and
badness, Tightness and wrongness are made. And Nlebuhr claims that one of the
main advantages of the relational theory of value over the "objectlvlst" and
"subjectlvlst" positions, 1s that 1t makes possible an understanding of how
claims about goodness and badness, Tightness and wrongness, can be rationally
ordered and criticized.*
The Idea Nlebuhr has 1n mind may be Illustrated with an example he
himself has presented. The value center of an evolutionary ethic will be
life Itself, and questions about what 1s good or evil, right or wrong will 1n
the final analysis be questions about what 1s good-for-l1fe. All value judg¬
ments are made relative to this center. Life Is the value-center rather than
the value: "living beings call forth reverence because they are functions of
2
the w1ll-to-l1ve." Every being which demonstrates the same will to live
which man himself experiences 1s to be valued, but that which is not living
1s by definition excluded as not having value. If 1t Is objected that vitalism
thus arbitrarily excludes "reverence for beings, Inorganic perhaps, perhaps
3
Ideal" then this can only be remedied either by replacing "the will to live"
as the value-center with some more Inclusive principle—which will Include
the Inorganic and the Ideal as sharers 1n both the realm of the real and the
realm of the valuable—or by recognizing sane other value system besides the
Hfe-centered system,and thus deny that the w1ll-to-Hve 1s "the absolute




fundamental principle of the moral."' It 1s not possible therefore to raise
the question of what life 1s good-for within such a value system because the
question presupposes that some other center of value has been accepted other
2
than, or 1n addition to, that of life.
Two points should be noted here. First, 1t 1s possible to make criti¬
cal evaluations that are true or false concerning the way In which some
external reality actually aids or frustrates the central being and 1s thus
judged to be either good or bad. This statement focuses on Nlebuhr's concern
for an ethic that 1s objective and rational. On the other hand,he seems to
be arguing that it 1s not possible to establish rationally the priority or
primacy of one being over against other beings as a center of value or starting
point of any value system. Theoretically at least, Nlebuhr claims, "there can
3
be as many value systems as there are beings 1n existence," and 1t 1s not
possible to rationally grade or rank these various value-systems as to their
relative value in relation to each other.4 Nlebuhr 1s sure that no empirical
or phenomenologlcal inquiry can demonstrate that just this being should be
regarded as the center of a universal system of value. Nor 1s 1t possible to
demonstrate by purely rational means that values have some kind of Ideal exis¬
tence to which non-1deal exlstents must conform. Rather, Nlebuhr asserts that
every system of value necessarily begins "with an act of decision for some
5
being as value-center."
^Albert Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought, 1933, p. 108; cited
by Nlebuhr RMWC, p. 37, n. 9.
2CV (1961), p. 110. RMWC, pp. 36-37.
3Ib1d. 4Ib1d., p. 112.
5Ib1d. (Italics added.)
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The Idea of a plurality of value systems 1s the most conspicuous fea¬
ture of Niebuhr's understanding of that complex phenomenon known as "culture."^
Culture 1s a name given to that Incredibly complex total process of human
activity where man proposes ends designed largely to serve his own good. "In
defining the ends that his activities are to realize 1n culture, man begins
with himself as the chief value and the source of all other values. What 1s
2
good is what 1s good for him." Cultural anthropocentrlsm need not deny that
men do seek the good of other beings besides themselves, and "often seek to
serve causes transcending human existence;" nevertheless, in the end "the prag-
3
inatic tendency to do all these things for the sake of man seems Inconquerable."
Furthermore, Nlebuhr argues that there 1s no universal culture 1n the sense
that the values which men seek to realize and conserve are not sought as good-
for all men everywhere and at all times. Rather, men are conscious of living
1n a particular culture, society, class or other group and consequently seek
values which are relative to such societies. Thus, each of the groups regards
Itself as the center and source of all value but disguises the relative charac¬
ter of its starting point by convincing Itself that the values 1t seeks are
Identical with what is good for all men.
The difficulties involved in seeking to elaborate a universal ethic
that will unify and order the pluralism of cultural values by beginning with
man as the source and center of all value Is well Illustrated, according to
^H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (New York: Harper & Row,
1951, paper edition, 1956),pp. 35ff,Hereinafter cited as CC.
2Ib1d., p. 35.
3Ib1d.. pp. 35, 36.
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Nlebuhr, by the "theories of English [sic] empiricism."^ The first problem
lies at the point of determining what the fundamental nature of man 1s. Is
he fundamentally a pleasure-seeking being, and 1f so, 1s "pleasure" here under¬
stood to be that which 1s relative solely to bodily states, or something more
or other? Is 1t possible to give a consistently empirical account of human
nature and Its needs that will provide the basis for answering the question
of what 1s really good for man? But this question cannot be settled apart
from facing an even more basic difficulty. When the question of "what is good
for man?" 1s asked. Is 1t asked from the point of view of what Is good for man
as an Individual, or from the point of view of what Is good for society? But
the conflicts that Inevitably arise between that which 1s good for the indivi¬
dual citizen and that which 1s good for the larger society of other citizens
with whom the Individual must live demonstrates the presence of two value
centers—the Individual and society. "Between these two objective but rela-
tlvlstlc value systems English [sic] ethics sought to find some kind of
p
reconciliation but never with complete success." No reconciliation between
them seems possible,because on the one hand, aV[ value 1s defined as relative
to the needs of Individuals In their movement towards self-realization. On the
other hand corporate needs and potentialities are recognized which transcend,
and Inevitably conflict with, and Indeed often deny, the self-realization of
Individuals. J. S. Mill believed that justice was adequately served by his
single principle of "the greatest happiness for the greatest number" but
''cv (1961), p. 109. Nlebuhr has utilitarianism chiefly 1n mind which
was not strictly confined to English thinkers. Perhaps Nlebuhr has used the
term "English" Inaccurately as the equivalent of "British."
2Ib1d., p. 110.
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Insofar as justice involves the notion of an equality of treatment which takes
account of the very different needs and abilities of individuals, it more
nearly determines what is good for the society than what Is good for the In¬
dividual citizen. The only alternative which Niebuhr suggests is to ask if
there might be some other center of value transcending any individual man or
his societies that would be good for each and they good for 1t.^ But to ask
this question is4for Niebuhr, tantamount to challenging the basic dogma of a
humanist ethic which assumes the privileged status of man as one finite
2
reality among others. It does not ask what man or society are good-for. The
goodness of man for other beings is either ignored or it is silenced by the
assumption that their good is Identical with the good-for-man. The beginning
and end of ethics is man. But to challenge this assumption also implies that
the challenger issues his challenge from the point of view of a relational
theory which recognizes some other being as the center of value.
"Value Theory and Theology"
To this point Niebuhr has argued for his relational theory without any
appeal to theological premises. However; we cannot forget that his primary in¬
tention is not only to develop a philosophically rigorous and consistent value
theory but to ensure that in doing so the sovereignty and freedom of God and
^Niebuhr observes a similar duality of value-centers present 1n Idealist
ethics that define value as the good for man. For example, Nickolai Hartmann
in his Ethics (1932) argues on the one hand for recognition of an objective
realm of ideal essences as the center of value so that only in relation to
them is anything else valuable. "On the other hand man is his center of value,
in relation to whom even the ideas of value alone have actual worth." CV (1961),
p. 111. Cf. CC, pp. 6f, 35 n. 38.
2CV (1961), p. 112.
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the Independence of theology Is maintained. In order to understand the theo¬
logical considerations which support his contention that only a relational
value theory 1s adequate to the requirements of "monotheistic faith," we must
examine his critique of the relationship of value theory and theology 1n the
liberal Protestant theological tradition.
In "Value Theory and Theology" (1937) Nlebuhr argues 1) that all reli¬
gious experience 1s a species of value experience and therefore a theory of
value 1s essential to (1f not exhaustive of) any religious eplstemology. But,
2) the maoy value theories developed or appropriated by Protestant theologians
since Kant have been either Inadequate to the objective and realist require¬
ments of theology—that 1s they failed to assert the logical and ontologlcal
inseparability of the being and value of God and the primacy of the former
over the latter—or, having once affirmed this thqy have proceeded to develop
an eplstemology which is inconsistent with this presupposition. They began
by asserting the primacy of being over value but then introduced values known
Independently of the putatlvely religious object, God, as the very criteria
by means of which experience of God is distinguished from experience of another
sort. In short, taken together these value theorists have either a) made
values equivalent to God or, b) argued that values require God as a postulate*
or c) maintained that values are the criteria by which God 1s distinguished
from other objects 1n experience.^ An assessment of the accuracy of this
analysis 1s not as important for understanding his own approach as the conclu¬
sion he draws from 1t. It 1s this third position which he sees as most
pervasive. AT_1_ previous value theologies have in common the assumption "that
W, pp. 93-95, 112-113.
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men have a knowledge of absolutely valid values which 1s not only independent
of their knowledge of God but which is in some way determinative of God."^
The scientific theology of Professor Macintosh was a particularly dis¬
tressing example of this tendency, according to Niebuhr, because in spite of
the laudable Intention motivating his search for a truly scientific theology
centered on countering any naively subjective (unscientific) concern with
2
feelings or values; and notwithstanding his stress on the ontic priority of
being over value, he nevertheless argued that divine reality is not self-revealing
but is identified by ideals "worthy of our supreme and absolute reverence and
3
devotion" quite apart from any distinctively religious experience. Niebuhr was
critical of this view on two main counts. First, that in theology, no less
than in science, the objects "God" or "nature" must be valued for their own
sake and not for the sake of any values considered absolute and "prescribed to
them prior to their own valuation."4
A faith which finds 1n God the source and center of all value,
which values personal existence only because 1t makes the enjoy¬
ment of God possible, and hopes for immortality only because 1t
hopes for the vision of God, which founds its morality upon the
sole value of God and the sacredness of his creatures because
]Ibid., p. 95.
An adequate grasp of Macintosh's theology may be gained from the follow¬
ing works: Theology as an Empirical Science (New York: Macmillan and Company,
1919), esp. pp. 13-26; "Experimental Realism In Religion," in Religious Realism,
eti. D. C. Macintosh (New York: Macmlllan Company, 1931), pp. 307-409; The
Problem of Religious Knowledge (New York: Harpers and Brothers, 1940), esp.
Ch. XX. Here MacintosrflnsTsts that values known as absolute apart from our
experience of God must serve as criteria "for criticism of all intuitions and
doctrinal beliefs as to the character and activities which can be consistently
ascribed to a transcendent divine reality," ibid., p. 358.
3
D. C. Macintosh, The Problem of Religious Knowledge, p. 164.
4VTT, p. 102.
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they are his creatures—such a faith must remain dissatisfied
with an approach which however dlsgulsedly, makes him a means
to an end however noble the end In human esteem.1
This illicit Inversion of theological priorities Nlebuhr believes 1s
in large part the result of accepting uncritically an absolute rather than
a relational theory of value. But an absolute theory of value must riot only
be rejected on the theological grounds that it denies from the start any love
for, or worship of God for his own sakejbut also because of its philosophical
inadequacy. Niebuhr 1s well aware that Macintosh and realist theologians
generally recognize that values are qualities which an object or person may
have in relation to other objects or persons, their purposes, desires, Interests
and so on. But he sees no justification for the further contention that some
values relative to persons can be viewed as absolute "having positive worth,
always everywhere and for all." Once this step is taken the advertised em¬
pirical character of these value theologies 1s denied and values which were
at first recognized as relative to human experience are now assumed arbitrarily
to be the supreme and final values of all reality. The final step has now
been made possible. Just these values which at first were recognized as
relative to human experience, and then were elevated as the supreme and final
values of all reality whatever, now become the sufficient criteria for distin¬
guishing what may or may not be identified as knowledge of God.
The serious consequences of this approach for theology and for theolo¬
gical ethics are plain. While Niebuhr's defense of the indispensible role of
some theory of value 1n setting forth a religious epistemology indicates his
1Ibjd.» p. 103.
2
0. C. Macintosh, "Experimental Realism in Religion," p. 310. Cited
by Nlebuhr 1n "Value Theory and Theology," p. 108.
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unwllllngness to make theology totally discontinuous with some general theory
of value, he early recognized that this particular theory espoused by D. C.
Macintosh resulted In the Identification of theology with a specific theory
of human value. This confusion of devotion to human values with devotion to
God could only be sustained on the basis of assumptions which must be questioned.
The first 1s the assumption that 1t 1s possible to Identify universal values
of the ethical which together constitute the Irreducible essence of all par¬
ticular historical religions. However, the majority of the great religions
resist this kind of universal1sm and direct attention to a transcendent God
who has revealed himself 1n particular contingent events. "Universal validity
1s claimed for these revelations not because of their correspondence to some
system of valid values previously discovered by men, but because they are
revelations of the universal power and reality to which man and his values are
required to conform."^1 A second assumption 1s Involved 1n this refusal to
reckon with the truth-claims made by particular historic religions. Revelation
—understood as the sovereign unveiling by God of his own goodness as Creator,
Judge, and Redeemer—1s an embarrassment to such value theologies which believe
that reason 1s "the high road to the knowledge of God and salvation" and that
revelation 1s "the religious name for that process which 1s essentially the
2
growth of reason 1n history." The belief that "reason" names a source from
which wholly rational valuatlonal principles may be drawn (for founding a
universal religion to which the historic religions are approximate witnesses)
Involves a false estimate of the power of reason and a failure to recognize
1IMd., p. 105.
2CC, pp. 110, 111
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that all ethical systems rest in the final analysis on dogmas that can only
be described as religious. When Kant asserts that there 1s nothing good other
than a good will, or the hedonist maintains that whatever 1s pleasurable 1n
human experience and that alone 1s good, the final "center of value" has been
Identified 1n relation to which the value or dlsvalue of all else 1s to be
judged. But the fact that various "centers of value" have been Identified 1n
Western moral philosophy makes 1t clear that no one of them can claim the self-
evident deliverance of human rationality. Rather, what must be recognized,
Niebuhr argues, Is the fact that non-the1st1c and thelstlc but non-revelatlonal
ethics, no less than revelatlonal ethics, begin with dogma. These dogmas are
In each case religious "assertions of faith, confessions of trust 1n something
which makes life worth living, commitments of the self to a god.'^ If knowledge
of God must be authenticated 1n terms of a final value which 1s dogmatically
posited yet trusted as Intrinsically valuable, then all that results 1s the
founding of one religion upon another, with the consequent obscuring of the
relation between theology and ethics. Two-fold damage 1s done. Not only does
theology become subordinated to or Indistinguishable from value theory of a
certain sort,but the religious character of the dogmas of any value theory what¬
ever 1s disregarded.
Above all else the most serious weakness of liberal theology was Its
2
failure to reckon with the sovereignty of God. Nlebuhr had come to recognize
that a theological ethic which restricted Its conception of God to the role of
a friendly guardian of human values could not do Justice to the traditional
]m, p. 106.
2
H. Richard Nlebuhr, "Reformation: Continuing Imperative," Christian
Century LXXVII (1960), p. 248.
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Christlan understanding of God, the Creator, Judge and Redeemer. Nor could 1t
do justice to the situation of man whose values are often tragically denied
and whose very existence Is threatened by death.
It 1s not only possible but highly probable that human
Ideas of justice and goodness, as well as justice and goodness
themselves as relative to Isolated humanity, are out of line
so to speak, with divine Ideas of goodness and justice, or with
the goodness and justice relative to the divine nature, so that
conflict and tragedy rather than progressive Integration are to
be looked for.'
The Absolute Center of Value
Earlier, mention was made of Nlebuhr's suggestion that a relational
theory of value could, theoretically at least, allow for as many relative sys¬
tems of value (each ordered around this or that being as center of value) as
there are beings 1n existence. In reality, however, such chaotic relativism
gives way to one of more manageable proportions. In most moral philosophy man
himself, or some extension of himself, 1s either the explicit or Implicit center
of value. Man therefore presumes that he 1s the source and center of value
and 1s himself the competent judge of good and evil for all other existent
beings. But Nlebuhr contends that this tendency of cultural life to make man
the center of value does not make 1t any less a relative or limited starting
point. Even the principle of reverence for life 1s for Nlebuhr not radical
VTT, p. 109-110. Fre1 seems to be mistaken 1n believing that Nlebuhr
came to this conclusion "since the writing of "Value Theory and Theology'."
"The Theology of H. Richard Nlebuhr," FE, p. 76. It Is worth noting that The
Kingdom of God 1n America (1937) was published In the same year as "Value
Theory an? YKeology" and 1n that book the theme of the sovereignty of God 1s
fundamental not only for the early Puritan theocracy (Chapter 2) but equally
for his own convictions. Cf. pp. xv1-xv11; 17-27.
2CV (1961), p. 112. RS, p. 112.
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enough, not totally Inclusive of all beings because 1t excludes reverence for
the dead or for Inorganic being.^ Neither humanism, nor vitalism, nor natural-
1sm represents a sufficiently Inclusive understanding of "the realm of being
2
1n Its wholeness." The only adequate center of value 1s not man or life or
nature but being itself or "the principle of being." "Radical monotheism de¬
thrones all absolutes short of the principle of being itself. At the same
3
time 1t reverences every relative existent." In a note Nlebuhr explains his
preference for the descriptive phrase "principle of being" (principle of value).
I use the terms 'principle of being' and 'principle of value'
In distinction from the terms 'highest being,' and 'highest value,'
or 'Being' and 'the Good,' because the principle of being Is not
Immediately to be Identified with being nor the principle of value
with value. As raaqy theologians have undertaken to say, God 1s
beyond being; they ought also to say that he 1s beyond value.
That by reference to which all things have their value 1s not It¬
self a value 1n the primary sense.*
The "choice" of man or life or nature 1s an arbitrary selection of one sort of
finite being from the rest of existence which "from any disinterested point of
5
view have [has] no greater claim to centrallty than any others." Furthermore,
the absolutizing of any part of finite reality, Nlebuhr contends, "Is ruinous
6
to the finite Itself," presumably because 1t sets up an Inevitable conflict
between being which has value or dlsvalue and being which 1s left 1n the outer





Ibid.. p. 33, n. 7.
5CV (1961), p. 112,
6Ib1d., p. 113.
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as an adequate center of value, but only the One beyond the many, "the trans¬
cendent One for whom alone there 1s an ultimate good and for whom, as the
source and end of all things, whatever 1s, 1s good."^ In relation to this "One"
all of reality 1s seen as worthy of existence. The center of value 1s not man,
nor life, nor nature but "the principle of being, the source of all things and
the power by which they exist. It 1s relied on to give and to conserve worth
2
to all that issues from 1t.H
Earlier 1t was pointed out that for Nlebuhr value exists only in those
situations 1n which Interdependent beings confront each other as good-for or
bad-for each other. Every being has positive value only in its relations to
other beings. Two kinds of worth are distinguished. The first Is objective or
external good. This results from the relation of one existent to other existent
beings which are Its complementary goods. The second 1s subjective or internal
good. This results from the relation of an existent being to its own essential
3
possibilities. It 1s necessary and helpful theoretically to distinguish each
but practically they are Inseparable. This 1s not a complete description of
all possible value relations, however, because each "existent being which 1s
becoming what 1t is potentially and which meets such complementary goods 1n Its
4
environment, 1s Itself good-for the other beings (1f not bad for then) ..."
1 ?
And what is true for being x 1s true for all other exlstents. Beings x , x
. . . xn, each with very different natures and tendencies are all related
^Ibid., p. 112.
^RMWC, p. 38. Cf. KGA, pp. 114-115.
3CV (1961), pp. 105-106.
4Ibid., p. 106.
-53-
muU1-d1rrsens1onany 1n large "complexes of being," now human, now animal, now
Inorganic and so on. This scheme clearly Involves reciprocity among beings in
that each needs beings external to Itself for the realization of Its own essen¬
tial possibilities. At the same time,each 1s the means towards meeting the
needs or fulfilling the capacities and potentialities of other beings. Niebuhr
does not limit value to the sphere of human existence and action. His rela¬
tional theory seeks to describe the conditions under which value appears
throughout all reality.
Now the question arises 1n the present context as to whether Niebuhr
means to maintain that this same reciprocal kind of relation 1s a satisfactory
scheme to account for the value relations between created being and a God who
1s conceived of as "the principle of being," the source of all things and the
power by which they exist, and as "the principle of value," that which gives
and conserves the worth of all that 1s. It 1s not hard to understand how God,
thought of 1n this way, 1s good-for other beings. Indeed, this would seem to
be true analytically 1n view of the very definition of God as "the principle
of value."'' But 1t 1s not so easy to understand hew this relation can be
reciprocal, as demanded by the relational theory Niebuhr has proposed. How 1s
Niebuhr to account for the value which created being has for God? He has
recognized the difficulty and denies that the external relation between God and
his creature 1s reciprocal: "1t cannot be said that God has need of any being
2
external to himself." But how then can he maintain a consistently relational
theory? He cannot at this point advance arguments 1n support of some notion
^The logical and eplstemologlcal difficulties which this definition of
God may entail are not presently In question.
2CV (1961), p. 112.
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of value as Intrinsic to the existence of God apart from any relations, with¬
out contradicting his theory. Evan if such a concession were granted in the
case of the relations between infinite Being and finite beings,it would Imme¬
diately raise the question as to why value could not be recognized as intrinsic
to finite being. No exception is possible because Niebuhr has categorically
asserted that "nothing is valuable in itself, but everything has value, positive
or negative, in its relations."^ He does not allow that any being has intrinsic
value that may subsequently be modified,either positively or negatively, by
external relations. To the contrary, the value of any being is established by
2
such relations. Niebuhr is therefore faced with an Impasse: on the one hand
he has argued that all value is grounded in the external relations between
beings, on the other hand he has denied that the value of God in relation to
the world is who!iy constituted by external relations.
The modification he is forced to make in his theory is as disappoint¬
ing as 1t was inevitable in view of his a priori rejection of the attribution
3
of Intrinsic value to any being. A radically monotheistic faith must, on
Niebuhr's view, "use a sort of psychological relativism" since it is "able
4
only to say that whatever is exists because 1t pleases God." But this appeal
to psychological considerations must be regarded as a piece of special plead¬
ing which is not justified on the basis of the relational theory which he
''ibid., p. 107 (italics added). For Niebuhr's acceptance of the Kantian
ban on all knowledge of the thing-1n-1tself cf. "Faith in Gods and In God," a
supplementary essay 1n RMWC, p. 116; hereinafter cited as FGG. MR, pp. vili,
2, 65, 86; PCM, p. 112; RS, p. 60.
2Cf. Schrader, "Value and Valuation," FE, pp. 188-191 passim.
3Cf. FGG, pp. 114f. PCM, pp. 112f.
4CV (1961), p. 112.
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has advanced. He can do so only In defiance of his theory. Furthermore,there
seems to be no good reason why the criticisms which he had earlier raised against
"subjectivist ethics" are not now applicable to his own theory. In the course
of the exposition of his relational theory Niebuhr recognized that this "rela¬
tivism raises great problems of Its own"^ but he nowhere suggests what these
might be» nor does he anticipate possible lines of rebuttal from those theorists
against whom he worked out his own position. Had he done so,he may have
realized that to resort to psychological relativism as an explanation for the
value which the world has for God was not a minor detail of little importance—
as he seems to think—but a serious breach in the logical consistency of his
theory of objective relativism. He does not attempt to resolve the issue of
whether the value of "whatever is," is relative to some constitutive need in
the nature of God or is relative to what pleases him. He simply passes over
it. "Whether the relation Is to need or to desire, in any case the starting
point is that transcendent absolute for whom, or for which, whatever is, is
good.*"1- But this will not do. His philosophical theory demands that he sup¬
port the former. But he refuses to do so, doubtless for the very good reason
that this would Impugn the Infinity and sovereignty of God which is the very
theological dogma he 1s most anxious to support. This seems to suggest that
his relational theory of value 1s at this point incompatible with his theo¬
logical interests.
It is worth remembering here that Nlebuhr's primary theological con¬




belng and valued He 1s therefore committed to metaphysical dualism and against
any monistic theory of reality. But his relational theory of value 1s, I be¬
lieve, much more compatible with a monistic theory. As Schrader has shrewdly
observed: "1t 1s an Important question whether Nlebuhr's relational theory of
value 1n Itself provides a sufficient safeguard against such a monistic theory.
It 1s not his relational theory as such which provides this safeguard, but
2
rather Nlebuhr's specific Interpretation and application of the theory."
Objective Relativism and Radical Monothelsm
The final element 1n Nlebuhr's theory of value may be described very
briefly; the difficulties which 1t raises will require more extended discus¬
sion. Nlebuhr has argued that radical monotheism makes relative every finite
center of value but does so 1n such a way that all beings must now be recognized
as valuable 1n relation to the one center of value, God.
The moral consequences of this faith 1s that 1t makes relative
all those values which polytheism3 makes absolute, and so puts
an end to the strife of the gods. But it does not relatlvlse
them as self-love does. A new sacredness attaches to the
relative goods . . . The moral consequences of faith 1n God 1s
the universal love of all being 1n him. It Is not an automatic
consequence . . . But this 1s Its requirement: that all beings,
not only our friends but also our enemies, not only men but also
animals and the Inanimate be met with reverence . . .4
\gA, pp. 17-25, 164, 192-198; MR, pp. 1x, 40; "Reformation: Continuing
Imperative," p. 248f.
^"Value and Valuation," FE, p. 182.
3
Polytheism 1s defined by Nlebuhr as any faith 1n a plurality of valued
objects. Even the various ethical theories of moral philosophers are referred
to by Nlebuhr as "polytheistic theologies of value" (CV (1961), p. 112) Insofar
as they operate with more than one center of value.
4FGG, p. 126.
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At this juncture the crux of Nlebuhr's relativism 1s exposed. His
emphasis upon the historical and social relativity which deeply conditions
all human knowing must be recognized as a pervasive and continuous feature of
his thought.' But the relativity of all values 1n the last analysis 1s
believed by Nlebuhr to be a necessary corollary of that radical monotheistic
faith that not only demands that no finite being be recognized as the absolute
(thus Idolatry 1s denied), but also that no finite value can be recognized as
an absolute (thus universal moral rules are denied). Furthermore, no system
of value can be graded as more or less adequate, more or less Important than
any other.
. . . The value theory of monotheistic theology Is enabled to
proceed to the construction of many relative value systems, each
of them tentative, experimental, and objective, as 1t considers
the Interaction of beings on beings, now from the point of view
of mans now from the point of view of society, now from the point
of view of life. But 1t 1s restrained from erecting any one of
these Into an absolute, or even from ordering 1t above the others,
as when the human-centered value system 1s regarded as superior
to the Hfe-centered system. A monothelstlcally centered value
theory 1s not only compatible with such objective relativism 1n
value analysis but requires 1t 1n view of Its fundamental dogma
that none 1s absolute save God and that the absolutizing of
anything finite 1s ruinous to the finite Itself,2
This passage 1s very significant for understanding Nlebuhr's ethics;
especially for understanding how he conceives of the relation between the value
which all beings have for God and God for them, and the value which any finite
being has for other finite beings. And Its Importance lies more 1n what 1s
denied than In what 1s affirmed.
"The value theory of a monotheistic theology" first of all affirms
1
MR, pp. v11f., 6-22, 141, 164; CC, pp. x11, 234-241; RS, pp. 46,
71-73, 80f., 90-93, 95f. Cf. Chapter IV below.
2CV (1961), pp. 112-113. Cf. VTT, pp. 108-110.
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that the value of all beings is a function of their relation to "the principle
of being," God, who 1s the absolute center and source of all value. Clearly
this denies to any one finite center of value such as "man" or "society" or
"nature," etc. a position of unconditioned transcendence 1n relation to any
other. To attempt to account for the value of all being 1n relation to one
finite being among other equally finite beings 1s, from any disinterested
point of view, arbitrary. From the point of view of radical monotheism it 1s
Idolatrous because 1t denies "the fundamental dogma that none Is absolute save
God." Such an inference 1s as analytically clear as it is deductively certain.
But Nlebuhr draws a further inference which would appear to be a non sequltur.
He argues that radical monotheism must deny that absolute value can be pre¬
dicated of any finite being and that no finite value system can be considered
to have greater or lesser value than any other. Now this would follow from
some but by no means all uses of the word "absolute." Here he uses the term
"absolute" to mean the Absolute, the One beyond the many, a transcendent,
unconditioned and unlimited being called God. It follows from this definition
that the term "absolute" cannot qualify any finite being. But this 1s not the
only possible meaning of the term. It has been argued, and it 1s still possible
to argue, that there are values which transcend temporal, social or psycholog¬
ical immediacy and which are "absolute" 1n the sense that they are recognized
as universally valid for all men everywhere and at any time, but which are
quite Independent of any such notion as "the Absolute."
Not only does Nlebuhr rule out all mundane absolutes but he also dis¬
allows any "ordering" of these relative value systems such that 1t 1s possible
to determine whether a human-centered value system 1s superior to a life-
centered system or not. But, so far as I can see, he has said nothing about
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radical monotheism which demands this sort of radical relativism. Taken
seriously, this unnecessary stricture would yield a theistic ethic quite with¬
out normative significance for the difficult, yet Inescapable task of analyzing,
comparing, and judging between varying and often conflicting moral values and
rules.
Nlebuhr was not unaware of this problem. He has been a severe and
clear-headed critic of all religious ethics which are content to elaborate an
absolute principle without showing Its normative relevance for guiding the
believer's present moral experience and actionJ This 1s articulated clearly
1n a brief early essay.
If ethics would develop Its Intention to the full, it must
discover not only its eternal authority 1n a cosmic constitution,
but also Its' responsibility to temporal problems and cultural
values: it must seek not only the definition of the absolutely
good and the absolutely bad, but 1t must remember its obligation
to realize the better and to prevent the worse.2
The first of these two co-ordinate goals 1s very well provided for 1n Nlebuhr's
"inonotheistically centered value theory" but the "obligation to realize the
better and to prevent the worse" 1s not only not provided for, but the very
possibility of determining the relative value of persons and things, ideologies
3
and institutions is precluded.
^C, pp. 69-76; 187-189.
^"Religion and Ethics," The World Tomorrow, XIII (1930), p. 445,
(italics added). The influence of Ernst Troeltsch from whom Niebuhr had learned
to respect both the complexity and urgency of this task 1s unmistakably 1n
evidence in these words.
3
In this same essay he rejects all religious ethics that confine "the
definition of ethical truth to eternal principles from which no effective
guidance for the moral life may be gained, so that Individual and espe-
clally social Institutions are left without ethical control." Ibid. (Italics
added.)
-60-
The problem with Nlebuhr's theory 1s not his affirmation that every¬
thing that 1s, 1s good, by virtue of 1t being good for God, but his denial that
these relative value systems can be ordered with respect to their relationship
to one another. An example may help to clarify the difficulty. Consider a
dispute between an ant1-v1visect1on1st and a neurological physiologist over
the morality of using animals for research. Nlebuhr's theory allows him to
make only two statements. He will remind each that neither human life nor
animal life 1s an absolute but only a relative center of value in relation to
the one absolute, God. And he would also remind the two disputants "that all
being . . . not only men but also animals" are to be "met with reverence for
all are friends 1n the friendship of the one to whom we are reconciled in
faith.But his theory makes It Impossible for him to formulate any criteria
or give any guidance on the question of whether human life or animal life is
of more value each 1n relation to the other. He simply ignores the problem
of how the inevitable conflicts of values among finite beings are to be settled.
The problem which we have been discussing goes to the very heart of
Nlebuhr's theological ethic. It will be helpful to define the difficulty fur¬
ther 1n the form of two questions. Did Niehuhr believe that any ethical theory
must provide standards by means of which human agents are enabled not only to
identify and distinguish that which 1s absolutely good (or evil) from that
which 1s relatively good (or evil), but also to distinguish between relative
rights and wrongs, goods and evils? Does his own theory provide such standards?
The foregoing examination of his monothelstlcally based value theory suggests
that it not only does not Include such standards but categorically disallows
VgG, p. 126.
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them. The final section of this chapter will seek to show 1) that in hiis
own ethical reflections Niebuhr consistently refused to elaborate any moral
principles for the ranking of human valuations or for guiding human decision
making; while 2) in his. study of the history of Christian ethics he demanded
that such principles be provided. The former contention will be illustrated
by an analysis of Niebuhr's treatment of the practical ethical Issue of whether
Christians should or should not participate in war. The latter will be accom¬
plished by following his discussion of the difficulty which Protestant thinkers
have encountered in providing a constructive ethic for ordering the life of
the believing community and for regulating its conduct within the wider culture.
With respect to the two questions posed above we will see that when Niebuhr
addressed himself to the general question of what is required in a Christian
ethic he recognized the need for ethical standards. He answered the first
question positively. But when his own ethic is examined,it is found that in
his general theory of value and in his analysis of a practical ethical problem,
he falls to provide the necessary ethical criteria. The second question must
be answered negatively.
Toward a Constructive Ethic; An Inconsistency
The difficulty which we have Just pointed out 1n Niebuhr's general
theory of value is also evident when attention 1s given to his analysis of a
practical ethical problem. In a number of occasional essays he attempted to
provide an analysis of war from the point of view of radical monotheism.'
*"The Grace of Doing Nothing," Christian Century, XLIX (1932), 378-380.
The view expressed here that the only legitimate response of a Christian to war
Is one of repentance for the common sin of all men which occasions God's
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Taken together, these essays are very clear about what a Christian's duty to
God 1s in such crises, but little or nothing 1s said about how he is to deter¬
mine what his duty 1s to his neighbor. That he has such a duty, that he must
act, that even indecision is a kind of action, is not denied; but nowhere does
he discuss, much less solve, the problem of how the Christian who fulfills his
duty towards God is to determine what his duty 1s toward his neighbor, or how
conflicts among human values and duties are to be settled. In the following
attempt to justify and illustrate these claims primary attention will be given
to the argument presented in his article "War as the Judgment of God," (1942).
The other essays largely serve to corroborate or further develop the argument
given there. They will therefore be called upon as supporting witnesses where
appropriate.
The approach of a radical monotheist to the problem of participation
or non-participation in war "is determined by the principle that man's action
ought always to be response to divine action rather than any finite action."
Niebuhr acknowledges the fact that in most Christian thinking war is understood
judgment drew a rejoinder from his brother Reinhold Niebuhr entitled, "Must
We Do Nothing," ibid., pp. 415-417. H. Richard Niebuhr replied later In a
letter to the editor entitled "A Communication: The Only Way Into the Kingdom
of God," ibid.. p. 447. "The Christian Church and the World's Crisis,"
Christianity and Society, VI (1941), 11-17; "War as the Judgment of God,"
Christian Century. LIX (1942), 930-933; "Is God 1n the War?" ibid., 953-955;
"War as Crucifixion," ibid., LX (1943), 513-515. War was the"only practical
ethical problem which Niebuhr analyzed 1n any detail In his published works.
He was doubtless right 1n believing that the reality of war and suffering pro¬
vided an acid test of his monotheistic principle. "To deny that God 1s In war Is
for the monothelst equivalent to the denial of God's universality and unity—to
the denial that God is God. . . . The fight for the Interpretation of war as
divine judgment is to my mind, a fight for rationality in religion and for con¬
sistency in man's ethical response to his environment." "Is God in the War?,"
p. 954.
^"War as the Judgment of God," p. 630.
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rightly in the first instance as the judgment of God on the common sinfulness
of men. However, he also believed that too often it is also interpreted
wrongly as involving judgments about the absolute or relative rightness or
wrongness of our own actions or those of the enemy. Christian pacifists, for
example, agree that war is the judgment of God on all the participants, but
they also assert that Christians must distinguish between the bad actions of
all men who make war and the good actions of those who refuse to participate
in it because "men not God, make war."1 Christian patriots also regard war as
the judgment of God, but they also respond to it as involving the action of an
enemy who has attacked their country. Thus,they too,are divided in their
response; as Christians they respond in penitence before the divine judgment,
as citizens they respond by defending their country. Yet a third group dis¬
tinguishes between the absolute judgment of God to which they respond in
repentance and the relative judgments of men to which they oppose their own
contrary relative judgments. For example, they assert the relative rightness
of the defense of democracy over against the relative wrongness cf totalitar¬
ianism.
In every case there is a dualism: two actions must be responded
to, the action of God and the action of the opponent. . . . But the
dualism of double response is an intolerable one; it makes us . . .
ditheists who have two gods, the Father of Jesus Christ and our
own country, or Him and Democracy, or Him and Peace. Country,
Democracy and Peace are surely values of a high order, if they «
are under God, but as rivals of God they are betrayers of life.
This statement calls for two comments In view of his general theory of
value. It exhibits the same uncompromising attitude toward all finite centers
1Ibid.
2Ibid., p. 631. Cf. "Is God in the War?," p. 954.
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of value. To seek to understand war as a radical monothelst 1s to forsake all
prior commitments to the absolute value of peace, or the absolute duty of
defending one's own country, or even the relative rlghtness of democracy over
against totalitarian forms of political order. On the other hand, however, he
allows that "country," "democracy" and "peace" are "values of a high order."
But to say this implies that Nlebuhr himself has ranked these values above
others, and this is a judgment which his theory does not allow. All that he
can strictly say 1s that these are human values and that they are neither more
nor less valuable than any others.
Now 1f war 1s to be Interpreted wholly 1n terms of the judgment of God
who is present 1n these, as 1n all historical events, then 1t 1s necessary to
understand more clearly what this means. It must first be understood, Nlebuhr
asserts, that the notion "judgment" 1s not to be equated with vengeance or with
the Idea of restoring a moral balance 1n human affairs by making those who
inflict suffering, suffer In kind. The God who 1s present as the judge of men's
sin 1s the same God who 1s present as their redeemer. The judgment of God 1s
redemptive, his justice 1s gracious and his grace just. Wars may be described
as "crucifixions" because more often than not 1t 1s the Innocent rather than
the unjust who suffer most. But wars may not be described as "hell" because
God 1s present 1n them and he Is present not as vindictive Judge but "as vicar¬
ious sufferer and redeemer, who 1s afflicted 1n all the afflictions of his
people."^ Nlebuhr was not unaware of the fact that 1t 1s much easier to
_ _
Ibid., p. 633; "War as Crucifixion," pp. 514-515. To develop this
point fully It would be necessary to discuss Nlebuhr's speculative suggestions
on the vicarious nature of the suffering of "the relatively Innocent" partici¬
pants In war.
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understand war as judgment upon human self-righteousness and unrighteousness
than 1t 1s to see any trace of divine grace 1n them. But he was convinced that
1f God 1s not present judging the actions of evil men and redeeming both the
innocent and the guilty then radical monotheism must be given up. Furthermore,
the development of an Intelligible Interpretation of war that compromises
neither the unity nor universality of God, nor ignores the facts of our actual
experience of war also becomes Impossible.^
In the second place, 1f God 1s present in war judging all men then all
the participants in the conflict are absolutely in the wrong before him and no
relative judgments of the rightness or wrongness of any of their actions 1n
any way mitigate or modify his judgment. It 1s true that God does not exer¬
cise his justice or grace except through human agency, but human actions can
never be identified with the divine and therefore no party to any conflict can
2
claim divine sanction for their cause.
Finally, divine judgment and redemption cannot be confined to the sphere
of man's spiritual or religious life. To do so 1s to deny that God 1s present
1n all events, 1n every sphere of human action. All men are therefore called
upon to respond to God in repentance and faith In their social and political
3
affairs no less than In their personal religious life.
This Interpretation of God's action In war has definite consequences
for human action. The first Is the abandonment by the Christian of all attempts
to determine the rightness or wrongness of human action, our own or our enemies.
^Ib1d., p. 631; "War as Crucifixion," p. 514; "Is God 1n the War?,"
p. 954.
2
"War as the Judgment of God," p. 631.
^Ibld., pp. 631-632; "The Christian Church In the World's Crisis,"
p. 11.
-66-
That the final or ultimate judgment of human affairs 1s the prerogative of
God no Christian would deny*but this surely 1s not the Immediate problem with
which we are concerned In trying to determine the penultimate question of the
rightness or wrongness of our participation in war. Nlebuhr does not deny that
we must "Inquire what duty we have to perform 1n view of what we have done
amiss and 1n view of what God 1s doing."1 He is sure, furthermore, that this
duty Includes the offering of active "resistance to those who are abusing our
2
neighbors" but nowhere does he explain on what grounds such a decision was
made. The decision to offer resistance to those who are abusing our neighbors
logically presupposes 1) that a judgment has been made about the identity of
the abusers and the abused and 2) that 1t 1s right to offer resistance to such
abusers on behalf of the abused.
A second consequence of this interpretation of war, Niebuhr argues,1s
the forsaking of all self-defensiveness and self-assertiveness. Whether the
Christian participates in war or not, his motive for doing so or not doing so
can never be the defense of his own values.
To carry on the war under the judgment of God is to carry it
on as those who repent of their self-centeredness and who now try
to forget about themselves while they concentrate on the deliver¬
ance of their neighbors. ... For those who refuse to participate
In war either by physical or spiritual action such abstention
can be reconciled to divine judgment only If 1t be part of a total
action 1n which concern for others has been given pre-eminence
over concern for self and Its values.3
The Christian cannot claim that his own Hfe has greater value 1n the sight of






consistent with Niebuhr's principle that God alone has absolute value and every
other being has equal value in relation to him. But the above quote also makes
1t quite evident that he completely ignores the normative question of how any
Christian is to decide whether or not he should participate in war. All that
his principle of radical monotheism will allow him to say is that both those
who participate in war and those who do not must be sure that in either case
their response is wholly motivated by a concern for others. However, as we
have seen above, he was not himself content to stop with this true but rather
trivial exhortation. He did assert that the Christian should offer resistance
to the oppressor on behalf of the oppressed. Yet neither in his general theory
of value nor in the essays on war does he show how he arrived at such a decision
on the basis of his principle of radical monotheism.'
The absence of arty theory about how the Christian is to determine his
duty toward his neighbor and about how he is to resolve conflicts among human
values and valuations should not be attributed to Ignorance or indifference
on Nieouhr's part. Rather it 1s, I think, an almost inevitable consequence of
his tendency to be exclusively preoccupied with the absoluteness of God as the
ultimate center of value. His principle of radical monotheism effectively
relativlzes the value of all finite beings but having done so, it 1s, as a
'it should be noted that in these articles Miebuhr has utilized a con¬
ception of God that assumes many characteristics that go quite beyond the
definition of God as "the principle of being" and "the principle of value."
To speak of God as Judge or Redeemer would ordinarily be thought to presuppose
the notion of God as <i personal being rather than the principle of being who
may or may not have personal attributes. It 1s by no means an easy task to
arrive at a precise determination of Niebuhr's conception of God. He employs
both the personal language which the biblical writers used to speak of God
and the formal impersonal language common to many idealist philosophers. This
issue will be discussed more fully in Chapter V.
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purely critical principle, ill-fitted to deal with the nonriative question of
ethics. In neither his relational theory of value nor in these essays on the
problem of war does he come to grips with the problem of how the radical mono-
thelst 1s to choose between relative and often conflicting human values and
duties.
That Nlebuhr was well aware of the need for normative principles 1n
a Christian ethic is much 1n evidence 1n the first chapter of The Kingdom of
God in America (1937) in which he discusses what he has called "the problem
of constructive Protestantism."^ This 1s a very clear and concise account of
the difficulty which Protestant theologians have encountered 1n their efforts
to provide a constructive ethic for ordering the common life of believers. To
the degree that they have affirmed the all-pervasive presence and power of a
God who 1s at every moment creating, sustaining and redeeming human life,to
that same degree they have seemed to abrogate the need for an ethic that con¬
cerned Itself with the ordering of human conduct. The greater the conviction
that true goodness and justice 1s wholly the gift of a sovereign God the greater
the conviction that all human judgments about good and evil, about right and
wrong are in each case relative to the self-interest arid pride of all men,
especially of those who rule.
The Protestant Reformation was, first and foremost, according to Nlebuhr,
a reform movement that affirmed the primacy of the creating, judging and redeem-
2
1ng presence of God 1n every sphere of human and natural life. It was not




dedlcated to the denigration of human freedom and rationality. Negative pro¬
tests were made, but above all else 1t was a positive movement that called
for renewed faith in the greatness and goodness of God. The Reformers empha¬
sized anew the present powerful rule of God 1n the affairs of men. "The divine
attribute which Impressed their minds was not so much God's changeless perfec¬
tion as his forceful reality or power. . . . the distinction between Catholic
and Protestant views may be summarized 1n the contrast between vlslo del and
regnum del."1 The Protestant Christian 1s less concerned with the conception
of God as an unchanging essence, the vision of whose perfection 1s his final
goal, than with the view of God as a dynamic creating and redeeming power, to
whom all men now respond either with trust or distrust. Catholic Christianity
cannot be charged with having no understanding of reqnum del- however, 1t does
understand the exercise of his rule differently. The Reformers' emphasis on
the power rather than the changeless perfection of God produced a change In
their conception of the way In which God exercises his rule among men. Cathol¬
icism tends to think of his rule as requiring the mediation of "an articulated
and hierarchical structure while Protestantism represented 1t as immediate and
2
direct." For the Catholic Christian God had created all things according to
a hierarchical structure which reason could discern at least 1n part. If the
assistance of divine grace was needed to reveal the fulness of God's rule this
was thought to be necessary 1n view of the flnltude of man's mind, and the
3
Incommensurability of Its powers to comprehend transcendent mysteries. The
11bid., p. 20.
2Ib1d., p. 21.
3Ibid., pp. 21-23. Cf. CC, pp. 145-148.
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Protestant Reformers did not deny that the grace of God was needed to reveal
truth impenetrable to finite minds but they believed that it was needed even
more to correct the error and self-deception of man's Incurably self-interested
and therefore corrupt reason. Indeed,the Reformers believed that they saw
clear evidence of the self-1nterestedness of human reason 1n the Justification
given by monks, priests and popes for their claims to mediate and administer
the rule of God for their fellow believers. "In the place of the hierarchical
structure 1n which the higher governed the lower, the Protestant set forth the
Idea of multiplicity in which many equals were all related directly, without
mediation to the ultimate ruler.
The Protestant assertion of the absolute primacy and direct presence
of God to man was therefore a very effective critical principle for challenging
the absolute claims of any human Institution or agency. But when it faced—
as 1t must—the task of ordering its ov/n life, of providing guidance for be¬
lievers who had to make moral choices which reflected a rational assessment of
the better or worse policy to pursue, Its critical principle seemed 111-fltted
by Itself to provide any constructive guidance. "As a theory of divine con¬
struction the Protestant movement was hard put to 1t to provide principles for
2
human construction."
In Nlebuhr's judgment Protestantism found Itself faced with a peculiar
dllenma. It 1s one thing to say that the Word of God alone must rule both
church and state, that 1t must be the norm for ordering human life both Inside




God and to hold to the "Word" alone without making clear to them how this Word
1s to be understood? If this 1s to be accomplished, does 1t not necessitate
setting up the same sort of authorities (who Identify and Interpret the Word of
God) which the principle of the primacy and Immediacy of God's rule had denied
to Catholicism? The problem 1s just as perplexing 1n the realm of morality.
The sovereignty of God as a first principle 1n the Protestant ethic did effec¬
tively rebuke all morallsm and legalism but "1t offered no standard whereby men
could make choices between relative goods and relative evils, 1t gave them no
scale of values whereby their Interests could be harmonized and the higher
could be made to control the lower."^
^Ib1d., p. 32 (Italics added).
CHAPTER III
THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF-EXISTENCE ANO ACTION
Introduction; Value and Selfhood
H. Richard Niebuhr did not write a systematic Christian ethic to which
we car go for an ordered and coherent account of his understanding of moral
experience and action. However, it is possible to distinguish in what he has
published two theories which attempt to provide an analysis of what 1s involved
in the employment of value predicates and 1n the inking of moral decisions.
The previous chapter has critically explored his relational theory of value.
The present chapter will provide an analysis of his relational theory of action.
The existence of these two schemes raises questions about the relationship
between them. This first section will attempt to clarify that relationship.
It 1s necessary first to consider each theory 1n relation to the
development of Niebuhr's thought. The present analysis agrees with Hoedemaker
in the Identification of these two patterns of analysis but can find no support
for his contention that "the 'center of value' scheme is gradually replaced by
a greater concentration on existentialist ways of thinking and on the scheme
of 'response and responsibility."'^ In the first place "the center of value"
\ibertus A. Hoedemaker, The Theology of !"U_ Richard Nlebuhr (Philadelphia
and Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1970), p."76. ~
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scheme was given systematic elaboration In his essay "The Center of Value"
which was first published In 1952: and the theological position espoused 1n
Radical Monotheism and Western Culture (1961) everywhere presupposes his rela¬
tional value theory.' If 1t was replaced (which 1t was not) 1t certainly could
not have been "gradually"! Furthermore, while "the scheme of response and
responsibility " was given Its roost elaborate exposition 1n The Responsible
Self (1963) it did not first appear there. It 1s clearly expounded 1n two
2
earlier essays: "The Responsibility of the Church for Society" (1946), and
"The Ego-Alter Dialectic and the Conscience (1945). Even earlier in The Meaning
of Revelation (1941), Nlebuhr sounded themes which he was to develop in The
Responsible Self (1963). "The participant In Hfe simply cannot escape thlnk-
3
1ng 1n terms of persons and of values." "Knowledge of other selves must be
received and responded to. Where there 1s no response it 1s evident there 1s
no knowledge, but our activity 1s the second not the first thing, . . . Selves
4
are known 1n acts or not at all." Granted there 1s "a greater concentration
on existentialist ways of thinking" but here^too,caution 1s needed. The evi¬
dence at hand only supports a view of Nlebuhr's debt to Kierkegaard and not to
5
twentieth century successors such as Heidegger, Jaspers or Satre. There was
an important change in Nlebuhr's thinking but It could not have been the
*Especially RMWC, Chapters 1 and 2.
2
In The Gospel, The Church and the World, ed. K. S. Latourette (New
York, London: Harper anffTrothers',194<§77 pp. 111-133.
MR, p. 106 (Italics added).
4Ibid., pp. 145-146 (Italics added).
5
Cf. "Soren Kierkegaard" 1n Christianity and The Existentialists, ed.
Carl Donald Mlchalson (New York: Scrlbner, 19!>6)» pp. 23-42; Ct, pp. 241-249.
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"gradual replacement" of value thinking by existential thinking for the very
good reason that the most Important relations obtaining between persons are
for Nlebuhr precisely valuatlonal. As was made clear 1n the last chapter the
change 1n Nlebuhr's thinking was a change from an absolute to a relational
theory of valued It was the theory of absolute value espoused by liberal
theology which he forsook but this change must have been effected quite early
1n his thinking because It was well formed by the time he came to write "Value
Theory and Theology" (1937). In this essay the absolute or Idealist theory of
value which American liberal theology had so largely adopted was challenged
2
from the point of view of a radically relational theory. But no appeal can
be made to the genetic development of Nlebuhr's thought to support the view
that value theory Itself 1s forsaken for some other approach to theology and
ethics. Inquiry Into the genesis and evolution of these two theories 1s not*
1n my judgment,as Important as the attempt to understand the logical relations
between them.
The exposition of Nlebuhr's relational theory of value Involved both
a negative and a positive argument. First, he argued against all attempts to
establish value as an Independent essence or quality. To say that something
1s good 1s not to apply a particular value predicate to any object, rather 1t
1s to put Into proposltlonal form a particular relation which exists between
two beings. This also rules out the possibility of arguing that value 1s
The theological position espoused 1n The Social Sources of Denomlna¬
tionalism (1929) clearly presupposed a theory of absolute"vaTue. "The cultural
captlv1ty of the church 1n America 1s diagnosed as resulting from Its failure
to rigorously apply the absolute "Ideals of the Nazarene." SSD, p. 9; Cf.




grounded in the subjectivity of the subject who makes value judgments. Second,
Nlebuhr's positive argument grounds all value judgments 1n the actual concrete
relations between one being and another. A crucial difference between the two
patterns emerges at this point. The relational theory of value 1s just that; 1t
centers on showing 1) that value predicates are relevant to the relations be¬
tween all beings, animal and natural as well as human. This assertion of the
inseparability of being and value ontologically 1s the philosophical basis for
his denial, 2) that value predicates can ever be restricted to the relations
between human beings, or that all non-human beings are valuable only Insofar as
they are related to human existence. From any disinterested point of view any
being at all may be a center of value. A man-centered value system has no more
claim to absoluteness than "the value system which fish or ants might construct
if they could consciously make themselves, as Individuals and as communities,
the centers of value." In the "center of value" scheme no clear distinction
is made between value relative to "existent beings" which also qualify as
"selves" and those that do not. There he 1s concerned more with value as a
function of the relations between any kind of being than with valuation as the
activity of "selves" which do not simply know or value themselves as one
"existent being" among others,but know themselves to be valued by other selves
as well as valuing others than the self. His relational theory of value does
not develop the existential emphasis on the self as agent; the self which 1s
not only one being among others 1n a complex relational structure, but is
precisely that being which self-consciously chooses and commits Itself on the
basis of some Interpretation of past, present and possible future actions of
]CV (1961), p. 110.
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others upon 1t. It was concerned almost exclusively with presenting an onto-
logical analysis of the relation of being and value. He did not address himself
to the eplstemoloqlcal problems Involved 1n human valuations.
In the "responsibility scheme" the emphasis 1s not upon value as at
function of the relations between beings but upon valuation as a mode of cognl-
tion, or an element in all cognition from the standpoint of the knowing subject.
An understanding of Niebuhr's relational theory of action depends upon his.
understanding of what 1t means to be a "self," where value relations and the
valuations of the self become part of the larger question of human selfhood.
The relational value theory stressed the notion of reciprocity among
related beings as good-for or bad-for each other. The central notion of
"responsibility" may be regarded as this reciprocity between beings described
from tdTe. point of view of one of these beings which as a "self" cannot escape
seeking some understanding of Itself 1n relationship to other things and
selves. Relational value theory 1s taken up into a more Inclusive theory. In
the "center of value" scheme Nlebuhr made no clear distinction between values
relative to "existent beings" which qualify as "selves" and those that do not.
Only once 1n "Value Theory and Theology" does he mention "the relative stand-
2
point of the observer." Yet elsewhere in his writings Nlebuhr has repeatedly
drawn attention to a very different kind of relativity—the historical
*Cf. Schrader's comment: "Nlebuhr wants to say that value 1s relevant
not only to human existence but also to the life of animals and' nature 1n
general. But he cannot and does not deny that all valuation depends upon the
Interpretation of experience from the perspective o?~a vaYuTng and also eval¬
uated subject." "Value and Valuation," FE, p. 177.
2
VTT, p. 106. Paul Ramsey and George Schrader have made similar obser¬
vations. Cf. "The Transformation of Ethics," FE, p. 152 and "Value and
Valuation," FE, p. 178, respectively.
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relativity of the valuations made by any "self". In the section on "relative
1
centers of value" discussed in the previous chapter Niebuhr does assume that
it is man qua man who affirms some other "existent being" as "center of value,"
but in neither of the essays in which he presented his relational value theory
did he give explicit attention to the subjective conditions of value knowledge.
The Meaning of Responsibility
In his posthumously published lectures, The Responsible Self (1961)
H. Richard Niebuhr proposed a theory for understanding and ordering moral ex¬
perience generally and moral agency in particular. He has called this "the
2
theory of responsibility." He developed his exposition of this new way of
conceptualizing moral experience and action by means of a comparative analysis
of the formal structure of the teleological and deontological ethical theories.
He was, of course, well aware that these two theories have provided the con¬
ceptual structure for all the most important normative theories of ethics in
the history of Western moral philosophy. Furthermore, he acknowledged that
Christian theologians who have had an interest in formulating a systematic
theory of Christian ethics have traditionally used one or other of these two
approaches.
On the theoretic side, when Christians have undertaken to set
forth the pattern present in the action of Christ they have found
kinship between it and certain patterns of moral conduct set forth
by the universalist philosophers, that is by thinkers who saw man
first of all as a citizen of the universe, as endowed with a reason
that seeks universal truth, as subject to laws that are universal.
For the most part these affinities of the Christian ethos with
lrSupra, pp. 39-44.
2
RS, p. 61, passim.
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other types of universal ethics have been stated 1n terms of Idealism
or of legalism, as when Platonic or Aristotelian ethics on the one
hand, Kantian thought or universal utilitarianism on the other, have
been associated with Christian ethics.1
Niebuhr's dissatisfaction with both did not arise because he believed
their employment so seriously compromised the content of Christian ethics that
they should be abandoned on theological grounds. Nor did 1t result from un¬
covering large areas of logical confusion which rendered each generally Invalid.
The criticisms which he does make are not directed toward alleged logical
difficulties or terminological unclarity attending the normative and meta-
ethical judgments contained in them such as is found in the works of moral
philosophers like G. E. Moore, Stephen Toulmin or William Frankena. Indeed,
Niebuhr is not interested in them as normative theories of ethics; nor is he
concerned to question their adequacy as meta-ethlcal theories. Rather he cen¬
ters his attention upon two particular images of man which, he argues, each
presupposes. Both assume that their theories about what is good for man and
what is required of him are consonant with the actual nature of man qua man.
The teleologist, no matter how he defines the telos which is to be realized
in action, carries on his debates with his fellow teleologists "against the
2
background of a common understanding of the nature of our personal existence."
"Moral theories [teleological] and moral exhortations to a large extent pre¬
suppose the future oriented, purposive character of human action and differ
for the most part only—though seriously enough—in the ends they recommend or
3
accept as given with human nature itself." The same is true mutatis mutandis
1
Ibid., p. 168. Cf. pp. 65f, 127-135; CE, p. 6.




Nlebuhr contends then that teleologlcal and deontologlcal theories of
ethics, when they are analyzed according to their formal structure (rather
than the varying material definitions of what 1s normatlvely good or right)
presuppose and are largely determined by some "root-metaphor" or "symbollc-
form." This approach Involves an acknowledged borrowing from Ernst Casslrer's
2
"philosophy of symbolic forms."
I propose that we undertake to reflect on our life as moral selves
1n general, as Christians 1n particular, with the aid of con¬
temporary Ideas about the nature and role of symbolic forms. These
Ideas have been made familiar to us by many students of human life
and action but have not been widely used 1n those inquiries we
generally designate by the name ethics. . . . This 1s the line of
thought persuasively presented and amply Illustrated by that
philosophy of symbolic form which Ernst Casslrer developed.3
It is an attempt to show that man has always sought to understand himself and
the moral quality of his actions by means of conceptual schemes (teleology and
deontology) which are derived from particular archetypal preconceptual symbols
or "root-metaphors."^
hbld., pp. 51-53.
^The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, 3 Vols., translated by Ralph Manhelm
(New Haven: Yale Un1vers1ty Press1953-57). An Essay on Man (Hew Haven:




The term 1s Professor Pepper's. Cf. Stephen C. Pepper, World Hypo¬
theses : A Study 1n Evidence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961),
Perhaps tFe clearest short definition of the meaning and function of a root
metaphor 1s the following: "I mean an area of empirical observation which 1s
the point of origin for a world hypothesis. When aqyone has a problem before
him and 1s at a loss how to handle 1t, he looks about 1n his available ex¬
perience for some analogy that might suggest a solution. This suggestive
analogy gives rise to an hypothesis which he can apply towards the solution.
. . . The originating analogy, I have called the root metaphor of a world
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Our method has been derived largely from the philosophy of
symbolic forms which sees man as symbolic animal. He is a
being who grasps and shapes reality, including the actuality
of his own existence, with the aid of great images, metaphors,
and analogies. These are partly in his conscious mind but so
largely 1n his unconscious mind and in the social language
that he tends to take them for granted as forms of pure reason.
They are, indeed, forms of reason, but of historic reason . . .
his patterns are not copies of the reality to which he reacts
but products of an art of knowing in which subject and object
interact. His conceptual systems, accordingly, are largely
abstractions from his symbolic forms.'
Given this view of man as an Image-making and image-using creature Niebuhr
explores two questions. First, what are the root-metaphors by which men have
sought to clarify and order their moral life? Second, are these symbols and
the conceptual schemes which have been developed from them wholly adequate?
The Symbols of Homo Faher and Homo Politicus
Historically and practically, the symbol of man-the-maker, man who
constructs things and plans his actions according to some goal or envisaged
2
end has been pervasive. In the everyday affairs of our common life, whether
hypothesis. An analysis of the root metaphor generates the categories of the
hypothesis. The adequacy of the hypothesis then depends on the capacity of
the categories to render interpretations of the features of our world with
precision and unrestricted scope. A world hypothesis differs from other hypo¬
theses only in its unrestricted scope." Concept and Quality; A World Hypo¬
thesis. The Paul Carus Lectures for 1961(La Salle, Illinois: Open Court"
Publishing Co., 1967), p. 3. Pepper's work is cited by Niebuhr in support of
his understanding of man as a symbol-using animal. In his role as metaphysi¬
cian man has used such symbols or root-metaphors as generative substance, the
republic, the organism, the machine, or the mathematical system, to describe
the character of being itself. Cf. RS, p. 153.
]RS, p. 161.
2Ibid., pp. 48-51 , 69f, 88-91 , 108, 131-136, 160.
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iri the sphere of science, education, legislation, industry or agriculture,
we find ourselves engaged in purposeful activity directed toward securing some
end or fulfilling some ideal. From Aristotle to his Christian disciple,
Thomas Aquinas, to the more recent schools of idealists and utilitarians,
hedonists and self-realizationlsts, the symbol of homo faber has been the
dominant image in all teleological thinking about morals.
For the Greek philosopher and many who knowingly or un¬
knowingly follow him, man is the being who makes himself—
though he does not do so by h1mself--for the sake of a desired
end. Two things in particular we say about ourselves: we act
toward an end or are purposive; and we act.upon ourselves, we
fashion ourselves, we give ourselves form.
The teleologist approaches the double task of understanding the meaning of
his existence and action as a man in terms of the myriad enterprises in which
he seeks to attain some goal which he has set for himself or which has been
set for him by another. Having observed this about himself it seems only
natural to ask if there is not some final end, some goal transcending all the
more immediate goals which is good in itself. Many questions have been and are
continually debated by teleological theorists. What 1s the nature of the end
to be realized? Is it to be defined from the point of view of the self alone,
or the immediate society of family, race, class, or from the perspective of
universal community? The answers given to these questions vary greatly, but
all are agreed that the image of man as homo faber affords the most adequate
analogy for understanding and shaping human life and conduct.
But for many other philosophers the image of mari-the-citizen, obedient
man under law living out his life in the midst of customs, commandments, and
Ibid., p. 49.
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rules has seemed to be a far more typical and pervasive characteristic of
1
human experience than that of man-the-maker. This political symbol, like the
technical symbol of man-the-maker 1s synecdochlc. A symbol drawn from one
2
area of human experience 1s used to Interpret aVT_ of 1t. In science, govern¬
ment, Industry and family life men find 1t morally necessary to legislate,
administer, and be subject to laws and regulations. From the Stoics and Kant,
to Its criticism and refinement by others like the "Cambridge moralists" and
eminent modern representatives among idealists and Intuitlonists, the symbol
of homo poHtlcus has been the dominant Image in all deontologlcal thinking
about morals.
The Image has applicability to all our existence in society.
We come Into being under rules of family, neighborhood, and
nation, subject to the regulation of our action by others.
Against these rules we can and do rebel, yet find 1t necessary—
morally necessary, that 1s,—to consent to some laws and to
give ourselves rules, or to administer our lives 1n accordance
with some discipline.3
The teleologlst does not understand himself as living apart from law;
ant1nom1an1sm 1s no necessary feature of his self-understanding. But rules are
always means to an end and they are never good 1n themselves. He submits to
rules or laws only Insofar as they serve some end viewed as good 1n Itself.
For the deontologlst, on the other hand, laws are good 1n themselves Irrespec¬
tive of consequences. He understands himself to be a law-giving (active) and
law-consenting (passive) being whose good is defined by precisely these activi¬
ties. The lawful life 1s the good life and the law 1s not a future Ideal but
1
Ibid., pp. 51-54, 70-71, 88, 92, 128-135, 160.
2




always a present demand.^ Among deontologlsts, too, many discussions ensued
2
over the scope of "the republic that 1s to be governed." Is 1t the self seek¬
ing unity 1n its many roles as a law-maker and law-ab1der (or law-breaker). Or
is 1t the human community which legislates laws which may, but often do not,
coincide with the rules proposed by less Inclusive groups or by the Individual
self? Or is there sane community more Inclusive than that of the human com¬
munity—nature or God—whose laws are either obeyed or disobeyed but not denied?
The answers given to these and other questions vary, but all are agreed that
the Image of man as homo poHtfcus 1s the most adequate symbol for interpreting
moral as opposed to non-moral experience.
Nlebubr readily grants that these two symbols of man-the-maker and
man-the-c1t1zen have both yielded comprehensive interpretations of that reality
we Intend when we use the term morality. But symbols remain symbols and not
reality. As synecdochlc analogies they cannot avoid having the limitations
Inherent 1n their function. They are both broad and comprehensive symbols but
they are not copies of reality.
. . . the fundamental Images which we employ 1n understanding
ana directing ourselves remain Images and hypotheses, not
truthful copies of reality, and something of the real Hes
beyond the borders of the Image: something more and something
different needs to be thought and done in our quest for the
truth about ourselves and 1n our quest for true existence.3
The above passage makes 1t clear that Nlebuhr's rejection of these two symbols




3ib1d., pp. 55-56, Cf. p. 161.
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functlon of symbols. In The Responsible Self he gives brief hints at what is
Involved but no adequate account of the nature and function of symbolic forms
1s givenj It 1s impossible for any Interpreter to understand with any pre¬
cision Niebuhr's own understanding of the core Idea of "symbolic forms," from
the very cryptic Interpretation he has given. He acknowledged the fact that
"method has been derived largely from the philosophy of symbolic forms
. . and that he had undertaken "to reflect on our life as moral selves
. . . with the aid of contemporary Ideas about the nature and the role of
3
symbolic forms," but he apparently did not think it necessary to spell out
what this "method" entailed. He does not provide the reader with any explana¬
tion of "the nature and role of symbolic forms." Given the ambitious task
The Kantian concept of "form" was the starting point of Cassirer's
"philosophy of symbolic forms." It was his chief aim to demonstrate that the
synthesizing powers of mind so profoundly and precisely detailed by Kant In
the "transcendental analytic" cannot and should not have been limited (as Kant
did limit then) to knowledge in the realm of the natural sciences and mathe¬
matics but must be extended to include the totality of human culture. His
magnum opus, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, is a sustained attempt to effect
a transition from "Kant's "critique of reason** to a "critique of culture." (Vol.
I, pp. 73-85). On this view the natural sciences are only one of several in¬
stitutionalized activities such as art, language, myth and religion—which
together define the meaning of "culture."
The specific details of the relation between Cassirer's notion of
"symbolic forms" to that of Kant may be found in the following studies.
Carl M. Hamburg, Symbol and Reality: Studies in the Philosophy of Ernst
Cassirer (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), pp. 34-43; Charles~¥. Hencfel's
^Introduction" to The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Vol. I, pp. 1-65; S.
Kcrner, "Ernst Cassl'rer," the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 2, edited by
Paul Edwards (New York and London: Collfer-Macnil 1 fan, 1963), pp. 446-466;
J. K. Stephen, "Cassirer's Doctrine of the a priori," and Robert S. Hartman,
"Cassirer's Philosophy of Symbolic Forms," in The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer,
edited by Paul S. Schlllp (Evanston, Illinois: The Library oTTivIng Philoso-
phers, Inc., 1949), Vol. VI, pp. 151-157 and 289-333 respectively.
2RS, p. 161 (italics added).
3Ibia., p. 151 (italics added).
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whlch he set for himself the existence of this "hidden agenda" weakens the
theoretical usefulness of his analyses of the teleologlcal and deontologlcal
theories as well as his own constructive proposal.
The two older Images of man-the-maker and man-the-c1t1zen have yielded
"fruitful" but "inadequate" conceptual schemes. All images yield only partial
perspectives on the totality of moral reality. A new image will yield a dif¬
ferent conceptual scheme. It, too, will be a partial perspective and therefore
will not yield a conceptual scheme to replace the older images.
It represents an alternative or an additional way of conceiving
and defining this existence of ours . . .' [It] brings into
view aspects of our self-defining conduct that are obscured when
the older images are exclusively employed.
But at another point Nlebuhr seems to have advanced a larger claim for the new
image of responsibility.
On the whole, the difference between teleologies! and deontological
practice and theory can be reduced—perhaps the two approaches may
even be reconciled—if it is noted that both obedient man and man-
the-maker are both responders and that there are yet other ways of
responding to action upon us beside these two.3
It is difficult to tell exactly what kind of "reconciliation" Niebuhr has in
mind here. Also, it is hard to see how the true but trivial fact that in both
schemes the moral agent responds, could by itself provide any grounds for
effecting a reconciliation. Niebuhr may have had something more and different
in mind than this, but if he did, he chose not to pursue it.
Nevertheless, my present intention is not to argue that the
method of response-analysis is a more inclusive and fruitful
approach to . . . human life than the standard approaches but
rather to try to understand our existence . . . with its aid,
1Ibid., p. 56.
2




puttlng aside the question of Its greater applicability or the
question whether 1t Indeed offers opportunity for a more unified
understanding of our ethos or only another, complementary way of
dealing with ethical problems. ...
The fundamental characteristic of the theory of the responsible self
is Niebuhr's constantly reiterated belief in the primordial social and temDoral
character of all human existence. Both the teleologlcal and deontologlcal
schemes on his view share a common fault. They both have an individualistic
2
and nor»-h1stor1cal view of human selfhood. The self exists only in relation
to other selves. But 1n both teleology (where the first relation is to Ideals,
ideas or goals) and in deontology (where the first relation is to law or laws)
this relation to other selves 1s derivative or secondary rather than primordial.
Thus,when Nlebuhr says that "there are yet many other ways of responding to
actions upon us besides these two," he apparently means that both the object
responded to (selves rather than Ideals or laws) and the response itself are
different. His arguments in support of these contentions will be explored
further later.
Niebuhr 1s by no means the only thinker to have felt dissatisfied with
3
the traditional distinction between teleologlcal and deontologlcal ethics.
He did not believe that further refinement of these schemes was any answer. In
^Ibid., pp. 136-137.
2Ibid.t pp. 69-71, 90-93.
3
Cf. the remark of R. B. Braltnwalte: "The more I study ethics the
more convinced I become that the traditional distinction between 'teleologlcal
ethics' . . . and 'deontological ethics' ... 1s a false one. ... In the
contest of Christian ethics, a Christian does not love his neighbor only to
secure joy, peace, the visio del, but neither does he do so only to obey a
Kantian imperative: he does so 1n order to become a member o^ the Kingdom of
Heavenj that 1s, he opts for one total universe rather than for another."
Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Ian T. Ramsey (New
York: The MacmTlTan" CoriipanyTl%6j, p. 92.
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each case they are derived from images of man's nature which are no longer
adequate 1n view of a new image which he believed was emerging in the conscious¬
ness of modern man. "To these two great dominant symbols a third is being
gradually added in our modern world, the symbol of responsibility . . . the
symbol of homo dialogicus . . It would make no sense to ask Niebuhr why
he chose this particular symbol of responsibility, for it is a cardinal feature
of this approach to morals that symbolic forms are not "chosen" either arbi¬
trarily or as a result of rational deliberation. The symbol of responsibility
is, he believed, simply there, present in the consciousness of modern men, in
our common moral language and in the specialized inquiries of the several
2
social sciences.
The Symbol of Homo Dialoglcus
We must begin by distinguishing the use of the word "responsibility"
among most moral philosophers from its special function as a symbolic form.
The concept of responsibility has had a prominent place in the thought of
3
moral philosophers at least since Aristotle. Most of than have agreed that
some degree of freedom must be accorded the agent in the determination of moral
4
actions. Thus debate has centered on the meaning of the notion of "freedom"
}RS, p. 160.
2Ibid., pp. 56-57, 162.
3
Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 3, Sec. 1-5.
4
For example, Kant 1n a lecture on "Degrees of Responsibility" says:
"The degree of responsibility depends on the degree of freedom. Freedom In¬
volves capacity to act, and in addition cognizance of the impulsive ground
and objective character of the action. These are the subjective conditions
of freedom, and 1n their absence responsibility cannot be imputed." Lectures
in Ethics, translated by Louis Infield (New York: Harper & Row, Pub., 1963)7
p. W.
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or "free-win" apart from which the Idea of responsibility was believed to have
little clear meaning. The kind of freedom Involved has most often been ex¬
pressed by the two terms 1ndeterm1n1sm (the view that some events, among them
human volition or decisions, are uncaused) and determinism (the view that every
event Including human volition and decisions are caused by or happen as an
effect of antecedent events) which 1s not the same as fatalism (the view that
holds that al_l_ human decisions are wholly caused by some power or agency
external to the human agent). Determinism, as 1t 1s understood 1n ethics, 1s
a moral concept and is not to be confused with logical necessity on the one
hand, or mechanical notions of force or compulsion on the other.^ Generally
speaking 1n the history of moral theory the teleologlcal or utilitarian tradi¬
tion has tended to stress the fact that determinism 1s morally compatible
with the notion of responsibility while the deontologies! or Kantian tradition
1
has generally denied this to be so. With the demise of Idealism generally,
3 £l
and of self realIzationlst and 1ntu1t1on1st ethics 1n particular, most recent
Cf. William K. Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 57-62,and JbTnrTHospers, Human Conduct (London: Rupert
Hart-Davis, 1963; New York: Harcourt, Brace X World, Inc., 1961), pp. 502-507.
2
Cf. A. C. Ewing, Ethics (New York: Macmlllan, 1953), Chapter 8. Pro¬
fessor Ewlng 1s almost alone among recent English moral philosophers to champion
indetermlnism 1n the great tradition of Butler, Sldgwick, Rashdall, Martlneau,
Moore, Prltchard and Carrltt. Sir David W. Ross is an exception among deon-
tologists however.
3
A. C. Bradley, Ethical Studies, 2nd edition (Oxford University Press,
1962), especially his essay "The Vulgar Notion of Responsibility in Connexion
With the Theories of Free Will and Necessity," and T. H. Green, Prolegomena
to Ethics (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1899), Bk II, Ch. I are represen¬
tative.
4
G. E. Moore, Principle Ethlca (Cambridge, 1903). This 1s the most
Influential work by a twentieth century 1ntu1tion1st.
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EngUsh and American moral philosophers see determinism as not morally incom¬
patible with responsibility, whatever may be the result of metaphysical argu¬
ments in favor of determinism or IndeterminismJ
It 1s of first Importance to understand that Niebuhr intends something
very different 1n his employment of the Idea of responsibility as a symbolic
form. Responsibility is not simply a normative concept whose meaning is defined
by the use to which it has been put in the older conceptual schenes of teleol¬
ogy and deontology which have so dominated our common moral discourse.
The use of this image in the field of ethics is not yet con¬
siderable. When the word, responsibility, is used of the self as
agent, as doer, it 1s usually translated with the aid of the
older images as meaning direction toward goals or as ability to
be moved by respect for law.
The symbol of responsibility comprehends a different understanding of
human self-existence and agency than those symbols from which the conceptual
schemes of teleology and deontology have been developed. It proposes a new
approach to the ancient Socratlc injunction, "Know thyself." What does it
mean to live and act as a man qua man? With what great symbol or metaphor can
we best understand ourselves and order our activity "as we decide, choose, com-
3
m1t ourselves, and otherwise bear the burden of our necessary human freedom"?
According to Niebuhr's typology, the teleologist answers this question by say¬
ing that man can best understand his existence and action by means of an
analogy drawn from the work of the artist or craftsman who creates or constructs
Vor a brilliant account of the metaphysical debate see Richard Taylor's
essay, Metaphysics (Englewood CUffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963),




thlngs according to a vision, ideal, or plan. He understands himself 1n all
his activity as homo faber, and therefore when he faces the practical question,
"What shall I (we) do?" he answers first by asking the prior question, 'What
1s the supreme goal or ideal for my life?". The deontologist believes that
man can best understand himself as a moral agent by means of an analogy drawn
from his role as a citizen, as & member of some social group governing as well
as governed. He understands himself in al_l_ his activity as homo pollticus,
and therefore when he, too, faces the practical question, "What shall I (we)
do?" he answers first by asking a prior question, "What 1s the supreme law of
my life?" The ethic of responsibility is controlled by "the image of man-the-
answerer, man engaged in dialogue, man acting 1n response to actions upon him."*
Man understands himself in aVj_ his activity as homo dialogicus, and when faced
with the practical question, "What shall I (we) do?" he answers first by asking
a prior question, "What is going on?", "What is being done to me?" or more
specifically, "To whom or what am I responsible and in what community of inter-
2
action am I tr\yself?".
It is necessary now to proceed beyond these preliminary questions and
examine the formal structure of the theory of responsibility.
Niebuhr's ethic of responsibility 1s comprised of four basic "elements."
They are the ideas of 1) response, 2) interpretation, 3) accountability, and
4) social solidarity. The first two of these ideas are not, to my mind, very
clearly distinguished from each other. "Response" 1s a reflexive notion; it
presupposes the idea of some previous action directed toward the subject who
Ibid., p. 56.
2
Ibid., pp. 63 and 68.
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makes the response. Furthermore, according to Nlebuhr, "we do not call it
the action of a self or moral action unless 1t is response to 1nterpreted
1
action upon us." Responses defined as "Interpreted actions" are therefore to
be distinguished from such bodily reactions as heart-beats or knee-jerks. But
if it is the idea of interpretation (the second defining characteristic of the
theory of responsibility) which differentiates responses from reactions, then
in what sense 1s the notion "response" a separate "element" or defining charac¬
teristic of the theory? Perhaps he simply intended to draw attention at the
outset to the reflexive linguistic character of the word responsibility, and
thus bring to prominence the idea of the moral agent as not first of all the
initiator of action but the recipient of some previous action. The actions
of others are in fact the "raw material" from which the self will fashion Its
own distinctive response.
The third element of "accountability" is not to be construed as It 1s
1n deontologlcal thinking, that is, as referring to obligation or duty. Respon¬
sible actions not only involve the interpretation of actions upon us but also
Include anticipation of the responses which our response will call forth.
An agent's action 1s like a statement in a dialogue. Such
a statement not only seeks to meet, as 1t were, or fit Into,
the previous statement to which 1t 1s an answer, but 1s made 1n
anticipation of reply. It looks forward as well as backward;
1t anticipates objections, confirmations, and connections.2
Accountability means that the self not only seeks to Interpret past actions
but also seeks to "take account of," possible future responses to Its response




here is that the responsible self cannot rest content with Interpreting past
actions In determining its response but equally must anticipate possible future
responses.
The fourth component is the idea of "social solidarity." Both words
are important. The action of an agent is responsible 1n the fullest sense only
when it is made in full consciousness of the continuity of Its own existence
within a continuing community of agents to whom response 1s being made. "Our
action is responsible, when it is response to action upon us in a continuing
discourse or interaction among beings forming a continuing society."^ On
balance it appears that these last two elements in the theory combine to stress
the relational complexity of the situation in which any agent must carry on its
Inescapable task of understanding, relating and evaluating the actions of other
agents upon it. The notion of "accountability" points specifically to the
future dimension, to the anticipation of continuing interaction of response and
counter-response. The notion of "social solidarity" increases the scope,and
therefore the complexity of the relations to include the whole continuing com¬
munity of agents. Niebuhr has summarized succinctly his initial sketch of the
formal characteristics of his theory of responsibility.
The idea or pattern of responsibility, may, ... be defined as
the idea of an agent's action as response to an action upon him
in accordance with his interpretation of the latter action and
with his expectation of response to bis response*, and all of this
in a continuing community of agents.L




1s toe notion "Interpretation." If, as Nlebuhr has affirmed, responsible action
begins with toe self's response to what 1s happening to it, then clearly 1t Is
absolutely essential that It be able intelligibly to identify, compare and
relate events such that they are understood and have meaning. The notion
"interpretation" is then,1n the broadest sense,an eplstemologlcal notion which
refers to this ability of the self to understand Individual events as related
to other events 1n a larger context of events. The responsible self 1s first
the recipient of the action of other selves upon It, but It is not a passive
recipient. It interprets these specific actions, and its responses to them will
be determined by its Interpretation of how these actions "fit" as parts of a
larger whole. This aspect of the ethic of responsibility was "prefigured" In
toe ethics of Spinoza according to NiebuhrJ For Spinoza,ethics is concerned
with that fundamental "correction of the understanding which will permit men to
substitute for toe unclear and self-centered, emotion-arousing Interpretations
of what happens to them, a clear and distinct interpretation of all events as
2
intelligible, rational events In the determined whole." As a neo-Kant1an
Nlebunr could not, of course, accept Spinoza's understanding of the relation
3
between mind and Its objects. As a Christian theologian he believed that
"revelation" rather than toe exercise of rationality was the Intelligible event
4
which alone made this "correction" possible. But these and other important
1
, pp. 57f., 171.
2Ibid;., p. 58.
3MR, pp. 10, 15; Cf. pp. 91-109.
A
Ibid., pp. 93, 109-132. "By revelation ... we mean that special
occasion which provides us with an image by means of which all the occasions of
personal and common life become intelligible." Ibid,, p. 109.
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differences aside, Niebuhr agreed with Spinoza that the basic ethical problem
for man is how to achieve the correct interpretation of the nature of Being
Itself, or of God. Furthermore, Niebuhr agreed with Spinoza that the question
of human freedom cannot be defined as self-determination, rather "freedom"
describes that state of consciousness which is consequent upon being delivered
from false or Illusory interpretations of reality. The self is determined 1n
Its responses by its Interpretation of the character of the universal context,
that 1s, by its interpretation of Being itself as good or evil. "All r?\y
specific and relative evaluations expressed in my interpretations and responses
are shaped, guided, and formed by the understanding of good and evil I have
1
upon the whole."
This "Initial sketch" of the theory of responsibility must now be made
more explicit. It is clear from what has been said already that this 1s not
a normative theory of ethics if we mean by "normative" rule governed. Rather,
it is in the first instance a theory of human selfhood. Niebuhr is attempting
to elaborate a distinctive theory of what it means to be a self, and 1n doing
so he is also arguing that the dominant schemes of teleology and deontology
are inadequate or defective precisely as theories of human selfhood. In order
to show that this is in fact the case Niebuhr proceeds to describe three dimen¬
sions of human self-existence which he believes are constitutive to the exis¬
tence of selves qua selves. Every being exists, knows and acts as a self only
insofar as it sustains these primordial relations. They are not the sort of
1
RS, p. 124. Niebunr rejected any mechanical or mathematical model
as appropriate for describing divine determinism. Cf. "The Idea of Covenant
and American Democracy," pp. 128, 131-135.
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relatlonshlps which any self can choose tc enter or refrain from entering Into
but they are given with the life of selves as such. They are the 1) social,
2) temporal, and 3) religious (value) relations.
The Soda! Self
One of the most prominent and constantly reiterated themes 1n Nlebuhr's
thought is his belief in the primordial social character of human existence.
The self exists only in relation to other selves. The decisions made by a
responsible self are his decisions but they are not Individualistic, for we
have no selfhood apart from our relations to other human selves. Niebuhr ack¬
nowledged his indebtedness to Kierkegaard for helping him to recognize the
"existential nature of the Irreducible self," but he was critical of his empha¬
sis on the solitariness of the individual. In order to contrast his own view
with that of Kierkegaard, Hiebuhr coined the term "social existentialism."^
Ethical decisions are existential because they cannot be reached by speculative
inquiry of any kind. They are not. arrived at by inferential reasoning. They
are "made in freedom by a responsible subject acting 1n the present moment on
2
the basis of what 1s true for hiin." The decisions we must make as responsible
moral agents are our decisions but we neither make them simply for ourselves
nor by ourselves. Klerkegaardian existentialism abstracts the self from society
and therefore in Niebuhr's view denies the irreducible social character of the
existence of any self. This sort of individualistic existentialism relinquishes
any interest in the self's responsibility for other selves. If, and when5we
^C, pp. 241-249.
^Ibid., p. 241. Cf. pp. 243-246.
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raise the ultimate existential question of the meaning of life, we cannot do
so simply as solitary individuals but only in solidarity with every other
meaning-seeking self. The most pressing existential questions are raised in
their "most passionate form not in our solitariness but in our fellowship."^
It is this same charge of Individualism which Niebuhr brings against
teleological and deontologlcal ethics. Here, however, the problem is not that
of the self's solitary relation to God in abstraction from the society of other
selves. The primary relation of the self is either to Ideals or Ideas (teleol¬
ogy) or to law or laws (deontology) and not to other selves. What is most
important about the self for the teleologist is its rational ability to under¬
stand the general in the particular, and to abstract "the formal measurable,
2
and comparable in all occasions." The observation is true, but it becomes
false when the self is Identified v/1th this one activity. "In this situation
I acknowledge a relation to other rational beings but any connection with then
is a function of my relation to the objects of reason. First I know the objects
-a
of reason and only secondarily do I acknowledge other knowers. Here a choice
has been made to regard the life of the mind as the essential characteristic
of human selfhood. For the deontologist it is "conscience" rather than the
power of understanding or knowing which is the most important element 1n self¬
hood. Conscience is the self-legislating center of the self. The knowledge
present to conscience is a knowledge of law and every self defines Itself first
in relation to 1 aw.**
1Ib1d., p. 244.
2RS, p. 70.
3Ibid. 4Ibid., p. 71.
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Niebuhr has no wish to deny the importance of the existence of the self
as a rational being in relation to ideas,or as a moral being in relation to
laws and mores,but he rejects these relations as fundamental for understanding
and defining ourselves as moral agents. The self cannot be defined in terms
of any one of its subjective functions. No intrasubjective relation can be
allowed to obscure the primacy of the relation of one self to another.
To be a self in the presence of other selves 1s not a deriva¬
tive experience but primordial. To be able to say I am I 1s
not an inference from the statement that I think thoughts nor
from the statement that I have a law-acknowledging conscience.
It 1s, rather, the acknowledgment of my existence as the counter¬
part of another self , , . the self is fundamentally social In
this sense that it is a being which not only knows Itself in
relation to other selves but exists as a self only 1n that
relation.1
According to a long tradition the distinguishing characteristic of
selfhood is its capacity for critical self-awarer.ess or self-transcendence,
that is, the self is that kind of being which can view itself as an object.
But how is it possible to account for this reflexive capacity of any self to
become an object to itself? Nlebuhr's answer to this question was drawn for
the most part from the thinking of the American social psychologist, George
2
Herbert Mead, and the Jewish theologian, Martin Buber. Mead taught, and
Niebuhr accepted the view that selfhood is not a given quality of the organism
1Ibid.
2
A comparative study and critique of the dialogic theory of the self In
the writings of Mead and Buber has been provided by Paul E. Pfuetze 1n his
book, Self, Society, Existence: Human Mature and Dialogue in the Thought of
George Herbert Mead and Martin" Buber (New York: Harper andTrothers, 196177
originally published under the title, The Social Self (New York: Bookman
Associates, 1954). In a foreword to this book Niebuhr observes, "few recent
Ideas have been so fruitful in so many areas of thought as the idea of the
interpersonal nature of our human existence . . . with Its aid light 1s being
cast on may obscure places in our understanding of ourselves 1n our world."
Ibid., p. vi.
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at birth but develops through the individual organism's relation to other
selves and through its relation to the social process as a whole ("The general¬
ized other")\ The self's relationship to Itself 1s not direct but mediated.
The object-self is known only insofar as the subject-self takes "the attitudes
of other Individuals toward himself within a social environment or context of
2
experience and behavior in which both he and they are involved." A person
may choose subsequently to live a relatively solitary existence, as Kierke¬
gaard did; but he did not and could not have become a self outside of relations
to other selves. It 1s possible, on this view, to conceive of a solitary body,
but a solitary self 1s a contradiction 1n terms. Self-consciousness requires
3
knowledge of some of one's own past states, as Kant had taught, but according
to Mead those "past states" could not have arisen as self states apart from
the mediation of other selves. Thus Nlebuhr following Mead, does not claim
that the self is merely conditioned in some way by Its relation to other selves
but that 1t 1s wholly constituted as a self through Its relations to others.
It neither is_nor knows apart from these relations. The self is "a being
which not only knows itself in relation to other selves but exists as a self
only 1n that relation."*
In an earlier essay 1n which he 1s also expounding the Meadlan theory
of social selfhood he seems to deny that self-existence 1s wholly mediated by
^George H. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, edited and with an Introduc¬




Critique of Pure Reason, Kemp Smith trans., B 133.
*RS, p. 71.
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other selves. There he again affirms that "we know ourselves only 1n the pres¬
ence of another" but adds Immediately that "we are not entitled to affirm on
this ground that we exist only in the presence of another."^ It 1s quite clear
that in both instances he 1s saying that self-consciousness depends upon a
relation to other selves who either value or dlsvalue then. But does he in
the second Instance, deny that self-existence 1s also mediated? Perhaps not,
for strictly speaking he only denies that the proposition "we exist only 1n
the presence of another" may be Inferred from the proposition "we know our¬
selves only 1n the presence of another." The former proposition could be asserted
on other grounds.
The self 1s a relational reality both genetically and actually. The dis¬
tinctive mark of human selfhood 1s Its reflexlveness. This reflexiveness is
achieved through the mediation of other selves who criticize or compliment,
accept or reject, praise or blame the self. Selfhood 1s attained through a
process of Internalizing the valuations and judgments of others. The self 1s
always first of all a participant 1n some human community. "We do not only
live among other selves but they live 1n us and we 1n then. Relations here are
not external but Internal so that we are our relations and cannot be selves save
2
as we are members of each other." This 1s a relational theory of selfhood of
a most radical and comprehensive kind.
Nlebuhr was Impressed by the fact that G. H. Mead and Martin Buber,
^"The Eqo-Alter Dialectic and the Conscience," Journal of Philosophy,
Vol. XLII (1945), p. 353.
2
MR, p. 70. "Selves can only exist 1n definite relationship to other
selves. No hard-and-fast line can be drawn between our own selves and the
selves of others, since our own selves exist and enter as such Into our exper¬
ience only Insofar as the selves of others exist and enter as such Into an
experience also." George H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, p. 164.
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though very different with respect to their general philosophical orientation,
were agreed on the primordial social character of human existence. There 1s,
he remarked, a "strange parallelism between the ego-alter dialectic of G. H.
Mead's radically empirical philosophy and Martin Buber's religiously oriented
reflections upon the I-Thou relation."'' Mead's thought was naturalistic and
pragmatic. He sought to understand the nature of human social existence within
the context of evolutionary and behav1or1st1c thinking. Buber's thought was
thelstlc and existential. He sought to understand the nature of human social
2
existence 1n the context of personal 1stic and transcendental (Kant) thinking.
But the very different general orientation should not obscure Important similar¬
ities, similarities which Nlebuhr himself shared. First, both Mead's pragmatism
and Buber's existentialism agree on the primacy of action to thought; existence
to essence. Second, they both reject the need for any metaphysical Inquiry Into
the nature of th1ngs-1n-themselves. Mead does so on the general phenomenallst
thesis that such entities do not exist; Buber on the familiar Kantian grounds
that they do exist but are not open to rational description. Thus, while both
actually did have commitments to fundamentally Irreconcilable metaphysical
positions—Mead was a naturalist and Buber a theist—they were united In the
belief that the doctrine of social selfhood could be formulated Independently
of fundamental metaphysical assumptions.
The specific point 1n Buber's thought that Nlebuhr endorsed was his
1
H. Richard Nlebuhr, "Foreword," 1n Self, Society, Existence by Paul E.
Pfuetze, p. vi.
2
George H. Mead, M1nd, Self and Society, and The Philosophy of the
Present, edited by A. E. Murphy (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1932);
Martin Buber, I and Thou, translated by Ronald Gregor Smith (Edinburgh: T. &
T. Clark, 1937T, Between Man and Man, translated by R. G. Smith (London: Kegan
Paul, Trench, TrubnerlTCo.7 Y947T7"Cf. Pfuetze, Self, Society, Existence, pp.
350-355.
-101-
coritention that the I 1 n the I-Thou dialectic is different frot the I in the
I-it relation.
Using Mead's language we might say that Buber points out how
the I 1n the I-it relation Is not a reflexive being. It does
not know Itself as known; it only knows; were 1t not for the
accompanying I-Thou situation it would not know that it knows.
It values but does not value itself or its valuations.!
Self-consciousness is not an essential quality of human nature as such but it
is a state of being which is acquired by any individual within a society of
individuals who have themselves already attained self-consciousness. Niebuhr
was not interested, as was Mead, in pursuing the question of the genesis of self-
consciousness in the evolutionary development of the human species. Rather,
given the existence of a society of interrelated and interdependent selves, an
individual achieves selfhood through a process of internalizing the judgments
and evaluations of other selves upon it and upon each other. In this sociologi¬
cal explanation of human selfhood, self-awareness is wholly a function of other-
awareness. The inward dialogue which the self may have with itself necessarily
presupposes an external I-Thou dialogue. When Niebuhr asserts that "we are our
relations" he would seem to be saying that the self or "I" is exhaustively de¬
fined in terms of these external relations. But Niebuhr's eagerness to combat
any and all forms of individualism seems to me to have involved him in other
difficulties of which he was not perhaps sufficiently aware.
It is clear, I think, that Niebuhr believed that any inquiry into the
nature of man as he exists in and of himself committed the enquirer to an indi¬
vidualistic interpretation of human existence. We have already seen that he
has lodged this charge against the views of human selfhood assumed by teleological
]RS, pp. 72-73.
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and deontological moralists J The following quote contains a clear statement
of the basis upon which he mounted this charge. His own account of moral agency
is, Niebuhr declared,
. . . an approach to man's self-conduct that begins with neither
purposes nor laws but with responses; that begins with the
question, not about the self as It is in itself, but as 1t is 1n
its response-relations to what Is gTven w1 tPTl t and to 1t.2
Any claim that the Individual self exists and knows that 1t exists as one
finite personal being Independently of any relations to other selves or things
1s denied a priori In the Interest of an exclusively relational theory. How¬
ever, those who defend some theory of the substantiality of the self will
doubtless counter by arguing that Niebuhr's relational theory loses the self
1n Its relations, or more precisely, that Niebuhr cannot properly speak of a
self at all but only of a plurality of relations which are without any 1dent1-
3
fiable termini. They will argue that the assertion that "we are our relations"
as 1t stands 1s meaningless. If "we are our relations" then these relations
are not between anything at all. They are like lines "stretched in the air
4
but without being anchored at either end." If "we are our relations" then
1Ib1d., pp. 69-71.
2
Ibid.» p. 60 (italics added).
3Cf. Schrader, "Value and Valuation," FE, pp. 184-191, 200-204; Julian
Hartt, "The Situation of the Believer," FE, pp. 225-233, 242-244; Helmut Kuhn,
"Conscience and Society," Journal of Religion. XX I (1946), 203-214. Kuhn's
paper 1s a critique of the Interpretation of conscience which Niebuhr developed
1n "The Ego-Alter Dialectic and the Conscience." With respect to the "ego-
alter dialectic" he argues against Niebuhr 1) that self-consciousness is a
necessary 1f not a sufficient condition of our knowledge of other selves (pp.
203-20$ and 2) that while Niebuhr 1s right to maintain that self and society
are correlated he is wrong 1n treating It as symmetrical. It 1s asymmetrical,
(pp. 205, 208).
4
Schrader, "Value and Valuation," FE, p. 190.
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the self loses all self-identity and is reduced to a nexus of relations that
are themselves without any rootage in existence. To have a relation is not to
be a relation. The self performs activities but is not those activities; it
has abilities or capacities but 1t is not those abilities; it sustains relations
but 1s not those relations.
Finally, I would argue that Nlebuhr cannot maintain that the existence,
knowledge and value of selves are exhaustively determined by the relations they
sustain without collapsing the distinction between relations and what they
relate. On the other hand it is quite possible to allow that the nature or
moral character of a person may be radically affected or changed by the relations
he sustains, while at the same time insisting that a necessary condition for
any relations between selves is the existence of those selves.
The Social Self and Conscience
Our discussion so far has provided a general orientation to Niebuhr's
understanding of human selfhood. However, a closer reading of what is involved
in his relational theory of human selfhood is needed. An attempt at re-examining
the moral phenomenon known as "conscience" would, he believed, be a good prac¬
tical test of the viability of his theory. In The Responsible Self he continues
to sharpen his own position on this subject by way of critical interaction with
representatives of the teleological and deontological theories. In an earlier
essay, "The Ego-Alter Dialectic and the Conscience" (1945), essentially the
same protagonists are defined as representatives of the empiricist and ration¬
alist tradition. It is of some interest to note that in those essays where he
1s most concerned with working out the philosophical basis of his ethics, he
does so by setting up his own Neo-Kantian position over against selected
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representatives of the empiricist and rationalist traditions. This was, of
course, evident in his essay "The Center of Value.
Niebuhr begins his essay "The Ego-Alter Dialectic and the Conscience"
by asserting that most discussions on the meaning and function of conscience
have been confused. This confusion has arisen from a failure to understand the
complexity of the phenomena comprehended by this term. Bishop Butler, for
example, was doubtless correct 1n saying that "this principle 1n man by which
2
he approves or disapproves his heart, temper and actions, 1s conscience," but
he regarded 1t as an a priori principle which needed no further analysis or
justification. A beginning may be made In gaining clarity on this subject
Niebuhr believed, when we attend to "the phenomenon of a duality 1n the self 1n
which one Is judged, counseled, commanded, approved, or condemned by an alter
In the ego . , . which seems to be generally and perhaps universally exper-
3
lenced by men." Various accounts of this basic duality 1n the self-consciousness
of moral agents may be found In the history of moral philosophy: From Socrates'
daimon, to Kant's perplexity about a self which doubles as both judge and
accused to Adam Smith's distinction between the self as agent and as "Impartial
spectator" to G. H. Mead's description of the self which internalizes the
4
judgments of a "generalized other."
*Supra, pp. 27-31.
2
Joseph Butler, Works» ed. W. E. Gladstone (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1896), Vol. II, "Sermon I," paragraphs 7 and 8. Cited by Niebuhr, RS p. 74, n.
3. I have cited only the last sentence of a longer quotation by Niebuhr. In
checking the reference I note that it comes in Its entirety from "Sermon I" para¬
graph 8 not paragraphs 7 and 8. It is of some Interest to note in view of Niebuhr's
own thesis that 1n the early editions of the "fifteen sermons," sermon I, entitled
"Upon Human Nature" carried the sub-title "Upon the Soda! Nature of Han."
3
"The Ego-Alter Dialectic and the Conscience," p. 352.
^Ibid., and RS, pp. 75-79.
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Kant's account of conscience 1s criticized by Nlebuhr at two points.
First, he charges that Kant has unnecessarily confused the Inner dialectic be¬
tween the self as agent (noumenal self) and the self that 1s observed and judged
(the phenomenal self) with the conflict between reason and desires or Inclina¬
tion. Kant 1s right, according to Nlebuhr, 1n affirming that the self 1s both
subject and object but wrong 1n believing that the self that knows 1s a dif¬
ferent self from the one which 1s known and for assigning reason (pure practical)
to the former and confining desires and Inclinations to the latter. There are
not two selves, one noumenal and the other phenomenal, which must somehow be
brought into unity. On the contrary the one existing individual self comes
to know Itself, becomes an object to Itself, through the mediation of other
selves. Thus the distinction 1s Inter-personal not 1ntra-personal and the
Intra-personal dialogue 1s not primordial but results from the internalization
of the self-other dialogue.
What must be recognized Nlebuhr claims, is that there are "two distinct
movements in the moral life: (1) the conflict between the more and less social¬
ized, integrated and rational organization of ideas, drives, and sentiments
within a self; and (2) the dialectic 1n the self between an other and the self
in which future or past acts of the self are subjected to scrutiny.Both must
be affirmed but 1t is the latter self-other dialectic which is more fundamental.
Furthermore, reason and emotion qualify both movements.
The phenomenon of conscience cannot then be explained adequately on
Nlebuhr's view in terms of a dialectic between a "higher rational" and a "lower
empirical" self. In his later account of a social theory of conscience in
1Ibid.
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The Responsible Self, Niebuhr refers directly to Kant's discussion of con¬
science 1n The Critique of Practical Reason, There Kant does affirm the self-
other dialectic, but Niebuhr argues*he is restrained from giving it primacy
because of his determination to secure the categorical character of the moral
law promulgated by the rational self. The following is Kant's own account:
Every man has a conscience, and finds himself observed by an
inward judge which threatens and keeps him 1n awe. . . . Now this
original intellectual and moral capacity called conscience, has
this peculiarity 1n 1t, that although Its buslneii is "a business
of man with himself, yet he finds himself compelled by his reason
to transact 1t as If at the command of another person. For the
transaction here is "the conduct of a trial (causa) before a
tribunal. But he who 1s accused by bTs"conscience should be
conceived as one and the same person with the judge which 1s an
absurd conception of a judicial court. . . . Therefore 1n all
duties the conscience of a man must regard another than himself
as the judge of his actions, 1f 1t 1s to avoid self-contradiction.
Now this other may be an actual or a merely ideal person which
reason frames to Itself.'
Quite apart from its Intrinsic Interest 1t has been necessary to quote this
long passage in order to understand Niebuhr's second criticism of the Kantian
account of conscience. The problem centers around that philosophical crux
"as if." Kant cannot say that the experience of conscience arises because
the self is judged by another self external to the self but only that a self
experiences this judgment as if judged by another. He can only say that 1t
1s the rational self which judges the empirical self (or at least Its Inclina¬
tions, desires, affections, etc.) under the appearance of there being another
present as Judge. Kant had suggested that this alter 1n the ego "may be an
actual or a merely Ideal person which reason frames to Itself." Niebuhr denies
Kant*s Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of
Ethics, eu. ana translated, T. K. Abbott (London: Xoncpans, Green and Co.,
Ltd., 6th ed., 1927), pp. 321f. Cited by Niebuhr, RS, p. 74; "as If" Italicized
by Niebuhr.
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that this is the case. The "other" who judges the self is not a creation of
an autonomous pure practical reason but rather 1t Is present to the self as a
consequence of the process of Internalizing the approvals and disapprovals of
the self's actions by other selves. A self does not possess an a priori moral
capacity by which 1t judges its own actions "as 1f at the command of another
person." Consistent with his ongoing critique of deontologies! ethics Nlebuhr
locates the source of this difficulty at the point of the conflict of the
external self-other dialectic with the Kantian internal dialectic between the
"higher self" who legislates and the "lower self" who either obeys or dis¬
obeys. In a relational theory of selfhood there is no need for the rational
self to invoke a phantom other because conscience 1s a function of the self's
existence as a social self. It is continually aware that Its actions are
judged by other selves. "The experience of conscience 1s not like being Judged
by another person; it is indeed being Judged by another, though the other is
not immediately or symbolically and physically present to sense-experiencing
Jroan."
His social theory of conscience has been developed most significantly
in the moral theory of the empiricist tradition. There have been moralists in
this tradition too who have tended to confuse the self-other dialectic with
2
the duality of reason and emotion, but there is as little need for them to
do so as there was for Kant.
In and of itself a social interpretation of conscience does
not say anything about the rational or emotional character, nor
]RS, p. 75.
2
Niebuhr mentions Westermarck as an example of this tendency. Cf. "The
Ego-Alter Dialectic and the Conscience," p. 352.
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about the extent of the society to which man 1s able to reflect
on his own deeds by viewing them with the eyes of others.'
But empirical theories of conscience such as those defended by Adam
Smith and George Herbert Mead are less than satisfactory at a quite different
point. If Kant was criticized for not understanding the social nature of the
self, Adam Smith and 6. H. Mead are criticized for their view of the nature of
2
the other which is present to the self. Adam Smith described this "other"
as an "impartial spectator." The word "conscience" refers to that process in
which a self examines its own conduct from the point of view of an impartial
3
judge. Niebuhr's conviction that the value judgments of every self are made in
relation to a center of value which 1s considered ultimate leads him to question
Adam Smith's assertion that the other which judges the self is an
. . . "impartial spectator" animated by "disinterested emotions."
It is evident that the other on whose judgment the self depends in
judging itself is not uninterested but endowed with profound
attachments to certain beings, values or modes of conduct, though
these attachments differ with the nature of the particular other
whose judgment is sought or given.
If the other is to judge the self disinterestedly 1t will do so not in relation
to its "emotions" but in relation to some "value center" which both the self and
the other recognize as absolute.




H. Richard Niebuhr, "The Ego-Alter Dialectic and the Conscience," pp.
354-355. RS, pp. 76-79.
3
Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments 1n British Moralists,
Selections from Writers Principally of the Eighteenth Century, Vol. I, ed1ted
by L. A. Selby-Bigge (London: 0xfor3~lln1verslty Press, 1897), pp. 297-298.
4
H. Richard Niebuhr, "The Ego-Alter Dialectic and the Conscience," p. 355.
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The organized community or social group which gives to the Indivi¬
dual his unity of self may be called "the generalized other". . . .
It 1s 1n the form of the generalized other that the social,process
Influences the behavior of the Individuals Involved 1n 1t.
[It comes about when a self takes] the attitudes of others toward
himself, and finally crystalI1ze[s] all these particular attitudes
Into a single attitude or standpoint which may be called the
"generalized other."2
Nlebuhr believed this to be an Important concept but one that was not without
Its difficulties. He argued that the Meadlan account of the scope and homogeneity
of the society which 1s generalized 1n self-consciousness was too monolithic.
The self does not participate In a single homogenous society but In many and
diverse social groups. But 1f "the self does not deal with one generalized other
3
but with many," then neither are "all Its others 'generalized'." By the notion
"generalized other" Mead Intended a sort of consensus or composite picture of
the moral attitudes and judgments of the individuals composing a society. Nlebuhr
proposed two modifications of this Idea. He does not deny that the other which
judges the self may be a more or less faithful Image of some social group such
as the family or nation. But for theological reasons he was concerned to adjust
Mead's theory to the requirements of a thelstic ethic. The ultimate confronta¬
tion is not between the self and ajri "other" (defined as a regulative Ideal
grounded 1n the authority of a society of whatever scope); 1t 1s between the
self and the Other, or God (defined as the source and center of the universal
community).^
\lead, Mind, Self and Society, pp. 154-155. Cf. Paul Pfeutze, Self,




H. Richard Nlebuhr, "The Ego-Alter Dialectic and the Conscience," p. 354.
4
Ibid., pp. 354 and 357.
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A second criticism of the Idea of the "generalized other" 1s offered by
Nlebuhr. The response of a self does not depend so much upon Its ability to
frame this picture of a composite other, but upon Its ability to discern a cer¬
tain "constancy" 1n the actions of other selves. This "constancy" 1s really a
pattern which has been learned as a result of repeated encounters 1n which present
action 1s related to the past actions of the other upon the self. But, beyond
the constancy 1n the action of the Thou toward this self there 1s also the con¬
stancy of the response relations of this Thou with other members of the commun-
1 ?
1ty. "The social self 1s never a mere I-Thou self but an I-you self," that 1s,
the Thou to which response 1s made 1s not seen as a single Thou but as "a member
of an Interacting community." The self is able to Interpret and respond
"fittingly" to the action of this Thou 1n large part because 1t understands that
this single action directed toward 1t 1s consistent with past actions of this
Thou toward other selves. So,also*1n that experience of conscience 1n which "I
judge my action from the point of view of another, I do not abstract some vague
general figure from all the particular individuals who together constitute my
3
society, but I refer to constancies 1n the responses of Individuals. . . " In
all its actions the responsible self 1s also always an accountable self, account¬
able not only to its immediate companions (socially and temporally) but to other




Ibid. Niebuhr recognized that to speak 1n this way of behavioral con¬
stancies Is to re-Introduce some notion of law, that 1s, some generalization
about what may be expected 1n a given situation. But clearly this 1s not law
1n the form of a demand which the self Itself (Kant) or some other authority
proposes to the self. It Is law In the descriptive rather than prescriptive
mode.
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The Social Self and History
A second Important dimension of Riebuhr's theory of responsibility 1s
his understanding of the temporality or historicity of all self-existence and
knowledge. Social relations are not an incidental aspect of self-existence and
neither 1s history. The term "history" here refers to the relations between
Individual selves and between communities temporally considered. Time or history
is not therefore accidental to the self, but historical awareness <is an elemental
part of what it means to be a self. To be a soda! self 1s to have a history,
tvery theory of human selfhood must give an account of the temporality of human
existence.
The teleological and deontclogical traditions were censured by Ntebuhr
for having & too Individualistic conception of human agency. They are now criti¬
cized for minimizing the Importance of Its historicity. Teleologlsts are con¬
cerned with the future but primarily only as that shorter or longer time 1n which
the actualization of the telos may be accomplished. But, Miebuhr charges, "of
the critical present they seem hardly aware and the past seems to be cf little
moment In this way of thinking about our action."^ For the decntol©gist--and
Riebuhr again has Kant chiefly 1n mind—tiros 1s not a factor that 1n any way
qualifies even formally the actions of the law consenting self. For Kant, time
was important as a form of sense perception only and he categorically denied
2
that the pure practical reason recognized time at all. Kant did, 1t 1s true,
recognize the Importance of time for the practical reason when he postulated an
lRS, p. 91.
^Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, ed. Abbott, pp. 192 and 196.
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iiiifiortal existence. Niebuhr 1s doubtless correct 1n judging this to be "mostly
afterthought": A belated attempt to adjust "a rigorously logical system, based
on self-legislation only, to the practical needs of a man who though essentially
intelligible being, 1s a sense-being also."^
Niebuhr's criticism of Kierkegaard on this point 1s consistent with his
former one about Individualism. The social and historical character of self-
2
existence are inseparable.
Kierkegaard, rigorous developer of the Idea of Kant's second
critique that he was, tended to concentrate all the meaning of
personal existence Into the moment. His followers, the extreme
existentialists, define man in his freedom as one who newly
creates, chooses, and defines himself 1n every present, though
now he stands alone without even a universal law before him.
With them the subtraction from existing man of his time-fulness,
his past and future and his historicity, has gone as far as 1t
seems possible to go.3
This is a very instructive passage. It shows clearly the heart of Niebuhr's
dissatisfaction with any theory of human moral agency which denies the concrete
historicity of all existence in community. The decisions of every self are made
in what we call the "present." But the present 1s not a timeless moment between
past and future. The responsible self understands the temporality of its exis¬
tence and actions not primarily in terms of successive moments which can be
measured as discrete events. Rather, It 1s aware of a "present" which 1s not a
neutral moment between a no longer and a not yet, but a "present" in which the
past 1s the still present (by means of memory) and the future the already present
(by means of imagination).^ Time for selves is not a dimension of the external
]RS, p. 92. 2CC, pp. 246-248.
3RS, p. 92.
4Ibid., p. 93. Cf. MR, pp. 69, 71, 110-120, 128.
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worlti, a correlate of space. The time of objects 1n the external world may be
defineu in terms of their motion through space but for the self time is a dimen¬
sion of its existence in community.
The self does not and cannot leave its past behind. Publicly, it shares
habits of behavior, of language and thought as a participant in a specific
society. Privately, it remembers joys and sorrow, love and guilt as belonging to
itself alone. Both the categories of its historical reason which it shares with
its social companions and its private remembrances of the affections and valua¬
tions that accompanied its past encounters with other things and selves, will
largely determine what knowledge is possible to the self and how 1t will respond
in the present to "those beings who are like the Thou's and It's of [its]
remembrance."
To be a "time-full" self means that the future too 1s in the present in
the form of the self's expectations, anxieties and hopes. This does not mean
that the self projects itself with its plans into the future, but rather that
it understanas every present encounter with other beings to be qualified by the
hopes and anxieties, anticipations and expectations which it has of future en¬
counters. For example, if a self does not expect to meet another self again it
may ignore its actions, although that too is a response. If it does expect
future encounters it will seek to fit its present actions into a pattern of
responses that will evidence its trust or distrust, love for or indifference
toward that self.
Past, present and future are dimensions of the active self's
time-fullness . . . Whatever else the much commented on continuity
of the self in time may mean, this much must be included: the self
^Ibid., p. 96. Cf. pp. 93, 95-97; MR, pp. 13-16, 69. The importance of
the historicity of the self for Niebuhr's general theory of knowledge will be
treated in more detail in Chapter IV.
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existlng always in a now is one that knows itself as having been
and as going into existence and into encounter.'
It is clear from what has been said so far that the social and temporal
self always exists as an "encountered self." "To be In the present 1s to be in
2
compresence with what is not siyself." Host of our "now's" are routine repeti¬
tions of encounters with familiar others, the character of whose actions are well
known. But a self is most aware of its^existence in the present when it under¬
stands itself to be compresent with another whose actions are neither remembered
nor anticipated, yet are present to the self in threatening or promising form,
3
calling for a response.
The primordial social and historical dimensions of human selfhood combine
to support a theory of moral action that seeks to understand the flttingness
or unfittingriess of the responses of a self in a continuing process of Inter¬
action. It 1s not therefore concerned in the first Instance to determine the
rightness or wrongness of specific actions 1n relation to universal norms—
teleological or deontological—but 1t seeks to understand how each response
which the self makes to the actions of others upon it fit into a total context,
whether they are fitting or not will depend upon this social and time-full
self's interpretation of the objective moral character of that transcendent
being or power which is immanent in every society ana 1n all historical events,







There Is a third end final relation which defines responsible selfhood.
This relation is ultimately determlnative of our moral conduct as selves because
it is a relation to that upon which every self is absolutely dependent for Its
existence and value as a selfJ We remind ourselves that Nlebuhr never attempted
to define the self as a thing-in-1tself. He was committed to a relational view
of human self-ex1ster.ce. It is not possible on his view to define the self in
terms of its biological structure or of any of its functions such as thinking,
feeling or willing, or to Identify 1t with all of these together. But Hiebuhr
does not simply posit that the self is^, that Its primordial awareness is an
awareness of the radical contingency of its existence, rather he asserts that
the primordial awareness of every self is one of absolute dependence upon a
radical power or being that 1s other than any finite being. Beyond all the
finite beings to which the self must respond in all its social and temporal rela-
2
tions is this radical power to which it also must respond.
?11ebuhr does not deny that there is an intricate and inseparable rela¬
tion between the self and its body or mind or emotions. He does deny that it
can be identified with any one of them or all of them together. Furthermore
none of the responses which I_ make to my interpretation of those actions or
forces which have brought this body into being, or which have supplied this mind
with just these thoughts or ideas, are responses to that radical action by which
I am. The self is not absolutely dependent on any of the finite agencies which
brought just this physiological, and psychological complex into being. "I am,
and 1 am I. That 'I am,' and 'I am I' here, now, bring to my awareness a radical
^KS, pp. 108-26; MR, p. 31. 2Ibid., pp. 109-115.
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ueeu which I cannot Identify with any of the specific actions that have consti¬
tuted the elements of my body [mind or emotions] . . Awareness that I am
1s at once awareness of that power which elected roe Into existence and maintains
use In existence. Awareness that I am JMs awareness of royself as just this
unique and Irreducible individual that experiences this radical dependence. I
come to understand that "1t was not 1n my own power, nor 1n my parents' power to
2
elect my self Into existence." I understand too that I can destroy the life of
my body but it is not clear that by this action that I am able to destroy tnyself.
In the preceding discussion of Niebubr's phenomenologlcal description of
the self as a social and temporal being exclusive attention was given to trying
to clarify those dimensions of human selfhood strictly 1n terms of the self's
Interpretation and response to the actions upon 1t of other finite things and
selves. This was done 1n the Interest of trying to Isolate and examine single
aspects of a more complex relational structure. It now needs to be emphasized
that Mlebuhr further argued that awareness of this radical power may also be
o
discerned as present 1n all the self's responses as a social and temporal self.
Our Interpretation of the immediate depends upon our sense
of the ultimate community of Interaction. So also the tlroefulness of
our agency and of our historical Interpretation are conditioned by
our understanding of what lies at the limits of our time. In both
cases something that we may call the religious element in our re¬
sponses has come Into view, meaning by the word, religion, in this
connection man's relation to what 1s ultimate for him—his ultimate
society, his ultimate history.
In his analysis of the social dimension of human selfhood Nlebuhr argued
that the structure of our life in response to persons and things 1s not diadlc
hbld., p. 109. 2Ib1d., p. 114. Cf. CC, p. 250.
3Ib1d., pp. 79-89 and 98-107 respectively.
4lb1d.t p. 109.
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but always triadlc.^ The responses we make are never a single response to per¬
sons or things; they are always accompanied by and Inseparable from a further
response to a third reality which transcends both self and other. It 1s this
conception of the triadic structure of responsible selfhood which provided the
basis for his critique of the notion of "the generalized other" as it was employed
in rationalist and empiricist descriptions of the moral phenomenon called
2
"conscience." The trladic structure present in all human knowledge of other
things (theoretical knowledge) and persons (practical knowledge) is a central
Niebuhrian theme. In the moral triad every relation between two selves (I and
Thou) also involves their relation to a third reality. Faith defined as trust
or confidence and as loyalty or fidelity, is the term used by Niebuhr to describe
3
the fundamental moral quality of the relations involved. Trust is the passive
element. It is passive because it refers to the self's reliance upon some other
being for a sense of worth or value. Loyalty 1s the active element. It 1s
active because it refers to that commitment made by the self to another self or
to a cause. In ell social life these two modes of faith are present in either
positive or negative form qualifying every human intention and action.
The importance of these notions for Niebuhr's understanding of the struc¬
ture and character of moral experience is particularly apparent 1ri writings
published after 1950.^ He began to recognize that "faith" was a more complex
*RS, pp. 79-84; H. Richard Niebuhr, "The Triad of Faith," Andover Newton
bulletin XLVII (1S54), pp. 3-12.
2RS, pp. 74-79.
RMWC, pp. 16-23, esp. p. 18; "The Triad of Faith," pp. 6-12; CC, pp. 252-
254; RS, pp. 118-123.
4Cf. CC (1951), pp. 252-254; "The Triad of Faith" (1953); "The Idea of
Covenant and American Democracy," Church History XXIII (1954), pp. 126-135; "On
the Nature of Faith," in Religious Experience and Truth: A Symposium (New York:
New York University Press, 1961), pp. 93-102; RHlTc"Tf961), pp. 16-23; RS (1963),
pp. 118-123.
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phenomenon 1n the life of selves than he had previously realized. It is also
clear that he was directly influenced by the moral philosophy of Josiah RoyceJ
particularly Royce's understanding of the covenantal or promisory character of
communities in which selves understand themselves to be bound by loyalty to one
2
another and to a cause which transcends them. Royce defined loyalty as "the
3
willing and practical and thoroughgoing devotion of a person to a cause."
Niebuhr also acknowledged that Royce's description of the moral life as primarily
an affair of loyalty was a theory "closely related to [his] notion of responsi-
4
billty." Royce too, he believed, sought to define the moral life less in terms
of the teleological image of man the realizer of ideals or the deontological
symbol of man obedient to laws and more in terms of the image of man as a covenant-
maker (or breaker). A person attains mature selfhood as a moral being by being
loyal to other selves and to a cause that transcends them all and that is loyal
to them.
The most explicit treatment of the triadic structure of the moral life
is contained in Niebuhr's lecture, "The Tried of Faith" (1954). He begins by
arguing that while it is true that the concept faith refers to a reality which
^C, p. 251; RMWC, pp. 18, 21-22, 132; RS, pp. 83-89; "The Triad of
Faith," p. 7; "The Idea of Covenant and American Democracy," p. 133.
2Cf. The Philosophy of Loyalty (Hew York: Macmlllan, 1908) and The
Problem of Christianity, 2 VoTs"(New York: Macmillan. 1913).
The Philosophy of Loyalty, p. 51.
4RS, p. 83.
I*
Ibid.; "The Idea of Covenant and American Democracy," p. 133.
6"The Triad of Faith," pp. 7-9. "[Man] is a personal covenanting being,"
1bio., p. 11. ". . . the moral requirement and ability of promise-keeping is
central to human existence." "The Idea of Covenant and American Democracy,"
p. 133.
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is a relation rather than an entity, it does not refer to a single uncornpounded
relation but to a structure. Faith is present in the dynamic complex inter¬
relations of human communal existence.
What's faith? Faith as I know 1t in my common human life seems
first of all to be a kind of double relation between the I and the
Thou in which I trust in thy loyalty to speak the truth to me as
thou seest the truth and in which I trust 1n thy faithfulness,
not only to me but to something else. For a third dimension comes
into view, a third part of this structure of faith. There Is not
only the reciprocity of I-trusting-you, you-beina-faithful-to-me;
there could not be real faith if there were only the I-Thou
relationship.
Niebuhr finds the traditional medieval distinction between fides (belief),
fiducia (trust) and fidelitas (loyalty) helpful. They belong together; 'where
there is no fiducia, no trust, there can be no believing, and there can be no
2
believing where there is no loyalty or faithfulness.*1 When, for example, I
believe that a statement made to me by another person is true, my belief depends
upon a trust in that person's loyalty to me as one who seeks or expects the
truth, and as one who is loyal to truthfulness as a cause to which we both are
conriii tted.
3
The case may be illustrated more fully by an example Niebuhr has given.
Consider the situation of two soldiers in combat. They are loyal to each other
and trust in each other's loyalty. Each trusts the loyal other and is loyal to
the trustworthy other. The two strands of faith mutually qualify their actions
toward each other. But their situation is more complex. As soldiers they fight
for a cause which transcends then both. It may be identified as their country,
cr some political ideal) or something else,but whatever It is, it is a common
^"The Triad of Faith," p. 6.
2Ibid.
3ibid., pp. 7-8. Cf. RS, p. 83f.
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cause which requires their trust and loyalty. The fact that they are together
as soldiers testifies to the presence of this cause whose existence and worth
they are called upon to defend. Finally, they must believe that the common cause
will not be disloyal to them, that it will not deceive them or let them down.
It 1s, of course, often the case that soldiers are very doubtful about this last
relationship. They may think that their loyalty to each other is a much more
tangible reality than loyalty to the cause but they cannot deny its presence or
Its claim on them. Even if they distrust the goodness or rightness of their
cause and even if they become disloyal to it or to each other, faith is still
present,albeit in the negative forms of distrust and disloyalty. Distrust is
perverted trust, not the absence of trust. Disloyalty is loyalty denied, not
1
the absence of loyalty.
The following summary statements may be made of Niebuhr's description of
the fiduciary and promisory character of the triadic structure of the moral life
of selves. 1) All moral relations between selves are, at their profoundest
level, relationships of trust and loyalty. 2) Morality is ultimately a matter
of loyalty to a cause which transcends the self and its companions, and is the
ground of the unity of any community of selves. 3) Both trust and loyalty have
a dual aspect. There is the penultimate trust and loyalty between selves and an
ultimate loyalty of both selves to a cause which transcends them. The loyalty
to the cause is ultimate because it is the cause, or more exactly the loyalty of
the cause to both self and other, which is the objective ground of every self's
trust in and loyalty to another self.
This triadic structure of the moral life 1s central to Niebuhr's whole




has defined it. It 1s present in the social existence of every self. For
example, the self in its role as a patriot Is related to his fellow citizens and
to his country as the cause. He cannot avoid making responses to the moral
approval or disapproval of his peers, but he never does so apart from his response
to the cause (his country) or its representatives (such as heroes or founding
fathers) to whom he looks for ultimate praise or blame. "In reaction to the
present action of his companions, he anticipates the action upon him of that
third and does his fitting act, that is, makes a response that fits into this
2
continuing trladic interaction." In all his social roles and relations this
dual response is made.
Hiebuhr now advances a final observation which may well be one of the
more controversial aspects of his whole theory. It 1s this. He argues that not
only the self exists as a self always 1n relation to other selves, or that self-
transcendence 1s achieved only through its existence in a society, but he also
argues that the societies in which the self exists and makes Its responses are
not more self-contained tnan are the individuals that exist in them.
The societies that judge or in which we judge ourselves are
self-transcending societies. And the process of self-trans¬
cendence or of reference to the third beyond each third does
not come to rest until the total community of being has been
involved.3
In all our response relations 1n any community there is always a contin¬
uous double dialogue taking place. For example, a patriot within a nation does
respond to his companions and he is also responsive to a "transcendent reference
group" which represent the nation. For the democratic patriot who is a citizen
of the United States, Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Lincoln, etc., will perform





whom the patriot will appeal for ultimate approval or disapproval of his conduct
and of his response to his co-patriots. It is this relation which guarantees to
him a relative independence of individual moral judgment and action from the
judgments and actions of his immediate companions. Now these "founding fathers"
encountered in memory also refer beyond themselves for they represent both the
community and what the community stands for--its cause. But this appeal to a
"transcendent reference group" cannot stop here with the "closed society" of all
loyal democrats.
Ultimately we arrive 1n the case of democracy at a cornnunity which
refers beyond itself to humanity and which in doing so seems to
envisage not only representatives of the human community as such
but a universal society and a universal generalized other, Nature
and Nature's God.'
Niebuhr was well aware that in our concern with responses to 1nmed1ate
companions we do not always raise this final question about universal community
and the final cause to which loyalty is owed. But he was convinced that in those
"critical moments" when we do ask this question we will recognize that our life
in response to action upon us takes place in a universal community "whose bound¬
aries cannot be drawn in space, or in time, or 1n extent of interaction short
2
of a whole in which we live and move and have our being."
This movement toward the universal may also be seen when attention is
11bid., p. 85.
2
Ibid., p. 88. Niebuhr suggests that this movement toward the universal
is not only present in the moral life but also in theoretical knowledge of nature.
"Though science does not undertake to know the universal, 1t seeks to interpret
each particular occasion by reference to more general patterns so that the move¬
ment 1s toward the universal. It operates with universal intent." Ibid. Else¬
where he argues that the fiduciary and promisory structure of the moral life 1s
present 1n the scientific community as 1t is in all other identifiable human
communities. This must be so because scientists do not cease to be moral beings
because they are scientists. Cf. RMWC, pp. 85-89; 131-136.
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given to the temporal dimension of human existence. The self must respond 1n
the present to the actions of others upon 1t and 1t does so as a self conscious
of a personal and social past and of an anticipated future, that 1s, 1t responds
as an historical being, as a time-full self. This means that all interpretations
of present events are made with an awareness of and are modified by a larger
historical context, but if this is so then the question of the extent of the
historical context within which the self makes its present responses must be faced.
The self as a time-full being cannot avoid the ultimate question posed by the
movement of its life from a past to a future—the question of the limits of its
life. Niebuhr believes that for most men all of the time, and for almost all
men much of the time, this ultimate historical context is interpreted as death
in one of its many forms.
Deep in our minds is the rtyth, the interpretative pattern of the
metahlstory, within which all our histories and biographies are
enacted. . . . It is the almost unconquerable picture in the mind,
of everlasting winter lying on the frozen wastes of existence before
all its time and after all its time. ... It is the image of myself
as coming to that future when there 1s no more future. ... It
has scores of forms . . . this mythology of death. . . . And all the
forms lead to the ethos of defense, to the ethics of survival.
When the self interprets this law of death to be the law of its temporal exis¬
tence, it responds to all actions upon it by seeking to defend itself as worthy
of existence, by declaring those beings "good" which support its physical,
spiritual or social existence and calling "evil" those that threaten its






It 1s Important to understand that Nlebuhr has not argued that his
phenomenologlcal analysis of the self 1n Its social and tlmeful existence, by
itself, establishes the fact that 1t exists at every moment as an absolutely
dependent self. He does maintain that his attempt to Interpret the moral life
of man with the aid of the Idea of responsibility involves a similar movement
toward the universal to that present in teleology and deontology. The universal
element 1n responsibility ethics 1s not, of course, to be Identified with a
universal Idea or Ideal to be realized, or with the universal form of a maxim
which must be obeyed. The universal element In the ethics of responsibility
enters at the point of recognizing that all responses to the finite actions of
other things and selves are qualified by the self's Interpretation of Its actions
as taking place in a universal community, and in ultimate history.* But the
primordial religious dimension of human existence 1s much more clearly seen
when attention is given to the self's existence 1n absolute dependence. In the
final analysis, Niebuhr argues, human selfhood cannot be uricerstoo solely 1n
terms of Its finite relations. Each self's awareness of itself as just this
radically contingent individual 1s the one point at which a simultaneous aware¬
ness of its absolute dependence enters.
The religious or faith dimension comes clearly Into view the moment the
self asks Itself how 1t 1s to Interpret the character of the radical power that
"flings it Into existence and holds 1t there."" The self raises the question to
itself as to whether this being upon which 1t is absolutely dependent for Its
existence 1s good for It or bad for 1t, whether 1t sustains it 1n Its existence
or whether it 1s heedless of the self's existence. If the Inscrutable power by
*Ib1d., pp. 87-89, 97-99. 2Ibid., p. 115.
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which the self 1s, 1s good, 1t deserves trust, but 1f 1t 1s hostile or heedless,
then profound distrust will be the Inevitable response. In order to do justice
to these Issues 1t 1s necessary to pass over Into a consideration of N1ebuhr*s
theology. If 1t 1s asked why 1t 1s that one or the other of these responses 1s
given, or, how 1t 1s that the Issue of the objective moral character of being
Itself as either good for or bad for the dependent self are to be settled, then
it 1s necessary to go beyond this formal description of the ethic of responsi¬
bility and inquire into strictly theological matters that "are not the task of
Christian ethics as ethics to set forth."
Teleology, Deontology and Responsibility
In the essay The Responsible Self (1963) Niebuhr set forth his "theory
of responsibility" as an alternative way of conceptualizing the formal structure
of moral experience and action to the traditional teleologlcal and deontological
theories. Earlier it was observed that he was not interested in examining the
structure of these theories as normative theories of ethics if one means by
normative, theories which seek to articulate general principles of obligation
or value in relation to which all particular actions or persons may be justified
as morally right or wrong, good or bad. Rather, he centers his attention upon
two different images of man which these theories presuppose. Each theory assumes
that its general principles of moral obligation and value are consonant with the
actual nature of man qua man. It was precisely the view of man or of the self
which each presupposed that Niebuhr rejected. Both are criticized for having a
too individualistic and non-historical understanding of human self-existence.
^Ibid., p. 143.
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The purpose of this concluding section is to aroue that Nlebuhr's
search for an alternative way of conceptualizing the formal structure of human
moral experience and action was occasioned by a more fundamental disagreement.
All teleological and deontological theories are agreed that the performance of
any moral action presupposes the fulfillment of three antecedent, conditions.
Niebuhr rejects each of them. In the first Instance both approaches maintain
that moral decision-making depends upon the moral agent being in possession of
two distinct kinds of knowledge: First, it 1s necessary to have knowledge of
general moral rules or principles. Second, 1t 1s necessary to know whether a
contemplated act falls under a given moral rule or principle or not. The moral
agent is in a position to act only when he is in possession of both kinds of
knowledge. But such knowledge 1s not a sufficient condition for the performance
of a moral act. Both of these approaches also agree that knowledge of moral
principles and knowledge of the moral rightness or wronqness of a contemplated
moral act, as determined by the principle, does not by itself guarantee that
the moral agent will choose to act in conformity with what he knows the moral
principle requires. To will to act in conformity with the principle or not is
the third prerequisite for making moral decisions. Constitutive of moral
self-hood is a distinct power called "the will" which determines moral choices.
Both theories assume "freedom of will" in the sense of the self-determination
of the agent to affirm or deny, obey or disobey, what it has understood ante¬
cedently to be required by the moral rule.
Both deontological and teleological theories agree then,!) that there
are moral norms or rules in relation to which all moral decisions are made, and
2) that all moral decisions to act according to these rules further presuppose
the freedom of the agent to act contrary to such rules. The differences between
them do not preclude this fundamental agreement. The chief difference between
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them has to do with the identification of the basis of moral authority in each
case.
Over against this view Miebuhr attempted to set forth a very different
account of what is involved in human moral agency. Responsibility ethics
accredits itself as a distinct fem of the moral life not simply by denylno what
teleology and deontology assert, but by setting forth an alternative understand¬
ing of moral agency. While it 1s true that 1n The Responsible Self Nfebuhr did
not explicitly draw out the comparison which 1s presently being offered, 1t 1s
clearly implicit 1n what he wrote there. It Is suggested, at least, when he
observed that it 1s the task of the moral theologian, "to bring greater clarity
to the self 1n Its agency, not by supplying a theory upon which practice may
follow but by Illuminating the theory that 1s actually though unacknowledqedly',<• < MM » i mm'i* , miii, ■wit... t. »—i. i. miW*. .w>m iwim^rffcin n . nwnwll *w. ■ » -■■■ Ml*, m*
present In practice."* Nlebuhr seems to be Implying that his theory of respon¬
sibility 1s that "theory that is actually though unacknowledgedly present in
practice" while teleology and deontology set forth theories "upon which practice
my follow."
Both teleology and deontology center attention on the conformity of a
self-determining moral agent's actions to antecedently understood moral impera¬
tives. This means that the primary moral relation is not between a self and that
being on which it 1s absolutely dependent but between the self-as-wlll and pre¬
viously cognized mora! Imperatives. From the point of view responsibility,
morality 1s not fundamentally a matter of obedience to rules.2 Thus 1t can have
no interest 1n putting forward a theory about what rules we ought to obey or
what end we ought to realize. Moral conduct 1s ultimately determined by every
1rs» P- 135- (italics added).
2
"The consistent ethics of radical faith 1s not constituted by the
attachment of certain ethical rules to religious beliefs . . RMWC, p. 48.
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self's trust or distrust, loyalty or disloyalty to God.
The conduct of life issues out of the central faith. . . . Men are
so created that they cannot and do not live without faith. . . .
Hence the great ethical question 1s always the question of faith,
"In what does man trust?" Moral reasoning always builds on the
explicit or Implicit answer given to this prior question. A mode
of life which is not founded on faith 1n God 1s necessarily
founded on some other faith, there 1s no faithless ethics.'
In the theory of responsibility there are no rules, no imperatives and
no notion of will as a morally neutral power determining moral choices. For
Niebuhr moral understanding and moral choice are one and the same action which
he terns "Interpretation." The "patterns of interpretation we employ seem to
determine— though in no mechanical way—our responses to action upon us.'" The
moral quality of our actions is not determined by conformity,or lack of 1t,to a
moral imperative, but by the self's interpretation at every moment of what is
happening, that is, by its interpretation of the character of that being upon
which it is absolutely dependent as either good or evil, as either life-giving
or death-dealing, as God the friend or God the enemy.4 For the theory of respon¬
sibility 1t 1s impossible for aqy moral agent not to be determined by its inter¬
pretation of the trustworthiness or untrustworthir.ess of that being upon which
it is absolutely dependent. If this being is interpreted as untrustworthy then
the self 1s negatively determined by it; if it 1s interpreted as trustworthy
then the self is positively determined by it. But there can be no situation in
which the self interprets being as trustworthy yet responds with distrust and
disloyalty, or one where the self interprets it as untrustworthy, yet responds
^"Evangelical and Protestant Ethics," pp. 222-223.
2RS, pp. 63, 101-107, 117-125, 137, 141-14*.
3Ibid., pp. 61-62. 4Ibid., pp. 140-143. Cf. pp. 239-242.
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wlth trust and loyalty.
The ethics of responsibility does not deny the freedom of man.2 It does
deny the notion of "absolute human freedom, the ethics of man the conqueror of
the conditions 1n which he lives, the ethics of human mastery" on the one hand,
3
and the notion of divine determinism In the sense of fatalism on the other.
The God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ 1s the loving dynamic
One, who does new things, whose relation to the world 1s more like
that of father to his children than like that of maker to his
manufactures; 1t 1s more like that of ruler to his realm than Hke
that of designer to his machines. The symbols fatalism uses to
Interpret what 1s happening do not fit the situation. The [Images]
of the kingdom and of the family are to be sure, symbols also,
but they do greater justice to our actual experience of life.
They fit this dialogue in which our free acts take place in
response to actions over which we have no power, 1n which our
free acts are not truly ours, and free, unless they are the con¬
sequences of interpretation?*
Thus for Nlebuhr the moral deed 1s not prepared for by determining which
moral principle justifies 1t: nor 1s It then actualized by a morally neutral
contra-causally free will. This 1s so objectively because the will of God 1s
understood more as what God does and Is doing than what he requires. It 1s so
subjectlvely because our knowledge of the nature and will of God 1s not mediated
by principles or propositions about God or his will but 1t 1s an Immediate rela¬




Nlebuhr did not address himself to the question of human freedom 1n any
systematic way but 1t Is clear from scattered references 1n various places in
his writings that he rejected any notion of a morally free will. The account
given here of his view of freedom 1s drawn from the following sources: "Man
the Sinner," The Journal of Religion, XV (1935), Dp.£73f, 279. Cf. KGA, pp. 112-114.
118; CE, pp.' 239^241? 387? CC, pp. 249-252; RS, pp. 100-106, 173.
3RS, p. 173. 4Ibid. (Second italics added.)
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There Is a second and related reason why Nlebuhr rejected teleology and
deontology as fit "Instruments" for setting forth a theory of moral agency 1n
a theological ethic. Both agree, as we have stated earlier, that 1n any norma¬
tive ethic 1t 1s necessary to have knowledge of general moral rules of obligation
(eg. "we ought to keep our agreements") or of value (eg. "benevolence 1s a vir¬
tue"). Both agree also that the cognition of these principles 1s logically prior
tc any moral choice. Nlebuhr's ethic of responsibility however 1s 1n agreement
with those existentialist thinkers who deny that the fundamental moral relation
1s one between the self and moral principles. This 1s not, for Nlebuhr, because
God 1s dead but because theoretical knowledge of God as he is 1n himself 1s dead.
All "knowledge" of God 1s faith-knowledge, that 1s, a non-theoretical variation¬
al knowledge. "The standpoint of faith, of a self directed toward gods or God,
and the standpoint of practical reason, of a self with values and with a destiny
are not incompatible, they are probably Identical."^ Thus knowledge of God or
his will cannot be Identified with knowledge of Scripture, or doctrine, or meta¬
physical theories about God. Religious knowledge is unique and "this uniqueness
has been shown to be due to the fact that 1t 1s a type of value knowledge or valua-
tlon." If knowledge of God can only properly be attained within the limits of
practical reason and 1f all theological principles or propositions which assert
this or that about God, or command this or that as his will, are Instances of
theoretical knowledge, then they are either not fa1th-knowledge of God or they
are statements about God which may or may not be true of him. In either case
the self would not be in that relation which is decisive for the determining of
moral conduct.
^R, p. 80. Cf. VTT, pp. 110-116. 2VTT, p. 112.
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The argument was advanced 1n Chapter II that Nlebuhr's relational
theory of value not only failed to provide any normative ethical principles for
ordering relative value systems but positively disallowed them. It was also
argued that there was nothing 1n his relational theory which necessitated this
restriction. At best,such a prohibition must be regarded as quite unnecessary;
at worst,it would make 1t quite impossible for a theologically grounded ethical
theory to provide guidance for the difficult yet Inescapable task of making
moral discriminations between the various competing and often conflicting claims
of relative finite centers of value. Finally, 1n the previous chapter this
problan was not pursued beyond the point of showing that the prohibition seemed
to be contradicted by other explicit statements made by Nlebuhr. It 1s also not
consistent with his diagnosis of the need for such principles 1n the construc¬
tion of a viable Protestant ethic.
If the just concluded comparison between teleology and deontology and
the ethics of responsibility 1s correct, then the ambiguity 1n Nlebuhr's thought
with respect to the place of general moral principles 1n ethical theory seems to
be resolved 1n favor of their elimination. His theory of responsibility has at
Its heart the same theological principle of the absolute primacy and direct
presence of God to man which he had Identified as the central theological prin¬
ciple of "the Protestant movement,"^ In the following concise summary statement
of the theory of responsibility Niebuhr makes this point very clear. "Responsi¬
bility affirms: God 1s acting in all actions upon you. So respond to all actions
2




of moral action centered on the Image of man-the-answerer, man acting 1n response
to actions upon him, Into Inseparable relation with his central theological prin¬
ciple of radical monotheism.
In setting forth Nlebuhr's relational theory of moral action 1n this
chapter, little specific attention has been given to his understanding of the
nature of the God who Is active in all events. In order to do justice to his
doctrine of God 1t will be necessary to deal separately with his understanding
of the self-revelation of God 1n and through Jesus ChrlstJ The decision to de¬
lay entering upon the strictly theological side of Nlebuhr's ethics 1s not a
wholly arbitrary one dictated by the expositor's need to treat major themes se¬
quentially. This approach has been taken because Nlebuhr himself put forward his
relational theory of moral action as a philosophical theory which could be
accepted as an adequate conceptual scheme for understanding and ordering human
2
moral agency quite apart from the acceptance of any specific thelstic beliefs.
This view of what 1t means to be a responsible self 1s not derived directly from
Christian doctrines. He does not deny, of course, that he is himself committed
to a thelstic point of view, but he does deny that the usefulness of his theory
3
of responsibility 1s limited to those who share a thelstic commitment.
The object of the inquiry 1s not, as 1n the case of Christian
ethics, simply the Christian Hfe but rather human moral life in
general. ... I regard this as an effort 1n Christian moral
philosophy . . . because I am concerned 1n 1t . . . with the develop¬
ment' of an Instrument of analysis which applies to any form of human
life Including the Christian. All life has the character of re¬
sponsiveness, I maintain. We Interpret the actions to which we
respond differently, to be sure, but we do respond, whether we
Interpret them as actions of God or of the devil or of a blindly
running atom.^
*Cf. Chapter V below.
3Ibid., pp. 44-46.
2RS, pp. 45f, 57f, 67, 150-154.
4Ibid., pp. 45f.
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Both the relational theory of value and the relational theory of moral action
are presented as philosophical theories. He also contended that as relational
theories each 1s better suited to the requirements of Christian theology, as he
understood 1t, than other alternatives.
In the chapters which follow no attempt has been made to give a compre¬
hensive exposition and critique of the whole scope of Nlebuhr's theology. Both
the relational theory of value and the relational theory of action were developed
by Nlebuhr because he be!laved that other philosophical theories of value and
action available to the theologian for constructing a theological ethic were
not adequate to the requirements of his radically monotheistic Interpretation
of the Christian faith. Given this fact, 1t 1s clearly necessary now to In¬
quire more fully Into what radically monotheistic theology entails. This will
be accomplished by exploring the answers Nlebuhr gave to two questions. (Chapter
V) First, how 1s God known, and what 1s the nature of that being whom Chris¬
tians believe has been revealed 1n Jesus Christ? Second, what are the conse¬
quences of knowing or trusting 1n God for human conduct?
For Nlebuhr, all knowledge of God depends objectively upon the "self-
revelation" of God to man. Subjectively, all knowledge of God 1s "faith-
knowledge." The precise meaning which he attached to these key notions
"revelation" and "faith" can clearly be understood only within the context of
his general theory of knowledge. Niebuhr has argued that a positive personal
and rational relation between man and God 1s possible, but that Its actuality
1s qualified from the side of the subject by two universal limitations Inherent
1n all human knowledge. First, he argued that the Kantian distinction between
the theoretical and practical modes of human cognition must, with some qualifi¬
cations, be accepted and that all knowledge of God is a kind of practical
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knowledge. Second, he believed that all human experience and knowledge, in¬
cluding experience and knowledge of God, 1s wholly relative to the historical
standpoint of the individual within a specific culture or society. The fol¬




THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE
The notion "relativity" is the most pervasive and at the same time the
most troublesome theme in Niebuhr's epistemology. All men considered either as
individuals or as groups are wholly encompassed by an inclusive relativity which
defines their being in a world. We are and have value only insofar as we sus¬
tain particular relations with other things and selves within the realm of being.
Sufficient attention has already been given to 1) Niebuhr's rejection of all
definitions of value as an independently subsisting quality or property and
2) to his vigorous promotion of the view that value is a function of the rela¬
tion of being to being. But we have not yet given sufficient attention to 3)
his account of the epistemologlcal status of value judgments. Two basic pre¬
suppositions largely determine his understanding of all value judgments. The
first follows from what has already been said about value relativity, the second
is an application of his understanding of "historical relativism" to all rational
activity including the judgments of the practical reason. On the one hand value
judgments express in prepositional form the specific value which one being may
have for another. If a person says that "x is a good person" this does not mean
that "goodness" is a quality predicated of x, but rather 1t gives expression to
the quality of a particular relation of x to that person or to some other
person(s). Nor does it mean that this value judgment expresses subjective
emotions; the projection of a feeling that this person has for x. What it does
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mean 1s that the person uttering the judgment understands that x has met some
constitutive need or needs or, otherwise furthered the realization of the capaci¬
ties or potentialities of himself or of some other person. Value judgments are
grounded 1n the external relations between selves. On the other hand all value
judgments depend upon the Interpretation of experience from a particular perspec¬
tive of the valuing self. Value judgments are not only relative to the situation
1n which beings are objectively either good-for or bad-for each other but they
are also relative to the subjective factors Involved 1n the Interpretation of
experience from the standpoint of the valuing self. Nlebuhr was convinced that
all knowledge claims are limited not simply because the knower's experience of
what 1s there 1s limited, but more because the ralnd Itself employs categories or
concepts 1n its interpretation of what 1s there which are not universal (that 1s,
not the same for every mind) but pervasively conditioned by the specific beliefs
of a particular society. The "objective relativism" described earlier must now
meet the challenge of an "historical relativism" which prima facie threatens to
deny the objectivity of all knowledge claims, Including judgments of value.
Two different notions of relativity must therefore be distinguished (though they
cannot be separated) 1n Nlebuhr's thought.^
First, relativity means relatedness. The primordial structure or pattern
of all existence 1s socio-theological In character. To be 1s to be-1n-relation;
a be1ng-1n-relat1on to things, other selves and ultimately to God. This rela¬
tional structure or pattern of being Informs Nlebuhr's understanding of all the
crucial doctrines of his theological ethic. The self and value and the funda¬
mental theological doctrines of faith and revelation all presuppose this rela¬
tional pattern of existence. He 1s everywhere concerned with being-1n-relation
^MR, pp. 6-22. Cf. Schrader, "Value and Valuation," pp. 176-178, 191-192.
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rather than being-1n-Itself; with selves 1n relation to other selves who are In
turn related to God and He to them. The primary Inquiry 1n ethics 1s never
first of all, or at all, Into the being and character of man-1n-himself, conscience-
1n-1tself, or values-1n-themselves any more than the object of theological In¬
quiry 1s the existence and nature of God-1n-h1mself.' This radical social charac¬
ter of all existence demands "... an approach to man's self conduct that begins
with neither purposes [teleology] or laws [deontology] but with responses: that
begins with the question, not about the self as 1t 1s In Itself, but 1n its re-
sponse-relatlon to what 1s given with 1t and to 1t. This 1s no less true for
theology.
The God who makes himself known and whan the Church seeks to
know 1s no isolated God. If the attribute of aselty, I.e.,
being by and for Itself, 1s applicable to him at all 1t 1s not
applicable to him as known by the Church, What is known and
knowable in theology 1s God In relation to self and to neighbor,
and self and neighbor 1n relation to God. This complex of related
beings 1s the object of theology.3
This passage well Illustrates another Important feature of the notion
of relativity as relatedness. The pattern of Interaction between beings is
always trladlc, never merely dladlc. Implicit In the relational theory of
value already discussed Is the triad of the self (or "existent being")-other
and "center of value." A clear Illustration of what 1s involved 1n a trladlc
relation 1s provided by Nlebuhr 1n setting forth his approach to the knowledge
of natural events.^ Further specification of Nlebuhr's eplstemology will concern
'"Faith 1n Gods and 1n God," supplementary essay In RMWC, pp. 114-116.
ZRS, p. 60. 3PCM, pp. 112-113. Cf. CE, p. 5.
^RS, pp. 79-82. The trladlc structure of all knowing and valuing 1s
made much more explicit in Nlebuhr's thinking since the writing of Christ and
Culture (1952) than 1t was prior to that time. It 1s consonant with 1) the
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us presently but the important point here is his contention that all knowledge
of natural phenomena depends upon three distinct yet inseparable relations.
There is first, the direct relation of the self to natural phenomena; second,
the direct relation of other selves to these same phenomena, and third, the
response relation of these selves to each other seeking to communicate and cor¬
roborate their interpretations of the same natural events. The self engages
... in a continuous dialogue in which there are at least these
three partners—the self, the social companion and natural events.
As It is true that I encounter and interpret no natural event
except as one who has been and will be in encounter with social
companions—also related to such events—so it is true that I
do not usually encounter and interpret the speech of companions
except as one who lives In relation to nature and Interprets
their words as issuing out of a like relation.1
The structure of knowledge is triadic because knowledge claims depend in part
upon the self's direct experience of nature, and in part upon interpretative
schemes learned from social companions. The self is not wholly dependent upon
Increasing emphasis on existentialist modes of thinking, and 2) an Increasing
affinity for the concept of "the community of Interpretation" which was the
central philosophical Idea in the thought of Josiah Royce. (Cf. The Problem
of Christianity, Vol. II, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1913). I" canTTnd no
references to Royce or to the notion of the triadic structure of social exis¬
tence prior to Christ and Culture. Since that time direct references to Royce
appear at important junctures in his writing on the nature of human community,
especially the notion of a "cause" as that third reality which unites self and
other together and to which they commit themselves 1n loyalty. Cf. CC, pp.
249ff; RMWC, pp. 18, 21f, 132; RS, pp. 83-89; "The Idea of Covenant and American
Democracy," Church History, XXIII (1954), p. 133f; and esp. "The Triad of Faith,"
Andover Newton Bulletin, XLVII (1954), pp. 3-12. Niebuhr's Interest 1n Royce
coincided with a"general revival of Interest in his philosophy. Nlebuhr directed
the unpublished Yale dissertation of Professor Paul Ramsey entitled "The Nature
of toan in the Philosophy of Joslah Royce and Bernard Bosanquet" (1943) and 1n
1950 Niebuhr's Yale colleague Professor John E. Smith, published his Important
study of Royce's later philosophy (comprising his theory of interpretation,




other selves for this knowledge for it does sustain direct relations with natural
events and may champion an interpretation of this experience in defiance of the
dominant pattern of interpretation mediated to it by social companions, both
past and present. The self's knowledge of nature is therefore conditioned by,
but is never wholly determined by, conventional interpretations such that "it
must ignore for the sake of its [societies] dogma all that is personal and all
that 1s novel in scientific theory. . On the other hand the self is never
so independent of its social culture that it apprehends natural events without
2
"some of the words, categories, and relations supplied by his society." Knowl¬
edge of nature is never pristine.
Relativity also means limitation. Relativity as relatedness focuses
attention on the external relations of a self with others. These relations are
irreducibly trladlc 1n character. Relativity as limitation focuses more upon
the internal structure of consciousness. The self 1n its role as theoretical
or practical knower is limited 1n all its knowing to a particular, rather than
universal point of view because of its finltude and because the concepts and
categories employed in all reasoning are not a priori and universal but a priori
3
and relative to the history of the society in which the self exists. In philo¬
sophical discourse the term "relativism" is used more often to refer to this
sort of subjective limitation than 1t is to refer to relativity as "relatedness"
previously described. Nlebuhr's discussion of the concept of "historical
relativism" provides us with the most radical expression of the idea of relativity
as limitation.
hbld., p. 81. Cf. CC, p. 39.
2Ibld.
3MR, pp. 7-13; CC, pp. 34-49; RS, pp 80f, 96f.
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Hlstqrlcal Relativism
In the prefaces of three of his most Important works Niebuhr makes
special mention of the Important place that historical relativism occupies In
1
his thinking. A sensitive awareness of the problems posed for theology and
ethics by the acceptance of the historically relative character of all knowledge
2
claims was, of course, aroused by his early study of Ernst Troeltsch.
Troeltsch has taught me to respect the multiformity and
individuality of men and movements In Christian history, to be
loath to force this rich variety Into prefashioned, conceptual
molds, and yet to seek logos in mythos, reason in history,
essence 1n existence. He has helped me to accept and to profit
by the acceptance of the relativity not only of historical
objects but, more, of the historical subject, the observer and
interpreter.3
On Troeltsch's own accounting the enduring problematic at the heart of all his
thought was the conflict between the merely approximate truth yielded by all
Inquiry into history and "the impulse in men towards a definite practical
standpoint—the eagerness of the trusting soul to receive the divine revelation
4
and to obey the divine commands."
his successive writings probe deeply Into the problem of historical
knowledge and its implications for the universal claims of Christianity and a
universal ethic. The historical method which Troeltsch employed and the
1MR, p. vli; CC, p. 14; RS. p. 46.
2
Ernst Troeltsch's Philosophy of Religion, Yale University doctoral
dissertation, "1924.
3
CC, p. xii. Cf. Introduction to The Social Teachings of the Christian
Churches by Ernst Troeltsch (New York: Harper forchbook's, 196077 pp. 7-12.
^Christian Thought: Its History and Application, edited with introduc¬
tion by Baron Von Hugel (New York: Meridian Books, 1957), p. 37.
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concluslons which he drew from his study of history were decisive for Niebuhr's
own approach to all historical Inquiry.^ They also provided the starting point
2
for his hlstoridst approach to theology and ethics. Two major studies pub¬
lished 1n the last decade of Troeltsch's life were particularly Important 1n
Niebuhr's judgment. His Inquiry into the relationship of Christian faith and
Western culture, Die Sozlallehren der chrlstlichen Klrchen und Gruppen (1912),
led him to affirm that not only the organization and polity, but also the theo¬
logical and moral affirmations of Christianity, were Inextricably Intertwined
with the development of Western Intellectual, social, political and economic
3
Ideas and ideals. This led him to modify his earlier view that Christianity
"I am most conscious of my debt to that theologian and historian who
was occupied throughout his life by the problem of church and culture—Ernst
Troeltsch. The present book [Christ and Culture] In one sense undertakes to
do no more than to supplement and 1n part to correct his work on The Social
Teachings of the Christian Churches," (Ibid., pp. x1-x1i). Nlebuhr does not
explain 1n any~cfeta1l the nature of this "correction," other than to Indicate
that his own study of the history of Christianity had led him to conclude that
"all this relative history of finite men and movements 1s under the governance
of the absolute God." (Ibid., p. x11). Some Indication of the nature of this
correction may be gained by noting that Niebuhr placed Troeltsch among "the
dualist" while plainly himself favoring "the conversion1st" answer to the nature
of the dialectic between Christ and culture. (Ibid., p. 181-183). Of the three
"median answers" Identified by Nlebuhr "the dualist" seeks to combine the two
authorities of Christ and culture by asserting paradoxically that while the
moralities of each are discontinuous with each other, both must be obeyed. Any
synthesis between them 1s Impossible within history; It awaits an eschatological
reconciliation beyond history. (Ibid., pp. 42-43). "The converslonlst" agrees
that the two moralities are Irreconcilable but believes that 1t 1s precisely
within man's historical existence that Christ is transforming culture and
society. (Ibid.) Nowhere 1n Christ and Culture does Nlebuhr explicitly acknowl¬
edge his preference for this position. But 1t 1s the only position he does not
criticize adversely. In The Meaning of Revelation however, he does give ex¬
plicit endorsement of this position as his own. "The problem of natural and
revealed religion, has been dealt with as Involving neither mutually exclusive
principles nor yet distinct stages in a continuous development but rather trans¬
formation or conversion, 1n which the later stage 1s less the product than the
transformer of the previous stage." (Ibid... p. v1i1),
2MR, p. x.
Christian Thought, pp. 51f. Cf. CC, pp. 30f; and SSD, pp. 17f.
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1
alone among world religions could justify Its claims to "absolute validity."
Christian belief and practice, far from being universally normative, was now
not even normative for all Christians at all times but only for each Individual
2
Christian 1n his own time and place. The character and purpose of God have not
3
been revealed 1n any definite or final way 1n any historical religion. This
particular expression of a nominalist temper is given even more consistent ex¬
pression and broader application 1n Per tilstorlsmus und seine Probleme (1922).
Here the historical relativity of all human knowledge 1s emphasized. No politi¬
cal, social, ethical, aesthetic and scientific Ideas so transcend the historical
circumstances in which they developed such that universal validity could be
claimed for them. "Indeed, even the validity of science and logic seemed to
exhibit . . . strong individual differences present even 1n their deepest and
innermost rudiments."4
Nlebuhr did not share the view of other critics that Troeltsch's
emphasis on the relativity of historical knowledge was excessive.On the con¬
trary, he was confident that the problems posed by historical relativism for the
unity of culture and the normatlveness of Christian theology and ethics had
Increased rather than decreased since Troeltsch's time. Furthermore, he believed
1Ibid., pp. 53-57.
2
"It [Christianity] 1s final and binding for us^, because we have nothing
else, and because 1n what we have we can recognize the accents of the divine
voice." Ibid., p. 55. It Is Interesting to note here also that Troeltsch has
now forsaken his earlier quest for a general religious a priori and 1s much
closer to the existentialists' stress on subjective truth.
3Ib1d., pp. 60-63. 4Ib1d., p. 53.
^Cf. Baron F. Von Hugel's "Introduction" to Christian Thought, pp. 20-
26; H. R. Macintosh, Types of Modern Theology (London and GTasgow: Collins,
1937), pp. 175-208, esp. pp7^95-198 and 204-208.
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that the historically conditioned character of all knowledge had been "demon¬
strated by history and sociology."^ It 1s a new factor 1n the self-understanding
of modern men which the theologian and moralist Ignore at their peril. "In
every field of philosophical Inquiry the historical approach has established
2
Itself." What 1s true for philosophy Is no less true for theology.
There does not seem to be aqy apparent possibility of escape from
the dllenrna of historical relativism for any type of theology.
The historical point of view of the observer must be taken Into
consideration 1n every case since no observer can get out of his¬
tory Into a realm beyond time-space; 1f reason 1s to operate at
all It must be content to work as an historical reason.3
His agreement with Troeltschean historlcism was complete.
It 1s necessary now to specify more precisely the concept of historical
relativism as Nlebuhr himself understood 1t. Briefly stated, historical rela¬
tivism means that there is no knowledge of things or events 1n themselves; all
4
knowledge Is conditioned by the standpoint of the knower. Whatever we know or
value, conceive or judge, Is seen from the point of view of a self that exists
1n a particular society at a particular time. Its very rationality 1s qualified
by the language and categories of Interpretation of this society.
Critical idealists and realists knew themselves to be human
selves with a specific psychological and logical equipment; their
successors know themselves to be social human beings whose reason
1s not a common reason, alike 1n all human selves, but one which
is qualified by inheritance from a particular society. They know
that they are historical selves whose metaphysics, logic, ethics
and theology are limited, moving and changing 1n time . . . though
we regard the universal, the Image of the universal in our mind
is not a universal Image.5
]MR, pp. 7-8. 2Ib1d., p. 12.
3Ib1d., p. 16. 4Ib1d., p. 7.
5Ib1d., pp. 9-10. Cf. CC, pp. 69f; 236-238.
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. . . Historical relativism affirms the historicity of the
subject even more than that of the object: man 1t points out,
is not only 1n time but time 1s 1n man. Moreover and more
significantly, the time that is 1n man Is not abstract but
particular and concrete; 1t 1s not a general category of time
but rather the time of a definite society with distinct language,
economic and political relations, religious faith and social
organization.1
The self 1s never 1n possession of Plato's timeless transcendent universals nor
Kant's transcendental a priori categories. It is in possession of categories
or patterns of Interpretation but they are not Inherent 1n the structure of the
mind, as Kant taught, but Inherited from the subject's personal and social past.
As a critical disciple of Kant, Niebuhr dispensed with the a priori categories
of the understanding as structuring present experience. But he remained enough
of a critical disciple to hold to a view of mind as actively structuring all
understanding of present experience (of things and other persons) by means of
"remembered Images." These
remembered Images are the product ... of a society which has
taught it [the self] a language with names and explicit or
Implicit metaphors and with an Implicit logic. With the aid
of that language the self has learned to divide up the continuum
of its experiences into separate entitles, to distinguish things
and persons, processes 1n nature and movements in society.
Only through the mediation of a specific language with Its contingent concepts
and categories does the mind attempt to Interpret direct confrontation with
natural and historical events.
Niebuhr was fully aware that the acceptance of historical relativism
3
raised the spectre of a "new agnosticism." The phrase "new agnosticism" 1s
significant because Niebuhr saw a definite parallel between the agnostic chal¬





by the early empiricists Locke and Hume, namely, that reason must work within
the limits of sensory experience.^ But just as reason survived the subjectlvlst
challenge of Hume and emerged chastened, disciplined and self-confident from
the pen of Kant, so today Nlebuhr 1s confident that the threat of skepticism
need not be the Inevitable result of accepting historical relativism. The
2
challenge can be met by developing a "new type of critical idealism."
Critical philosophy and critical theology accepted the limita¬
tions imposed on the rational subject by a new self knowledge.
. . . So 1n our time the recognition of reason's historical
limitations can be for theology in particular, as for the social
sciences 1n general, the prelude to faithful critical work 1n
history and historically apprehended experience.3
This can be accomplished by consistently tempering the emphasis of the "new"
critical idealists on the historically conditioned character of the mind's
categories with the critical realist's emphasis on the independent reality of
the object.
Niebuhr supported two central theses of a critical realist epistemology.
First, he maintained the Irreducibility of the subject-object relation. This 1s
well illustrated by Niebuhr's questioning of the validity of Paul Tillich's
view that the existence of the subject and the object is grounded in some more
primal strata of being. He questioned whether the polarity of being and non-
4
being employed by Tillich was a true polarity. If not, it was simply dialectical
^Ibid., pp. 2, 9, 13, 16f. 2Ib1d., pp. v11, 8, 65.
3Ibld., pp. 16-17.
4
Review of Paul T1ll1ch, Systematic Theology I in Theology LVI (1953),
p. 227. It is interesting to note that one other question which Niebuhr puts
to TilUch 1s addressed to his conception of reason. (Ibid., p. 228) His
question clearly implies that he thinks that Tillich's method of correlation
employs a conception of reason which 1s autonomous with respect to revelation
and history. It was precisely Tillich's emphasis upon historical relativism
that had attracted Niebuhr to his earlier work. Cf. Niebuhr's preface to The
Religious Situation, pp. 9-27.
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cawouflage for an idealist metaphysical monism. For Niebuhr the subject-object,
self-other dialectic is Irreducible and untranscendable whether between God and
roan, wan and wan, or man and objects in the external world. Objects both finite
and Infinite, persons or things, exist in their own right independently of any
knowing wind.
Niebuhr also accepted a second realist thesis; knowing conforms to being
and not being to knowing. It is true that the mind is not able to gain privi¬
leged access to any object such that it gains knowledge of the discrete charac¬
teristics of objects as they exist independently of the knower. It is also true
that the content of all knowledge claims are qualified by the contingent his¬
torically conditioned character of the images and categories employed by the
knowing self. But despite these limitations, if what we know is true, 1t is so
because it conforms to what 1s there and not because the knowing mind cannot err
In the employment of Its ordering images. Errors in our knowing result from
the employment of images which obscure or distort the requirement of the objectJ
No major theme in Niebuhr's theological ethic has called forth as much
2
critical comment as his commitment to historical relativism. There are, I
believe, at least two major reasons for this. The first 1s that Niebuhr failed
to provide a sufficiently careful, discriminating and self-critical definition
of the precise meaning he attached to the term. Nor did he give an adequate
^MR, pp. 97, 99, 102-108.
2
John Cobb, Living Options in Protestant Theology; A Survey of Methods
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1962), pp. 296-300; Hans Frel, "ThcTtheology
of H. Richard Niebuhr," FE, pp. 87-94; Paul Ramsey, "The Transformation of
Ethics," FE, pp. 151-158, 163-164, 170-171; John D. Godsey, The Promise of H.
Richard Niebuhr (Philadelphia and New York: J. S. Lippincott Company, 197077
pp. 96-107; Van A. Harvey, The Historian and the Believer (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1969), pp. 234-242".
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account of the way in which human reasoning is qualified by historical relativ¬
ism. It 1s perhaps too easy to point out the logically self-contradictory
character of statements which imply that historical relativism 1s a universal
truthl But to say unqualifiedly, as Niebuhr does, that "we are in history as
2
the fish is in water" is to use an unhelpful and misleading analogy. If al_T_
our being and knowing 1s wholly encompassed and determined by our particular
social history as the fish is wholly bounded by water, then how did Niebuhr come
by the knowledge of this universal truth? To know that this 1s true of all
human reasoning is only possible for a mind that has transcended its partial
perspective and attained knowledge of a universal truth. The principle of his¬
torical relativism can never become universally true of all human reasoning with¬
out itself becoming an absolute truth and thus falling Into self-contradiction.
But there 1s direct evidence in both his early and late writings that he recog¬
nized as well as anyone else that to deny the existence of universal truth is
to deny the possibility of a theological ethic. In his autobiographical essay
^Both Professor Van A. Harvey, 1n The Historian and the Believer (New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1969), esp. in the last chapter entitled, "Faith,
Images, and the Christian Perspective," pp. 246-2S1—and Professor Gordon D.
Kaufman, in Relativism, Knowledge and Faith (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1960), seek ^n their own ways to remedy these defects in their teacher's
work while remaining loyal to the historlcist perspective. "Historical relativism
may be deplored," says Kaufman, but "what is needed 1s an analysis of our thought
processes which will enable us to understand why it is that our thought 1s rela¬
tive and inadequate and subject to radical doubt with a careful assessment of the
metaphysical and theological significance of this fact." Ibid., p. 1x.
2
MR, p. 48. Commenting on the same passage Paul Ramsey says wryly,
"No fish ever discoursed at length on the bondage of its reason to liquidity,
or on the relativity of its point of viewing from the depths. 'The Critique
of Piscatory Reason' has not yet produced the thesis that fish are not only in
water but water also 1n fish, wholly determining the categories of fish under¬
standing. Indeed we can set it down 1n advance that, were such a literary
event to occur, the author would thereby have refuted himself by evidencing
1ncontrovert1bly that his own reason 1s not, to the whole extent of its being,
bounded by liquidity." "The Transformation of Ethics," FE, p. 157.
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wrltten 1n 1961 he expressed regret at having used the terra "historical
relativism;" "historical relatlonism 1s probably a better term, since 1t does
not involve subjectivism."^ The comment is 1n one sense a curious one because
1t Implies that substituting the word "relation ism" for the word "relativism"
would by itself preserve the theory to which the terms refer from subjectivism.
But this aside, 1t does show that he was sensitive to the problem and wished to
give full weight to his "conviction of the radically historical character of
human existence"^ without embracing the kind of historical relativism that would
rule out all universal truth 1n theology. Again, in a very early essay on the
implication of moral relativism for Christian ethics he expressly denied that
relativism ruled out the possibility of absolute truth.
To say that there are relative elements in the Christian ethic,
even in the New Testament formulation, 1s not to say that the
Christian ethic Is relative. The absolute within the relative
comes to appearance at two points—1n the absolute obligation of
an individual or a society to follow its highest Insight, and in
the element of revelation of ultimate reality.4
But when every allowance has been made for good intentions it 1s also true that
the exact nature of the claims which Nlebuhr made 1n the name of historical
relativism are ambiguous.
Paul Ramsey, among the several previous commentators on Niebuhr's
^"Reformation: Continuing Imperative," p. 249.
2Ib1d.
3
"Moral Relativism and the Christian Ethic;" An address given at a
Conference of Theological Seminaries meeting at Drew Theological Seminary,
Madison, New Jersey, November 29-December 1, 1929 on "Theological Education
and the World Mission of Christianity." Published In New York by the Inter¬
national Missionary Council, pp. 3 and 7-11.
4
Ibid., p. 9. This essay, above all others, shows the strong influence
of Ernst Troeltsch.
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thought, has given the most sustained attention to the important role which the
idea of relativism plays in Niebuhr's ethics J The critical thrust of his essay
centers on getting clear about this Issue. He has questioned the accuracy of
Niebuhr's use of the word "relativism." He suggests "the words 'relational'
and 'relatedness* better represent Niebuhr's position than the words 'relative'
2
or 'relativism.'" While he recognized that Niebuhr's choice of this word is
1) "In part only a terminological matter of no great importance," he also
believed it to be an indication of the Influence of 2) the "excessive contex-
tuallsm of much modern social philosophy, idealistic and pragmatic," and 3)
o
"the continued Influence of Troeltsch's cultural and historical relativism."
These three observations are correct,but I ain not sure that the terminological
innovations Ramsey advanced really succeed 1n removing the ambiguity in question.
Later in his essay he suggests that the term "objective relativism" be replaced
"with some such expression as 'relational objectivism' (when the relativity of
the object is at Issue) or 'perspectival objectivism' (when the relativity of
the subject is in view)."4 I would argue, however, that the term "objective
relativism" should be allowed to stand precisely because Niebuhr employs it to
hold together both the ontological notion of the "triadic" structure of being
(God-self-other) and the epistemological notion that all knowledge is relative
to the specific culturally conditioned categories of the knower's mind. This is
not a serious criticism of Ramsey's understanding of Niebuhr's ethics because
he is well aware of the fact that this terminological problem is occasioned by
a more basic epistemological problem.
^"The Transformation of Ethics," FE, pp. 140-172.
2Ibld., p. 142. 3Ibid., cf. pp. 151ff.
4Ibid., p. 156.
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Nlebuhr tended to Interpret certain epistemologlcal concepts as "facts"
which must simply be accepted rather than as theoretical notions which need
some sort of rational justification. As Ramsey has observed, "the reader [of
The Meaning of Revelation] is asked to presuppose that a volume entitled 'The
Critique of Historical Reason* has already been written, and has clearly estab¬
lished itself 1n a consensus of 'critical philosophers.'"^ But Niebuhr nowhere
advances a philosophical argument to justify the truth of historical relativism
as Indlspensible to any adequate eplstemology. Rather he simply asserts that
certain nameless social theorists and historians have demonstrated that this is
the case. "Theology," he declares, "is concerned with the principle of rela¬
tivity as this has been demonstrated by history and sociology rather than by
physics, and If it is developing into a relativistic theology this is the result
2
. . . of an attempt to adjust itself to a new self-knowledge." The point of
my criticism is not that Niebuhr should not entertain such a view but that he
does so uncritically.
Finally, it seems to me that the crux of the problem is Niebuhr's failure
to mark an important distinction between descriptive and normative relativism.
Does he in particular contexts claim that judgments of fact or value 1n society
S-j differ from those in society S2 (descriptive relativism) or does he claim
that what 1s really good, right or true in society S-j is not good, right or
true for society (normative relativism). One may hold the first of these
positions without accepting the second. A commitment to descriptive relativism
does not logically entail normative relativism. An awareness of the great
]Ibid., p. 153.
2
MR, pp. 7-8. Niebuhr doubtless had Troeltsch primarily In mind as
having "demonstrated" the truth of historical relativism.
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varlety of beliefs which various people hold to be true and the variability of
the values which they cherish at different times and places 1s a strong anti¬
dote to the ready acceptance of parochial beliefs masquerading as universal
principles. It was the prevalence of this tendency, especially 1n the Christian
church, that Niebuhr rightly criticized with tireless zeal. But the erection of
false norms does not provide grounds for denying the possibility or actuality
of universal principles of moral obligation or moral value.
Theoretical and Practlcal Knowledge
One cardinal feature of Nlebuhr's theory of knowledge is his serious
commitment to the historically conditioned character of all human reasoning.
A second Important element 1n his epistemology is his acceptance of something
like Kant's distinction between theoretical and practical reason.* Theoretical
reasoning Is that rational activity which a subject carries on in knowing ob¬
jects 1n the external world. Practical reasoning 1s that rational activity
which a self carries on 1n knowing other selves. Now these two kinds of
reasoning yield two kinds of knowledge which are wholly dissimilar. This 1s
so because both the knower and what Is known and the character of the rela¬
tionship between them 1s different. "Our knowledge of other persons differs
from our knowledge of objects externally regarded not only by being directed
toward different aspects of reality but by being a relation between different
terms."2
1MR, pp. v111, 65, 73, 74; RMWC, pp. 12-16, 78, 116f, 127-130; RS, pp.
82f. Recalling his break with liberal theology over the nature of the relation
between God and man, Niebuhr observes that this did not mean that he abandoned
"religious empiricism any more than [he] abandoned hlstorlsm or neo-Kantlan
epistemology." "Reformation; Continuing Imperative," p. 249.
2MR, p. 144. Cf. Ibid., pp. 144, 147; RS, pp. 72-73.
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The specific interpretation which Nlebuhr gives to the Kantian distinc¬
tion owes much to the familiar dlaloglcal theory of Martin Buber. According
to Nlebuhr, Buber argued that the "I" that knows and acts 1n the "I-Thou"
dialectic must be distinguished from the "I" 1n the "I-1t" relation.^ The "I"
1n the "I-it" relation 1s not a self-conscious being. It knows, but it does
not know that 1t knows. It values, but 1t 1s not able to value itself nor
evaluate Its valuation of other objects. The "I" 1n the "1-1t" relation 1s not
2
conscious of itself as a subject, as the counterpart of a Thou. In seeking to
interpret Impersonal processes and ideas the subject 1s not 1n this relation,
strictly speaking, a self."* ". . . The mind that contemplates Ideas is not the
self in Its whole concrete character with Its anxieties and hopes, its highly
personal guilt and need of deliverance from evil but rather a common mind, an
4
abstracted self." The "I" alone in this relation 1s active; the object 1s
passive. The self as observer 1s not concerned with questions about personal
freedom or with making judgments about the value or disvalue of the entitles
or processes 1t seeks to understand. It recognizes no qualitative dlstinc-
5
tions 1n the behavior of the external world. It is solely concerned with
tracing the efficient, material, formal or antecedent causal relations between
one object and another.6 This "I" is not conscious of Itself as just this
particular Individual existing here and now with a definite moral character
^MR, p. 65; PCM, p. 130; RS, p. 72. Cf. Martin Buber, I and Thou,
2nd edition, translated by Ronald Gregor Smith (New York: CharTes Scribrier's
Sons, 1958), p. 62f.
2RS, p. 73. 3MR, p. 145.
4PCM, p. 130. 5MR, p. 144.
6RMWC, p. 127.
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and specific moral commitments. It 1s conscious only of sensed qualities such
as colors or sounds, or entities such as tables and chairs, or abstract
actualities such as numbers or concepts of GodJ
In the I-Thou relation both the relationship and the related terns are
different. Another self is a "Thou" not an "it" precisely because 1t is not an
object passively awaiting the masterful curiosity of the theoretical reason.
The "I" here is not the initiator but the recipient of knowledge. The eplstemo-
loglcal relation is reversed.
To know a knower is to begin with the activity of the other who
knows us or reveals himself to us by his knowing activity. No
amount of activity on our part will serve to uncover the hidden
self-agtivity. It must make itself manifest or it cannot be
known.2
Knowledge of another self is not to be confused with knowledge of the consti¬
tution of human bodies or the contents of other minds. Selves reveal themselves
in the valuations they make of other selves. Selves know each other only inso¬
far as they value each other and respond to such valuations made by the other.
Nlebuhr fully endorses both Kierkegaard's and Buber's emphasis on the primacy
of the direct, untranscendable response-relation between one self and another,
between the I and the Thou.
Selves and not objects are the primary realities. Niebuhr champions
the primacy of moral knowledge without depreciating the importance of our ordinary
or more specialized scientific knowledge of nature. But in company with all
existentialist moralists he viewed with alarm the extent to which 1n the modern
world the scientific knowledge of objects rather than the moral-know!edge of
3
selves is recognized as most real and of greatest value.
]RS, p. 80. 2MR, p. 145.
^"Science in Conflict with Morality," supplementary essay 1n RMWC, pp.
127-141.
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Selves are ep1phenomena 1n the dominant world view of our
society. What alone is acknowledged, accepted as actual, is
the object. So far as selves can be made objects—set before
the ralnd as projected, external realities—they have their
place. But then they are no longer selves; they are not I's
and Thou's but It's.'
But in the relation of I to Thou there can be no Ignoring the concrete
personal concerns of each self. What 1s known in such relations are the doubts
and fears, guilt and anxiety, loves and hates, of particular selves who freely
choose to reveal themselves 1n these ways. Such knowledge is not conveyed by
means of propositions. To do so is to remain at the level of theoretical know¬
ing. Moral knowledge does not consist of a specific body of discourse relating
to a specialized kind of human activity which can be clearly distinguished from
activities of another kind. "Morality Is not something that can be Institution¬
alized as science, art, education, medicine, and religion are Institutionalized.
It pervades all activities."
This distinction between theoretical and moral reasoning may be made
clearer by 1) taking account of the notion of "truth" appropriate to each and
by 2) noting the role which "Imagination" plays 1n each.
The truth appropriate to theoretical reasoning 1s different from that
wnich is appropriate to moral reasoning, but it has nothing to do with the
distinction between that which is universally true and that which is true for
one individual. Rather, a distinction must be observed between "the truth
that is the opposite of error or ignorance and the truth which is antithesis
to lie or deception."3 A self which seeks to know objects is liable to error;




a self which seeks to know selves 1s liable to deceive and to be deceived. The
theoretical knower of objects defines truth as essentially a right relation
between Ideas, propositions, theories and objective reality or phenomena; and
as a right relation among these ideas, propositions and theories themselves.^
But the man who knows truth about objects may not communicate truly with another
person. Indeed 1t is a commonplace of our ordinary experience, as Socrates
observed to his sorrow, that it is precisely the man who really knows the truth
in the first sense who can He or deceive most convincingly. The situation may
be reversed. For example, a highly knowledgeable scientist who seeks to com¬
municate some scientific truth to an untrained friend will often find it dif¬
ficult to avoid either deceiving his friend on the one hand,or misrepresenting
2
the truth of what he knows on the other. These two kinds of truth must be
distinguished and both are evident "in a community of persons who value truth
not only as a kind of relation between propositions and facts but also as a
relation between persons."
In The Meaning of Revelation Niebuhr seeks to demonstrate the importance
of the distinction between theoretical and practical reasoning for the under¬
standing of past events. The same historical event may be understood from two
distinct points of view. He calls than "external" (scientific) and "internal"
(existential-valuatlonal) histories. An external history is any account which
is written from the standpoint of a disinterested observer who deliberately
divests himself so far as is possible of all valuatlonal and personal attachments
to the events he seeks to describe. An internal history is an account written
hbid., p. 134.
3Ibid., p. 135.
2Ibid., p. 46 and pp. 134-136.
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froni the perspective of a person whose life has been affected qualitatively by
the events which he describes J For example, the medical report of a doctor
describing the treatment of a patient who recovered his vision will differ
greatly from that penned by the patient himself. Whereas for the doctor this
event is an observed phenomenon, for the blind man 1t was a lived experience,
2
part of the story of what happened to him as a person. Nothing is gained by
asking if one or other of these two histories yields a truer or more accurate
account of what happened. Indeed, this question can only arise when it is for¬
gotten that true or false judgments may be made from either perspective.
"There is a descriptive and there is a normative knowledge of history and
3
neither type is reducible to the terms of the other."
The role that imagination plays in both kinds of reasoning also affords
insight into Important differences between them. Niebuhr seeks to clear the
way for his explanation of the role which Imagination plays in the acquisition
of all knowledge by denying that distinction between reason and imagination
that confines the former to theoretical reasoning and the latter to practical
4
reasoning. When this 1s done 1t becomes impossible to distinguish between
more adequate or less adequate Images employed by the practical reason. At
the same time the Indispensible role of imagination 1n theoretical reasoning
is denied. "Reason and imagination are both necessary 1n both spheres."
^R, pp. 59-67. 2Ibid., p. 59.
3
Ibid., p. 67. The nature of the distinction will be treated in greater
detail later in connection with Niebuhr's doctrine of revelation.




"Imagination," as Nlebuhr employs the term, has reference to that
essentially creative process In which the mind orders what 1s "given" to 1t.
For theoretical reason the "given" consists of the various kinds of sensations
mediated by our bodies. Sensations as such are non-intelligible. They must be
interpreted, that is, made to fit into an ordered pattern In which each stands
1n some meaningful relation to the others.
The jostling mob of confused, unintelligible, meaningless, visual
and auditory sensations 1s made to march 1n order by a mind which
approaches and apprehends them 1n some total Image. ... We do
not hear Isolated ejaculations, separate and therefore meaningless
words but apprehend each sound 1n a context which we 1n part
supply. ... We anticipate connections between sensations before
they are given and through imagination supply what 1s lacking 1n
the immediate datum.'
Error is possible in all our knowledge of physical things and processes, not
because sensations can be other than what they are, but because the mind may
employ false or erroneous Images 1n its Interpretation of them. Error in our
knowledge of nature arises when the images or symbols in the mind are either
separated from "constant reference to sensation 1n which mental expectations
2
are fulfilled or denied," or when images and symbols are identified with
objects so that no criticism of the former 1s possible. Knowledge of the
natural world depends upon a continuing dialectic between sensation and Imagina¬
tion.
The practical mode of knowing also Involves a dialectic,but in this
context both the "given" and the kind of Images employed differ. Here the
Ibid., p. 96.
2
Ibid.. p. 97. "... Reason forms and interprets sense-experience;
experience validates or Invalidates such experience-filled reasoning," RMWC,
p. 13. Cf. RS, p. 82.
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"brute data" are not sensations but the "affections of the self." Such affec¬
tions are doubtless mediated by our bodies but they are not identical with
bodily states or with any states of affairs external to our bodies. These
"affections" are mediated to us more often through our "social body," the com¬
munities in which we participate directly or sympathetically, than through our
physical structure. The practical reason does not concern itself with interpret¬
ing pleasure and pain, for example, as physical sensations, rather 1t seeks to
understand and interpret joys and sorrows, love and hate, humility and pride as
these arise in the life and actions of a community of persons. But these "affec¬
tions" like "sensations" are not In themselves Intelligible; adequate images and
patterns are needed so that they may be intelligibly related. The Images em¬
ployed by the practical reason are at once Inexpugnably personal and social. The
use of impersonal images In the realm of practical reason leads to mythology
rather than knowledge just as surely as does the use of personal images by the
7
theoretical reason.
The employment of erroneous or inadequate images by the practical reason
1s as productive of unfulfilled expectations and error as they are in the sphere
of theoretical reason. For example, a person suffering from great anxiety may
interpret his fears as part of a great conspiracy directed against him. H1s
images are erroneous and he either accepts the correction afforded by the very
different Interpretations of his companions or he retreats Into the solitary
world of private fantasy. The presence of a perverse or evil imagination is
apparent,too, in the conflict which exists between various social, racial, politi¬
cal, economic or religious groups. The Image of the depraved race may be used
by weak or powerful nations seeking to provide for themselves an intelligible
1
Ibid.,pp. 97-98. 2Ibid., pp. 98-99, 102-104.
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interpretation of their many feelings of anxiety, inadequacy or humiliation.
But the erroneous and evil character of such images becomes clear in the con¬
flicts which ensue and 1n the dissolution and destruction which results for both
the despised and the desplsersJ Error in the employment of such personal images
by the practical reason 1s so prevalent and so productive of evil consequences
that the temptation arises to abandon any hope of finding and using adequate
images which will provide an intelligible and coherent ordering of "the affections
of the self."
When personal images fail an attempt may then be made "to employ in the
understanding of personal relations the Images which we have learned to use with
2
some success in our external, non-participating knowledge of things." An
immediate consequence of this move is to render otiose any appeal to revelation
understood as that special occasion which provides the practical reason with
adequate images for the progressive ordering of the affections of the self. The
apprehension or Intuition of such "special occasions" 1s wholly an affair of the
practical reason. The impersonal, quantitative and non-historical concepts of
the theoretical reason are therefore quite incommensurate with this notion of
revelation. Further explanation of Nlebuhr's understanding of the thorny issue
of the relation between reason and revelation will concern us later; at this
point notice 1s taken of two objections which he raised against the use of Im¬
personal images In moral reasoning. "The first is that no man 1n the situation
of a participant in life actually succeeds in Interpreting and dealing with
other human beings on this level; the second is that the impersonal account
3





Accordlng to Niebuhr this first difficulty may be detected 1n the thought
of many philosophers from Plato to the present. Positivism provides a particu¬
larly clear-cut example.
Posltivists who affirm that terms of praise and blame are meaning¬
less yet tend 1n times of dispute with those whom they call
obscurantist to praise and blame as 1f there were persons before
them and as 1f there were value 1n their own view, as If truth
made a difference to persons. . . . The participant 1n life simply
cannot escape thinking in terms of persons and of values.
The transition from external knowledge of things and processes to Internal per¬
sonal knowledge of selves 1s made when motives are evaluated or when decisions
or promises are made. But when 1t 1s made the self which evaluates, decides or
promises 1s not the self in Its role as theoretical knower, but the self in its
role as practical moral agent participating 1n the life of a community of selves
who value, when they do not dlsvalue, each other's words, deeds, or character.
The second difficulty may also be seen In the thought of positlvlst philosophers.
The attempt to rule out all talk of "selves" and "values" as meaningless by means
of the a priori judgment that only words or sentences which refer to sense-
experience (or words or sentences which may be translated Into other words or
sentences which themselves refer to sense-experience) are meaningful 1s arbitrary.
But quite apart from the dubious character of this criterion, Niebuhr could not
understand how 1t could be thought to succeed 1n eliminating the need for ration¬
ality 1n morals. "The consequence of declaring any part of human experience and
action to be beyond reason is not to eliminate it from existence but to leave it
subject to unregulated passion, to uncr1t1c1zed custom or to the evil Imaginations
2
of the heart." The self as moral agent does not and cannot avoid seeking for
pattern and meaning 1n all Its relations but in doing so it cannot either adopt
hbid., pp. 105-106. 2Ib1d., p. 107.
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those Images appropriate to Its role as theoretical knower, or dispense with
any and all rational Images. The choice It faces 1s not between reason and Imag¬
ination but between reasoning with the aid of irreducible personal and moral
Images which are universally good or adequate, and reasoning with the aid of
egoistic or evil Images.
To confine rationality—that 1s the search for order, coherence, and
lawfulness—to the theoretical knowledge of objects and to deqy that a similar
activity 1s carried on by the self as moral agent 1s an error. Order, coherence
and lawfulness are also sought 1n the realm of personal relations and 1n the
determination of what 1s good and evil, just and unjust, wise and foolish. To
the extent that scientists, philosophers or other thinkers have either denied
or neglected the role which reason must play 1n ordering the affections or values
of selves 1n their relations to other selves, just to that extent Niebuhr judges
them to have contributed to the demoralization and depersonalization of modern
life. This 1s the Inevitable result of an exclusive preoccupation with Imper¬
sonal things, powers or forces and the relations between them. The object alone
1s considered actual and only the truth or falsity of statements about things
2
which are assumed to be objective are considered important. It 1s not enough,
Niebuhr observed, to officially acknowledge that "our Western morality 1s built
on the recognition that nothing 1s more Important, more to be served or honored,
3
apart from God himself, than I's and Thou's," 1f we then proceed to limit all
rational Inquiry Into human life to knowledge of ourselves as objects set before




the theoretical reason for observation, comparison, and subsequent generic
description.^ When this happens those specifically moral questions which a
scientist, for example, often raises to himself about the actual value of his
work, or about the meaning and justification of his vocation as a scientist
2
become meaningless questions to which no rational answer can be given. The In¬
sistent subjective concerns which men raise to themselves about the meaning of
their lives; about the worthwhlleness or triviality of the causes or values to
which they are committed, are moral questions which demand moral answers that
can be given, 1f at all, only by the exercise of practical reasoning. The terms
"theoretical" and "practical" denote two necessary and Irreducible modes of
reasoning.
The preceding exposition leaves no doubt about the fact that Nlebuhr
drew a very sharp distinction between theoretical and practical reasoning. This
1s particularly true of his use of 1t 1n The Meaning of Revelation. While 1t 1s
true that he did claim that the relation between them was "very close,he did
not explain how he knew this to be the case or what the nature of the relation
1s, given the radical character of the distinction he had made. Elsewhere he
observed that while philosophers since the time of Aristotle have distinguished
between these two sorts of reasoning, most have not thought 1t possible to unite
4
them systematically 1n a single theory. In the following passage he seems to
suggest that it 1s sufficient to recognize that these two modes of reasoning are
carried on by the one self even though 1t 1s Impossible to conceptualize how
^S, pp. 115-117.
^"Science In Conflict With Morality?," pp. 127-129, 138-140.
3MR, p. 94. Cf. p. 104.
^Particularly "Science In Conflict With Morality?," p. 127.
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they are so united.
Only the Individual self that both knows and acts provides an
un1ntellectua11zable or at least unconceptuallzable unlty.to
these various processes [viz. theoretical and practical].1
*n The Responsible Self, however, he Is less confident on this point. He re¬
affirms his view that the distinction 1s "useful," "unavoidable" even, but now
he wonders 1f 1t does not tend "to lead us somewhat astray by dissolving the
2
unity of the self." He 1s now convinced also that the subjective distinction
between theoretical and practical reason 1s employed 1n too simplistic a fashion
1f 1t has the consequence of obscuring "the practical or ethical elements 1n our
3
knowing as well as the observing, Interpreting elements 1n our doing." It 1s
doubtful that he could have written this at the time he wrote The Meaning of
Revelation.
The clearest example of Nlebuhr's analysis of "the practical or ethical
4
elements In our knowing" 1s contained 1n "Science 1n Conflict With Morality?."
Scientific Inquiry exemplifies man's capacity for theoretical reasoning 1n Its
most comprehensive and sophisticated form. The task of the moralist 1s not to
pass judgment on the adequacy of such theoretical reasoning, but to point out
the moral character of all scientific Inquiry. The moral character referred to
has nothing to do with the virtues or vices of scientists nor with any systematic
C
moral philosophy that may have been developed by them. By the morality of
lIb1d, 2RS, p. 82.
3
Ibid., p. 83. Cf. RMWC, p. 75, "Fact and value or theoretical and
practical reasoning cannot be so divorced from each other that political, ethical,
or religious men can reason without theorizing, observing and being concerned
with facts; or that scientific men can develope theory without making decisions
or choosing values."
4pp. 130-137.
^"Science In Conflict With Morality?," pp. 130f.
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sclence Niebuhr means those ethical elements that are actually present, not as
accidental features of scientific work, but as essential to 1t. Science 1s
morally ordered 1) by Its commitment to true and universal truth as a cause;
2) by Its conscientiousness in $elf-cr1t1c1sm; and 3) by Its faithfulness 1n
truth-telling.^ Conflicts may arise between the scientist's loyalty to scienti¬
fic Inquiry and his personal Interests or his loyalty to a particular political
Ideology, but this only confirms the fact that these are conflicts between
moralities. Conflicts may arise, Indeed have arisen, between this morality of
science and those moralities that make national survival or some system of
political or religious dogma an ultimate cause. Such conflicts do not support
any contention that there Is an Ineradicable conflict between theoretical and
practical reasoning 1n scientific Inquiry. They are better understood as
clashes between science operating with a commitment to the cause of universal
knowledge or truth and the parochial causes of these political or religious
"truth-systems.
Niebuhr also claimed that 1t was Important to recognize "the observing,
Interpreting elements 1n our doing." Unfortunately, he did not Identify these
"elements" or attempt any systematic exposition of their character. He did not
do so, perhaps, because he believed that as a moral theologian he was fully
occupied with the task of analyzing and assessing the function of practical
reasoning not only 1n religion but 1n other kinds of cultural activity such as
3
politics.
If Nlebuhr's description of the theoretical and practical reason 1s
1Ib1d., pp. 131-136. Cf. RMWC, pp. 86-88.
2RMWC, p. 86.
3"Sc1ence 1n Conflict With Morality?," p. 130. RMWC, pp. 64-78.
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Indebted to Kant 1n some major aspects, 1t departs quite radically from that
philosopher's views at other points, especially with respect to the practical
reason. His account of the role of Imagination 1n both kinds of reasoning
clearly presupposes an acceptance of the fundamental Kantian distinction between
the noumenal and phenomenal object, between objects as they are 1n themselves and
objects as they appear to us. He also agreed with Kant that Insofar as we claim
to know an object, its character as known by us 1s partly determined by the
peculiar character of cur perceptual and conceptual capacities. The extent of
his departure from Kant's views may be judged from the following points. His
acceptance of the universal truth of historical relativism made It Impossible
for him to agree with Kant that the categories or Images employed 1n all reason¬
ing are universal, that 1s, common to all selves.^ It 1s well known that Kant
sought 1} to distinguish between the a priori and a posteriori elements 1n the
theoretical knowledge of objects and 2) to give a systematic account of the a
priori elements In both theoretical and practical or moral knowledge. Nlebuhr
agreed that these elements must be distinguished but he Introduced two very
drastic revisions Into this Kantian scheme. First, his acceptance of the his¬
torical relativity of all human reasoning brought him into direct conflict with
Kant's Insistence that necessity and universality are the two defining charac¬
teristics of apriority. It 1s surprising then to find Hlebuhr referring to such
2
historically relative forms of human reason as a priori.
It [the self] cones to its meetings with the Thou's and It's with
an a priori equipment that 1s the heritage of Its personal and
social past; . . . The remembered images are the product not, 1n
the first place, of Its own past encounters but of a society which
^MR, p. 9; RS, pp. 80, 96.
*RS, pp. 80, 96, 154.
-166
has taught 1t a language with names and explicit or Implicit
metaphors and with an Implicit logic. With the aid of that lan¬
guage the self has learned to divide up the continuum of Its
experience Into separate entitles, to distinguish thlnas and
persons, processes 1n nature and movements 1n society.'
For Kant a priori meant underlved from, or Independent of, sense experience. If
we acquire Images In the manner described by Nlebuhr then they are clearly not
a priori 1n Kant's sense. Nlebuhr could only defend them as a priori 1n relation
t0 the particular experience of an Individual self: Kant, of course, argued
that the a priori elements 1n our knowledge are Independent of all_ experience.
Second, 1t 1s hardly accurate to call the description Nlebuhr has given of the
function of the practical reason a revision of the Kantian theory. For Kant the
role of the practical reason was severely restricted to the positing of unities
behind experience. For Nlebuhr practical reason functions 1n a manner analogous
2
to that of the theoretical reason. It is the reasoning of a self with a
personal destiny who seeks and finds meaning within experience. If labels are
to be used at all 1t may be said that critical Idealism 1s replaced by a sort
of critical existentialism.
1Ib1d., p. 96.
2MR, pp. 95-99. RMWC, p. 13.
CHAPTER V
FAITH IN GOD AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
NATURAL RELIGION AND MORALITY
Introduction
The relational theory of value (Chapter II) and the relational theory of
moral agency (Chapter III)., each 1n their own way, demonstrate the Intimate rela¬
tion between philosophical analysis and theological affirmation 1n Nlebuhr's
thought. He had little sympathy for those theological moralists who seek to
Isolate theological ethics from all commerce with traditional moral philosophy
1n the Interest of securing the autonomy of theology.^ On the other hand.he was
equally critical of any attempt to deny the legitimacy or possibility of formu-
2
latlng a thelstlc ethic. In setting forth these two theories primary attention
was centered on exposing the broadly philosophical elements Involved. Sufficient
attention has not yet been given to the theological convictions that Nlebuhr
held; theological convictions which he believed could best find practical ex¬
pression 1n terms of the relational theories he had developed.
At various points 1n his writings Nlebuhr has given brief summary state¬
ments of those convictions that formed the essential core of his own personal
3
religious faith and theology. In his retrospective essay, "Reformation:
Hhe theological ethics of Karl Barth 1s an example which Nlebuhr criti¬
cized. RS, p. 158; VTT, pp. 11Of.
2RS, p. 42; CC, p. 184.
3
"Reformation: Continuing Imperative," pp. 248f; KGA, pp. x11-xv1; MR,
pp. v111-1x; CC, p. x11.
-167-
-168-
Cont1nu1ng Imperative" (1960) he pointed to three convictions that had been
and remained fundamental to all his theological thinking since he first adopted
them as a young theologian seeking more substantial theological roots than
religious liberalism had, 1n his judgment, been able to provide.* Of first Im¬
portance among them was his conviction of the sovereignty of God. "... I
came to understand," he declared, "that unless being Itself, the constitution
of things, the One beyond all the many, the ground of my being and of all being,
the ground of Its 'that-ness' and Its 'so-ness,1 was trustworthy—could be
2
counted on by what had proceeded from It—I had no God at all." The vital
tap-root of all Nlebuhr's work as a moralist and theologian of culture 1s his
deep awareness of both the transcendence of God (the One beyond all the many)
and of the immanent presence and dynamic Initiative and action of God the
Creator, Judge and Redeemer, within human history and the whole realm of being
(the One jfjn all the many). To confess that God 1s sovereign means that every
self 1s determined 1n the particularity of Its Individual historical existence
by God, understood as the ground of all contingent being. Beyond this 1t means
that the ground of n\y being and of all being 1s trustworthy; 1s good to and
for all that Issues from It. Associated with this fundamental certainty were
two corollary convictions. The first was his acceptance of the judgment that
man apart from the grace of God Is lost, sinful, and Idolatrous; the second
was that forgiveness of sin, trust In God, and loyalty to his cause of univer¬
sal redemption 1s a wholly gracious and miraculous gift. He acknowledged that




of these convictions but together they remained the essential core of his
theology.
Nlebuhr was a self-consciously Protestant theologian (which does not
mean that he was polemically ant1-Cathol1c or ant1-Thom1st). It 1s not sur¬
prising therefore that he well recognized that each of these themes was central
to the thought of the Protestant Reformation. He had a lively appreciation for
the theology of the Reformers, especially Luther and Calvin. His early study
of the history of Christianity 1n America fostered In h1m a new and profound
awareness of the normative Importance of just these doctrines for understanding
3
the Protestant movement 1n America. Above all else he became convinced "that
American Christianity and American culture cannot be understood at all save on
4
the basis of faith in a sovereign, living, loving God." This did not mean that
the sociological point of view which he had taken 1n his previous study, The
Social Sources of Denominationalism (1929) was Invalidated, but 1t did mean
that that approach could not account for the origin or the effect of those con¬
victions which were independent of culture. That the peculiar Institutional
form which Christianity had assumed 1n America was largely the result of the
influence of such cultural phenomenon as ethnocentricity, class and sectional
loyalties, and economic status was clear enough. This approach could 1n this
way, very well account for the diverse forms which Protestantism in America had
assumed, but 1t could not account for the unity of Christianity as a confession¬
al movement. It could not account for the impact of a movement that for all
^Ibid., p. 249. Perhaps the most significant change centered in his
development of a more sophisticated and complex understanding of faith.
2CE, pp. 235-243 and 267-274 resp. and KGA, pp. 37f, and 38-41 resp.
Cf. esp. the "Preface."
3 4
The Kingdom of God 1n America (1937). Ibid. ,p. xv1.
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its diversity was united by its members' common trust in and response to "the
living reality of God's present rule, not only 1n human spirits but also in
the world of nature and human history."*
In his influential study, Christ and Culture (1951), Niebuhr has des¬
cribed five distinct answers or strategies which have been developed in the
history of Western Christianity, 1n response to "the enduring problem" of under¬
standing how Christians should live under the dual authority represented by
Christ and culture. The five typical answers fall Into two sub-groups. A group
of three "median" answers 1s identified. They occupy a middle ground between
two more extreme positions. The first radical view counsels the rejection of
all cultural values and achievements on the grounds that they are wholly inimi-
cable to the virtues and commands of Christ. The other extreme position seeks
to recognize a fundamental identity between the best human values and ach1eve¬
's
ments and the virtues and teachings of Christ. The first group emphasizes
the discontinuity, the second the continuity, between knowledge of the perfec¬
tion and will of God revealed 1n Christ and the knowledge of good and evil, right
and wrong present in culture. The second group of three "median" answers have
at least two features in common, the second of which 1$ important in relation
to this discussion of Niebuhr's own basic theological convictions. They agree,
against the extreme positions, In sua1nta1n1ng both that there are fundamental
differences between these two authorities and that each must be held together
in some sort of unity. They differ at the point of understanding how this 1s
*Ibid., p. 51.
2
Ibid., pp. 40f, and Ch. 2, "Christ Against Culture."
3Ibid., pp. 41f, and Ch. 3, "The Christ of Culture."
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to be achieved.^ A careful reading of Nlebuhr's description of the mediating
views of the "syntheslst" (best represented by St. Thomas Aquinas), the "dualist"
(especially Martin Luther) and the "conversionlst" (St. Augustine) reveals the
fact that they share precisely those three theological convictions which he him¬
self has affirmed.^ Translated Into the context of "the culture problem" this
means first that they were agreed that to affirm the sovereignty of God as
Creator, Judge and Redeemer means that the sphere of nature and culture can
neither be wholly rejected as the exclusive Christian does (for God not only
judges their sinfulness but he has created and redeemed them); nor simply
accepted as they are as the culture-Christian tends to do (for God does judge
the fallenness of man and all his works). Further, these centrist Christians
all believe that man's sinfulness is universal and irradlcable by his own
efforts. The Idea that sin is universal both 1n the sense that 1t 1s true of
all men and 1n the sense that it penetrates the totality of human personality
Is, for different reasons, rejected by both extreme positions. Unlike the
median views they each tend "to posit a realm free from sin; In the one case
the holy community [the exclusive Christian], in the other a citadel of righ¬
teousness 1n the high place of the personal spirit [the culture Christian]."3
Finally, this mediating group affirms both the primacy of God's grace and the
need to enter upon cultural activity in gratitude to God and 1n service to the
neighbor. The kingdom of God is both a gift and a task. The two extreme groups
tend (again for different reasons) to posit the primacy of law over grace. The
1Ibid., pp. 41f.
^Ibld., pp. 42f, and Ch. 4, "Christ Above Culture;" Ch. 5, "Christ and
Culture 1n Paradox;" Ch. 6, "Christ the Transformer of Culture."
3Ib1d., pp. 112f, pp. 78f.
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excluslve Christian tends to Interpret the gospel as a "new law" to be obeyed
for the sake of attaining ethical purity while the culture Christian fashions
spiritual Ideals or categorical Imperatives from the gospel to which the angels
of his better nature are, with effort, well able to conform.^
Given the fact that the theological basis of these three types of Chris¬
tian social ethics are identical with his own theological convictions, which
of them did he himself support? If this question had to be answered solely from
a reading of Christ and Culture, only a tentative answer could be given. On
the one hand, consistent with his emphasis on historical and theo-centric
relativism, Niebuhr argues that no one of these answers can be named the
Christian answer. Any attempt to do so would, he believed, be "an act of
usurpation of the Lordship of Christ which at the same time would Involve doing
violence to the liberty of Christian men and to the unconcluded history of the
3
Church 1n culture." A radical monothelst must restrain himself and simply
confess "that Christ as living Lord is answering the question in the totality
of history and life in a fashion which transcends the wisdom of all his inter-
4
preters yet employs their partial insights and their necessary conflicts."
On the other hand, 1n his treatment of the final median position, "Christ the
Transformer of Culture," the reader could not fall to note the absence of any
criticism of its theological or strategic adequacy comparable with that offered
of each of the other four views. When the rest of Nlebuhr's work is taken
Into account however, there can be no doubt that he consistently championed the
"converslonist" or "transformlst" position. It 1s, for example, a particularly
hbid.. pp. 113, 79f
3Ib1d., p. 232.
2Cf. Ibid., p. x11.
4Ib1d., p. 2 (Italics added).
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Important theme in The Meaning of Revelation (1941). There he argued that
natural and revealed religion entail "neither mutually exclusive principles,"
thus dualism is rejected; "nor yet distinct stages in a continuous development,"
thus the syntheslst view is set aside; "but rather a transformation or con¬
version In which the latter is less the product than the transformer of the
previous stage.The following passage is a particularly clear and repre¬
sentative statement of Niebuhr's understanding of the ethics of "conversion!sra."
. , . Conversion is the very neart of the Christian faith, for it
is the change of mind which the reception of the gospel of the
Kingdom brings with 1t. Such conversion is antithetical to sub¬
stitution. In the Christian life human eros 1s not supplanted by
divine agape but divine agape converts the human eros by directing
1t in gratitude toward God and toward the neighbor in God. The
community of the family is not supplanted by a monastic society
but the hearts of fathers and children and husbands and wives are
turned to each other 1n reconciliation because of the divine
forgiveness. The gospel restores and converts and turns again;
it does not destroy and rebuild by substituting one finite structure
of life or thought for another.2
Conversion!sal, in Niebuhr's judgment, has much in common with the dual¬
ist position. It 1s closer to the dualist than to the syntheslst view with
respect to Its understanding of man's sin and God's grace. The conversionlst
position accredits Itself as a "distinct motif" from that of the dualist by its
"more positive and hopeful attitude toward culture."3 This attitude 1s not a
simple human optimism; 1t arises as a consequence of the conviction that God
1s now active in all the events of history and culture bringing human life to
fulfillment to the glory of God. The ethic of conversion!sin is nourished by
certain theological convictions about creation, the fall of man, and history
1«R, p. v11i, Cf., pp. 116-121, 165-175, 182-191.




that taken together, 1n Nlebuhr's view, mark 1t off as a distinct type of
approach to the Christ-culture problem from that of the dualist position with
which it otherwise has much in common.
The conversionist places greater emphasis on the present creative and
ordering activity of God In the totality of nature and culture than does the
dualist, who tends Nlebuhr believes, to regard creation as simply a necessary
prelude to the supreme deed of atonement. As a result the dualist tends to
see the wrath of God as particularly manifest in the physical world and culture
at the expense of his creative and ordering activity. For the conversionist
the activity of God is at every moment a creative, ordering and redemptive
activity.^ Nlebuhr also argues that the dualist (he has Paul and Luther
particularly In view) tends to blur the distinction between man's created good¬
ness as a finite being and his fall into sin.2 The conversionist on the other
hand distinguishes sharply between creation and fall; the first is entirely a
good work of God, the latter 1s wholly a moral and personal action of man. All
the good gifts of love, aspiration and reason he retains as a fallen creature
but in his exercise of each he violates, corrupts and perverts every object
and every relationship he engages. These differences have consequences for
the attitude shown by the conversionist and the dualist toward culture. For
the conversionist
culture 1s all corrupted order rather than order for corruption,
as it 1s for the dualist. It 1s perverted good, not evil; or it
1s evil as perversion, and not badness of being. The problem of
culture 1s therefore the problem of Its conversion, not of its
replacement by a new creation; though,the conversion 1s so radical
that it amounts to a kind of rebirth.
V, pp. 191-193.
2Niebuhr was not unaware of the fact that the correctness of this judg¬
ment about either Paul or Luther has often been disputed. Cf. CC, pp. 193, n.
2, 165f., 172, n. 14.
3Ibid., p. 194.
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Chr1st1an life and conduct Is not therefore, on the converslonlst's view, to
be thought of In complete contrast to cultural life but as Involving a contin¬
uing transformation of 1t. Finally, the converslonlst agrees with the dualist
that this transformation awaits a final fulfillment which lies beyond history,
nevertheless he looks more to the present than to the future, as much to man's
cultural activity as to the life of the Christian community for the manifesta¬
tion of God's presence and transforming power. "For the converslonlst, history
1s the story of God's mighty deeds and of man's responses to them."^ It 1s
precisely this conviction of the direct presence of God to man In every histor¬
ical event that 1s the theological foundation of Nlebuhr's ethic of responsi¬
bility. A radically monotheistic ethic of responsibility affirms: "God 1s
acting 1n all actions upon you. So respond to all actions upon you as to
2
respond to his action." The converslonlst lives 1n eschatologlcal hope of
the divine rather than human possibility that all creation and culture 1s now
being transformed Into a kingdom of God 1n which all the activities of all men
will be directed toward and so reflect the love and glory of God.
This brief sketch of Nlebuhr's central theological convictions suggests
the possibility of Identifying two basic principles which structure his theo¬
logical ethics. The technical term employed by Nlebuhr to refer to the first
was radical monotheism. This 1s another way of speaking about and affirming
the sovereignty of God, that 1s, the primacy of his being and value to all con¬
tingent being and value. The second 1s the principle of "transformlsm" or
"converslonlsm." The somewhat barbarous term "transformlsm" has reference to
that continuous process of metanola—that 1s Itself a consequence of receiving
hbld., p. 195.
3CC, pp. 195f.
2RS, p. 126, cf., pp. 65-67, 165-170.
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radlcally monotheistic fa1th~1n which all human thought, valuation and action,
both 1n Its Individual and social expression, Is redirected toward God. These
two themes may also be understood as Nlebuhr's answer to two questions which
must be asked and answered by any theological ethic that warrants serious con¬
sideration. First, "How 1s God known and what may be known of him?" Second,
"What are the consequences of this knowledge for understanding and ordering
moral experience and action?" The four sections which follow will have as their
general purpose to further develop and clarify Nlebuhr's answer to these two
questions. He addressed himself to both of them (the second only briefly) 1n a
particularly clear and Incisive manner 1n an essay originally entitled, "The
Nature and Existence of God: A Protestant View," and later republished under
the title, "Faith 1n Gods and In God."^ In the following section I will analyse
this essay in some detail and give special attention to Niebuhr's understanding
of the phenomenon of "faith" 1n both natural and revealed religion.
"Faith In Gods and In God"
The content of this essay 1s comprised of Nlebuhr's answers to a number
of carefully formulated questions. Stated more accurately, the answers to each
succeeding question together answer his first, and for Nlebuhr, most Important
theological question: "How 1s faith 1n God possible?"2 These questions
^It was originally delivered as an address at the University of Michigan
as one of a series 1n which a Catholic, a Protestant, a Jewish and an atheistic
view of "the problem of God" were presented. Both the title and the sub-title
of the article as originally published—"The Nature and Existence of God: A
Protestant View," Motive, IV (1943), pp. 13-15, 43-46; and Its republished title,
"Faith 1n Gods and In God," supplementary essay In Radical Monotheism and Western
Culture, pp. 114-126—provide helpful clues to Interpreting his approach to the*
ultimate theological problem. So far as I can determine there are no alterations
or additions to the substance of the "revised edition." All references will be
to "Faith In Gods and 1n God."
2Ib1d., p. 116.
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themselves, and the order In which they are arranged, proceed from certain
self-consciously held assumptions which Invite careful scrutiny. The exposition
will proceed 1) by posing each of these questions, 2) by describing Niebuhr's
answers to them, and 3) by exposing some of the implicit or explicit assumptions
involved.
Niebuhr begins by arguing that 1t should be recognized that there 1s
more than one way of raising and formulating Important and legitimate questions
about the existence and character of God. A philosopher of religion, for example,
may begin with a particular definition of the word "God" and then ask "Does a
being having this nature exist?" Alternatively, a metaphysician may Inquire
first Into the ultimate nature of reality. Into first or final causes, Into
primal energy and so on, and conclude that the word "God" names this ultimate
reality which 1s the source or ground of both the existence and general charac¬
teristics (motion, causality, order, etc.) of our circumambient world. "The
Protestant theologian," Niebuhr asserts, raises his question about God 1n yet
another way. He does not approach the problem by formulating such theoretical
and speculative questions as "Does God exist?" or "What 1s the first cause?"
Rather he approaches 1t
as an eminently practical problem, a problem of human existence
and destiny, of the meaning of human life 1n general and the
life of self and community In particular . . . [He] has not
sought to convince a speculative detached mind of the existence
of God, but has begun with actual moral and religious experience,
with the practical reasoning of the existing person rather than
with the speculative Interests of a detached mind.'
Given these three methods, 1t seems natural to ask why any given
Ibid., pp. 115-116. Niebuhr's employment of a modified Kantian dicho¬
tomy between the pure theoretical and pure practical exercise of human ration¬
ality Is obvious here. It now becomes clear, too, why Niebuhr originally
entitled his essay "The Nature and Existence of God" and not "The Existence and
Nature of God."
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1nd1 vidual would formulate the problem of God 1n one of these ways rather than
another. Nlebuhr's answer 1s that this 1s to be explained partly as a conse¬
quence of an individual's identification with and training 1n a particular
tradition and partly as a result of "his own personal wrestling with the question
of life's meaning." That this 1s so for Niebuhr 1s clear from his own testi¬
mony; that 1t would be accepted as true by eve»7 inquirer for whom he speaks
seems doubtful. For example, 1s 1t the case that among those philosophers or
theologians who have had a serious theoretical Interest 1n pursuing one or other,
or both, of the approaches Niebuhr eschews, that there are none who have done
so Independent of conscious membership in any single philosophical or religious
tradition and without any confessed or discernible "personal wrestling with the
question of life's meaning?" Niebuhr Implies, 1f he does not actually assert,
that the particular questions which a given thinker raises 1n the course of his
Inquiry Into theistlc belief Is determined by particular antecedent sociological
and psychological events. This is an assumption some of these philosophers and
theologians would find reason to reject. It is, however, an assumption which
Is compatible with his acceptance of historical or cultural relativism.
Niebuhr is on firmer ground 1n asserting that Protestant thinkers have
generally been united 1n rejecting the cogency or the need for the traditional
arguments for the existence of God, but he seems to go further than this and
claim that there Is a discernible common method which "the great Protestant
2
thinkers" (Luther, Calvin, Edwards, Schleiermacher and Kierkegaard are named)
pursued 1n their attempts to answer the question, "How 1s faith 1n God possible?"
Is Niebuhr simply claiming that Protestant theologians have generally posed this
as the central theological question or 1s he also claiming that 1n seeking to
^Ib1d., p. 114. 2Ibid., p. 116.
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answer it they have employed a commonly understood method? In the following
passage he is clearly making both claims.
In some such fashion I conceive Protestant theology at work.
It Is well aware of other Inquirers 1n the same general field and
1t profits greatly by counsel and debate with them. Yet it seeks
to remain true to Its own particular problem and to jts own method
of inquiry.'
On the face of It, this would seem to commit Nlebuhr to the difficult
position of either 1) interpreting the Interminable debates (debates which we
2
have seen he himself entered) between various Protestant theologians over the
formulation of an appropriate theological method as Intramural debates about
the details of a single method, or 2) declaring that those who reject this method
do not qualify as "Protestant" theologians. It is instructive to note that both
of these judgments are present in Niebuhr's retrospective essay, "Reformation:
Continuing Imperative" (1S6Q). The first is well Illustrated 1n the underlined
words of the following passage.
I believe that the Barthian correction of the line of march
begun in Schleiermacher's day was" "absolutely"e'ssentia'l, But that
it has become an over-correction and that Protestant theology can
minister to the church's life more effectively 1f It resumes the
general line of march represented by the evanqelical, empirical
and critfcaT movement.
Niebuhr became increasingly critical of the later theology of Karl Barth (the
Barth of the Church Dogmatics) precisely because he believed that it had ceased
to be a theology of Christian experience and became a theology of Christian
doctrine. He had welcomed Barth's earlier work (especially his Romerbrief,




"Reformation: Continuing Imperative," p. 250 (italics added).
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flrst ed. 1919^) precisely because 1t did not forsake the relational and valua¬
tions! method of Schleiermacher but merely sought to "correct" that tendency
towards subjectivism which made man's relation to God (faith) rather than God
himself the object of religious knowledge. It 1s Important to recognize that
for Niebuhr what was "essential" was not a rejection of the relatlonal-valuatlonal
2
method but only a "correction" of an aberration in the employment of this method.
He rejected Earth's later judgment that subjectivism and anthropomorphism were
3
necessary implications of the relational method itself. Nlebuhr could only
regard Karl Barth's repudiation of the relatlonal-valuational method as a forsak¬
ing of the most distinctive and enduring characteristic of Protestant theology
and a going back "to the untenable positions against which the Reformation and
1
Barth's Romerbrlef (Bern, 1919) was .Included in a list of books he sub¬
mitted to Christian Century in response to the query: "What books did most to
shape your"vocational attitude and your philosophy of life?" "Ex Ubris" 1n
Christian Century LXXIX (1962), p. 754.
2Cf. VTT, pp. 98, 101-105, 110-113; MR, pp. 23-37.
3
For documentation of this change In Barth's thinking see the essay by
Hans Frei, "Nlebuhr's Theological Background," FE, esp. pp. 40-53; Van A.
Harvey, The Historian and the Believer (New York: The Macmlllan Company, 1966),
pp. 153-159; t. f. torrance, Karl liarth: An Introduction to His Early Theology,
1910-1931 (London: SCM PressTto.", 1962), pp. 33-198. Professor"Torrance
Identifies three distinct stages 1n the development of Barth's thought; the first
culminating 1n the first edition of Oer Romerbrief (Bern 1919). He argues that
this first edition reflects a kind of"critical 11 be ra lis"' but then 1n the second
edition (Munchen, 1921) the liberal valuatlonal theology of Schleleraacher 1s
criticized and rejected with the assistance of the Klerkegaardlan principle of
the Infinite qualitative difference between God and man. The third stage began
approximately with the publication of his study of St. Anselm, Fides Quaerens
Intellectual (£d. by Ian Robertson, London: SCM Press. 1960). Now the Klerke-*
gaardlan principle Is disavowed (cf. Church Dogmatics, I.!., p. 1x) and the focus
of his theology becomes the revelation of"the trTunelSod in Jesus Christ. This
Interpretation harmonizes well with Hans Frel's sympathetic assessment of Barth
and with his contention that 1n Nlebuhr's "objective relativism" he attempts to
unite logically Incompatible Interests. He wants to affirm the relat1onal1sm
and ontologlcal agnosticism of Schleiermacher and affirm the ontologlcal Inde¬
pendence of God and man and the objectivity, freedom and priority of God In all
human knowledge of him. Hans Frei, "The Theology of H. Richard Nlebuhr,"
pp. 74-78, 83-87.
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the 18th century revival had to protest."1 Niebuhr 1s not saying that Barth's
mature theology 1s not a theology about the one. God who is. But he 1s saying
1) that 1t cannot be assumed that the word "God" has the same referent or meaning
for Barth as it has for those Protestant theologians who begin with "actual moral
and religious experience." And he 1s at least Implying 2) that In forsaking
this method Barth has forfeited the right to be called a distinctively Protestant
theologian.
Many postliberals, particularly Karl Barth, . . . seem to me to
have gone back to orthodoxy as right teaching, right doctrine,
and to faith as fides., as assent; . . . toward the definition of
Christian Hfe 1n terms of right believing, of Christianity as
the true religion, and otherwise to the assertion of the primacy
of Ideas over personal relations. When I think about this I have
to say to myself that as important as theological formulations
are for me they are not the basis of faith but only one of its
expressions and that not the primary one.
If, as Niebuhr believes, the theological method characteristically em¬
ployed by Protestant theologians is irreducibly relational and valuatlonal, then
plainly everything depends upon how this value relation is understood. Accord¬
ingly, for Niebuhr the point at which "Protestants begin their analysis of the
problem of God 1s that of practical human faith in deity."3 In other words, 1t
is necessary to begin with an analysis of natural religion as a universal human
phenomenon. Each of the underlined words are Important. By the adjectival
1,1Reformation: Continuing Imperative," p. 250.
2Ib1d.
3
FGG, p. 116 (italics added). Another way of putting this is to say that
the first step toward answering the general question "How Is faith in God pos¬
sible?" 1s to ask and answer the question "What is faith?" or more exactly, "How
1s the word 'faith' to be understood In this question?" Cf. Hans Frel's Judg¬
ments, "The primary task of Protestant theology after Schleiertnacher has been
that of understanding the empirical reality, 'faith,' both internally and by
distinction from other ways of knowing. . . . It is one of the most persistent
questions among those to which H. Richard Niebuhr has devoted attention," FE,
p. 67. Niebuhr's retrospective essay confirm both of these judgments. Cf.
"Reformation: Continuing Imperative," p. 249f.
-182-
modifiers "practical" and "human" I take Niebuhr to mean 1) that faith is a
specific sort of non-theoretical valuation (i.e. it is "practical") and 2) that
such valuations are made by man qua man and are neither valuations which men ought
to,but may or may not make, nor are they valuations which it is only possible for
them to make consequent upon the reception of some extra-human or supernatural
power (i.e. it is human). Faith 1s then a personal kind of valuation, a positive
trusting in, reliance on, or counting on something. Nlebuhr is not contending
that this is a sufficient definition of faith as 1t is used among Protestants but
he does insist that this is the fundamental idea.
To make this clearer Niebuhr distinguishes between the notion's "faith"
and "belief." Subjectively, "faith" denotes an active "setting-forth" of the
self, a committing of the self to something, whereas "belief" denotes a passive
assent of the self to the truth of propositions. Objectively, "faith" 1s commit¬
ment to a power, or being, or agency over against the self, whereas "belief" has
as its object true propositions.
Faith . . . always refers primarily to character or power rather
than to existence. Existence is Implied and necessarily implied;
but there is no direct road from assent to the intellectual pro¬
position that something exists to the act of confidence and reliance
upon it.'
Faith, so understood, is present 1n every sphere of human knowing and
acting as a constitutive element of selfhood. A phenomenological analysis of all
our theoretical knowledge of objects in the external world, including other
persons, reveals the presence of this faith as the ground of its possibility. In
our ordinary knowledge of objects or in the sophisticated knowledge of the natural
sciences we are concerned with an impersonal theoretical knowledge of things, and
this kind of knowledge depends upon faith, as for example our faith in the
VGG, pp. 116, 117.
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1ntellig1b1l1ty of things, a faith which 1s maintained even 1n the face of
Ignorance and errorJ Similarly, 1n our personal relations 1n society we exer¬
cise confidence in and reliance on other selves which 1s Independent of "our
belief 1n each other's existence and distinct from our knowledge of each other's
character, though such belief and such knowledge do form the background and the
foreground of our faith."2
Nlebuhr does not 1n this essay make a point to distinguish his use of the
term "knowledge" from that of "belief" 1n the way that he did discriminate between
"faith" and "belief." However, he seems in the sentence just cited to use the
term "belief" as the psychological correlate of existence-propositions (I.e.
sentences which assert that something 1s or 1s not) and "knowledge" as the
psychological correlate of predicate propositions (I.e. sentences which assert
that something has or does not have certain properties). Thus both "belief-
states" and "knowledge-states" differ from "faith-states" because the object of
each 1s a proposition of some kind. But "faith-states" are not cognitive states
if one limits the meaning of what can count as a cognitive state to the subjective
apprehension of the meaning of propositions. This 1s so because the object of
"faith-states" Is not a proposition but some being or "value-center" or power
upon which the self relies and without which 1t does not and cannot exist. "Not
only the just but also the unjust. Insofar as they live, live by faith.""3 Faith
1s a universal and primitive attitude of selves.
^Nlebuhr analyzes the structure of faith present 1n the work of the scienti¬
fic community in RMWC, Ch. 4, "Radical Faith and Western Science," pp. 78-89;
"Science 1n Conflict With Morality?", Supplementary essay 1n RMWC, pp. 127-141.




Earller Nlebuhr was quoted as declaring that "the starting-point at
which Protestants begin their analysis of the problem of God 1s that of practical
human faith In deity." Having clarified what he means by "practical human faith"
we must now ask what he means by "practical human faith 1n deity." The term
"deity" 1s a synonym for "god" defined as any object of human faith which Is
relied on to bestow significance and worth on an Individual existence. According
to Nlebuhr It 1s simply a psychological fact that no human being lives without a
cause, without some object of devotion, some "center of value," something which
they recognize as a source of meaning and value. The object of such faith may
be ephemeral or even 111usoi7}but the trusting self never regards 1t as such.
Faith 1s never simply a subjective state, It Is always faith in or reliance on
some existent as the ground of meaning and value. Faith 1s Intentional 1n charac¬
ter. "We never merely believe that life Is worth living but always think of 1t
as made worth living by something on which we rely. And this being whatever 1t
be 1s properly termed our god."'
We are now in a position to ask and answer a second question put to the
original question, "How 1s faith In God possible?" That question 1s not now
"What Is faith?" but "Who 1s God?" The answer that has been given to the former
question requires that we formulate the latter one In some such fashion as this:
"Which among the actual objects trusted as gods 1s God?" Two initial comments
are worth making on the significance of this particular question. First, this
1s not a question which Niebuhr formulated 1n this way 1n this essay. However,
1t 1s entirely congruous with the logical development of his argument here. In
2
"Value Theory and Theology" he did ask just this question. He has also provided
'ibid., p. 119.
2
"The question about the existence or non-existence of the gods 1s a
false question. The true queiy of religion Is, 'Which among the available
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a criterion with which to judge that being which does qualify as God. A necessary
If not sufficient condition that any being must satisfy to qualify as God Is Its
ability to provide continuous meaning and value to our livesJ Second, It should
be noted that the question does not ask whether there Is a being which qualifies
as God, but only whether any of those beings which actually function as the ob¬
jects of men's trust do In fact qualify as "God." The former question cannot be
entertained as 1t falls Into that class of theoretical questions which Nlebuhr
has declared alien to the practical and relational method of Protestant theology.
The word "god8 means for Nlebuhr any object which functions as a center
of value for man. Two corollary judgments may be made. First, the natural re-
2
Uglous faith of roost men 1s polytheistic for men rely on many different gods.
Egoism is the most universal natural religion; not least, Nlebuhr observes,
among those who profess to believe In the transcendent God of Christianity. "The
most common object of devotion on which we depend for our meaning and value 1s
3
the self Itself.8 However, the fact that the self looks to many other sources
outside of Itself for the satisfaction of Its need for meaning and value 1s a
tacit recognition that the self as a center of value lacks the power to guarantee
Its own life against the threat of meanlnglessness and worthlessness. There are
many other objects of adoration and they have various modes of being. Some may
realities has the value of deity, or has the potency of deity?1 and this question
turns Into another query, 'Which reality has those characteristics which are the




Ibid., p. 119. Cf. "As a rule men are polythelsts, referring now to
this and now to that valued being as the source of life's meaning. Sometimes
they live for Jesus' God, sometimes for country sometimes for Yale." MR, p. 77.
3Ib1d., p. 120.
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be 1) tangible objects; others 2) images, concepts, or essences; others 3) "are
movements known only by a kind of empathy or by an intuition that outruns sense;"
others 4) have the peculiar and hard-to-define reality of selves or persons."^
Secondly, it Is also true that on this definition of what is entailed In natural
faith "there can be no such thing as an actual atheist though there may be many
2
who profess atheism." This 1s, of course, only another way of saying that
religious faith In some god is universal and that men do not and cannot exist as
selves without exercising such faith.3 Faith 1s an a priori condition of self
existence.
The charge has been made by Professor John Godsey that "for the most
part," Niebuhr, "refused to take with seriousness any professions of atheism"
and that for him, "man's problem is really not atheism but idolatry." Only late
in his career did this conviction begin to waver, permitting him "to ask whether
A
modern men have actually become nihilists who no longer even trust their gods."
In assessing the accuracy of this charge everything depends upon keeping clearly
in mind Niebuhr's careful definition of natural religious faith. It must be
1Ibid. 2Ibid., p. 119.
3Ibld., p. 117. "The necessity of believing 1n a god is given with the
life of selves. . . MR, p. 80.
^John D. Gtdsey, The Promise of H. Richard Niebuhr (Philadelphia and New
York: J. 8. Lipplncott Company, 1970*57 p. Ibl. Godsey does not cite any source
1n support of this statement but he may have had in mind the following statement:
"It seems to me that 1n the world men have became deeply disillusioned about
themselves and are becoming disillusioned about their Idols—the nations, the
spirit of technological civilization and so on. . "Reformation: Continuing
Imperative," p. 250. However, In lectures penned that same year (1960) he argued
that 1t 1s precisely in "the negative literature of disillusionment" that the
nature of faith Is clearly revealed. "When the failure of the gods is described
. . . when atheistic existentialism tries to find a center of value 1n the bare
self 1n Its self-making freedom we become conscious of the apparently universal
human necessity of faith and of the 1nescapab1l1ty of Its gods, not as super-
natural beings but as value-centers and objects of devotion." RMWC, p. 23 (Italics
added).
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understood that his argument assumes the objective truth of the proposition that
faith 1n sane center of value or god Is constitutive of the life of selves as
such. If the truth of this Judgment Is rejected, then and only then is It pos¬
sible (logically) to raise the question of atheism as a problem in the realm of
natural religion. If not, the possibility of atheism 1s precluded by definition.
Professor Godsey goes on to ask 1f in the light of "the death-of-Sod movement"
Nlebuhr should be criticized "for failing to face the problem of atheism more
squarely and to deal more adequately with the prob1wis involved 1n the Christian
affirmation that 'God 1s'.By this time 1t should be clear that from Nlebuhr's
point of view this request is tantamount to asking him to forsake that way of
doing theology which he argues is characteristic of Protestant theology.
The dismissal of atheism, however, only brings to attention the funda¬
mental difficulty which all forms of natural religious faith must face. The
problem which polytheism presents assumes a twofold form which may be expressed
again in the form of questions. How 1s 1t possible for the polythelst to be
conscious of himself as one 1n all his valuations and actions? (The dlvlslveness
of the gods) Do any of the gods qualify as the object of a universal faith?
(The disqualification of the gods) We become divided within Individually and
without socially because our gods "are all finite 1n time as 1n space and make
2
finite claims upon us." We rely upon many centers of value but our devotion
to some always Implies exclusion of others. We attempt to overcome this situation
in various ways: through the Integration of personality or the acknowledgment
of some hierarchy of values, or the devising of some new political order or cul¬
tural synthesis. However, the best that can be achieved Is some sort of com¬
promise because while each god 1s finite each "1n turn requires an absolute
^Godsey, p. 101 2FGG» p. 120.
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devotionand a denial of the claims of other gods."^
It 1s quite obvious that Nlebuhr's account of polytheism 1s a phenomen-
ologlcal description of one of the forms 1n which universal religious faith mani¬
fests Itself and so 1t is not the sort of description which either an historian
or an anthropologist might give of polytheism as practiced 1n ar\y ancient or
contemporary society. I cannot speak from any wide knowledge of the later kinds
of studies, but even a cursory acquaintance engenders doubts about the truth of
the assertion that the gods in such societies are thought of as making absolute
claims which necessarily Imply "a denial of the claims of other gods." The very
names given to most of the Greek gods, for example, indicate that 1t was believed
that their authority was limited to a specific sphere of human activity. The
orthodox Greek pagan does not seem to have believed that it was Impossible, 1n
theory at least, to satisfy the proprietary demands of the various gods. Rather,
he seems to have been more preoccupied with the problem of determining whether
he was Ignorant of the existence (and therefore the claims) of a bona fide god.
The observations of the Apostle Paul of worship of the gods in Athens, if at
all accurate, would certainly support this contention. While it may not be
possible to demand that by parity of reasoning the same must hold mutatis
mutandis for Nlebuhr's phenomenologlcal description, we may well ask why ar\y of
the equivalents 1n the phenomenologlcal pantheon, either such Olympian deities
as home, children, country or democracy, or such Chthonian powers as sex, money,
or physical strength, must be regarded as requiring exclusive devotion. Nlebuhr
argues that "we fight for liberty or solidarity, for equality or for order. . . .
But none of these gods 1s universal, and therefore devotion to one always Implies
lIb1d., p. 121. 2Acts 17.
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excluslon of another."1 But Is 1t the case that anyone fights for liberty with¬
out concern for solidarity, or for equality without any regard for order? It
1s true that psychologically at any given moment the attention given to one god
will necessarily mean that attention 1s not being given to another, but Nlebuhr
has not shown why 1t 1s necessary to conclude that the claims of any one finite
god logically excludes the claims of any other. Why should any one of the gods,
home, country, or democracy as such exercise an exclusive claim and the denial
of claims of the others?
Faced with the d1v1s1veness of the gods Niebuhr claims that we respond
by dreaming of the possibility that the claims exercised by the gods could be
organized in some sort of hierarchy or "a great pantheon 1n which all the gods
2
will be duly served, each 1n Its proper sphere." But it remains a dream: 1t
is neither a theoretical nor a practical possibility. The recognition of one
sort of value, say our country, as an absolute value logically entails the denial
of the claims of every other country. If we believe that our country has abso¬
lute value,then Nlebuhr 1s right, 1t does entail the denial that the value of
any other country may be regarded as absolute. But the weakness of his phenora-
enologlcal description of natural religious faith may He at the point of assum¬
ing that while the claims of each of these gods is finite they are also absolute
in the sense that they exclude each other. May It not be the cose that for many
contemporary "pagans" these "beings" are recognized to have only a relative, not
an absolute value? Nlebuhr assumes without discussion that 1t 1s self-evident
that each of the phenoinenologlcal gods he identifies demands an absolute or ex¬
clusive devotion which 1s Incommensurate with its finite ontologlcal status.
Vgg, p. 121.
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A polythelst cannot then, according to Niebuhr, be one self in all his
valuations and actions. The self 1s continually divided within Itself because
1t relies for meaning and value on many gods whose absolute claims 1t cannot—
logically and not simply practically—satisfy. But there 1s an even more serious
difficulty. "None of these beings on which we rely to give content and meaning
•t
to our lives 1s able to supply continuous meaning and value." Because they
are all finite they all pass away Into nothingness leaving the self defenceless
against the ultimate frustrations of a meaningless and valueless existence. A
greater tragedy than the d1v1s1veness of the gods 1s the evident disqualification
of any of our finite gods as objects of a universal faith that can sustain the
constitutive need of every self for continuous meaning and value. It 1s pre¬
cisely this realization of the death of all Its gods and the sober despair with
which 1t contemplates the endlessness of the creative process that the question
of God 1s raised for the self with the most exquisite existential pathos. For
Protestant theology the problem of God 1s only seriously faced and struggled
with 1n the Immediacy of this existential situation. It arises In that moment
when any self frustrated with the dlvlslveness of Its gods and filled with des¬
pair over their slide Into non-existence, asks Itself the final question about
the nature of that reality which remains when all else passes away. The extremity
of natural religion becomes the opportunity of revealed religion.
What 1s It that Is responsible for this passing, that dooms
our human faith to frustration? We may call It the nature of
things, we may call It fate, we may call It reality. But by what¬
ever name we call It, this law of things, this reality, this way
things are, 1s something with which we all must reckon. We may
not be able to give a name to It, calling 1t only the "void" out
of which everything comes and to which everything returns, though
that Is also a name. But it 1s there—the last shadowy and
1Ib1d., pp. 121-122.
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vague reality, the secret of existence by virtue of which
things come into being, are what they are, and pass away.
Against 1t there 1s no defense.1
This passage marks a critical point 1n the development of Nlebuhr's way
of thinking about the relation of God and man. The need to get as clear as
possible about what he 1s claiming 1s as necessary as 1t 1s difficult. He seems
to be allowing that there Is a sort of natural negative valuatlonal knowledge
or awareness of a "vague reality" which 1s ontologlcally distinct from and trans¬
cendent to all finite reality. I take him to be saying that Insofar as any self
becomes aware of the failure of all finite gods to sustain Its need for contin¬
uous meaning and value, so far also 1t becomes aware of a "vague reality," which
may be referred to 1n various ways, but which 1s recognized to be both the creator
and destroyer of all finite beings and values, Including the being and value of
that self. If this Interpretation 1s correct then Nlebuhr 1s assuming that 1n
addition to the finite powers, Ideal or actual, upon which the self relies for
meaning and worth there exists an Infinite power which 1s nothing less than the
efficient cause of all that exists. This would seem to be at least the prima
facie meaning of references to a "vague reality . . . [that] abides when all
else passes . . . [and] 1s the source of all things and the end of all." How-
eve^ the question arises as to whether the awareness that all finite objects do
1n fact cease to exist and so fall to function as centers of value for any self
need necessarily entail any awareness of some "supreme reality" which 1s
"responsible" for the passing of these gods. It 1s, I would argue, one thing
to make the judgment that all the beings on which men rely for meaning and value
cease to exist and that this 1s a universal law that has unexceptional applica¬
tion to all beings "finite In space as 1n time": it 1s logically a quite different
lIb1d,. p. 122
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thlng to assert that there Is some ontologlcally distinct sort of reality which
1s the source and end of all such beings. For Nlebuhr the word "void" Is not a
synonym for "nothing," that Is, literally the absence of anything, rather 1t Is
a "name" which denotes an Indeterminate something ("vague reality"). Nlebuhr Is
reluctant to consider the possibility that a greater tragedy than the death of
the gods could be the death of or the absence of God. His analysis of natural
religion does not take Into account the experience of those men who are keenly
aware of the relativity and temporality of all their gods but who nevertheless
refuse bitterly, resignedly or even joyfully to believe In the existence of any
transcendent or transcendental power. He does not, of course, deny that there
are those who make this profession but he dees deny that such professions are to
be Interpreted as atheistic In the ordinary sense. They are rather confessions
of deep distrust of the goodness of the ground of their being and of all that
exists.*
There 1s, Nlebuhr declares, another wholly different kind of response
which has been given and continues to be given to this "last power." It 1s a
strange and finally Inexplicable fact that some have received the great gift of
being allowed to put their trust In and to rely for meaning and worth on this
source and energy of all the gods of natural faith. They "have been enabled to
2
call this reality God." Nlebuhr concludes this essay by posing three questions
*RS, p. 140. "The natural mind 1$ enmity to God; or to our natural mind
the One Intention in all Intentions 1s animosity. . . . We live and move and have
our being in a realm that Is not nothingness but that Is ruled by destructive
powers whlcR" Frlng us amf it! we have to nothing." Ibid.. (Italics added).
Cf. RMWC, p. 24f.
2fG6, p. 123. "What Is the absurd thing that comes into our moral his¬
tory as existential selves, but the conviction mediated by a life, a death, and
a miracle beyond understanding, that the source and ground and aovemment and
end of all things—the power we (In our distrust and disloyalty) call fate and
chance—1$ faithful, utterly trustworthy, utterly loyal to all that Issues from
1t?" CC, p. 264.
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about this radically monotheistic faith: 1) "What does 1t mean to attach faith
to ttils power?" 2) "How does such faith come about?" 3) "What are the conse¬
quences of such faith?"*
Nlebuhr believed that Alfred North Whitehead had described succinctly
and eloquently the coming of this faith. 1,Rel1g1on;' he said "1s transition from
2
God the void to God the enemy, and from God the enemy to God the companion."
But he also describes It himself 1n words that Spinoza or even Plotlnus might
well have written.
All the relative judgments of worth are equalized 1n the presence
of this One who loves all and hates all, but whose love like whose
hatred 1s without emotion, without favoritism. To have hope of
this One Is to have hope which is eternal. This being cannot pass
away.
We notice first that this statement 1s wholly consistent with Nlebuhr's doctrine
of objective relativism. Above all else Nlebuhr wished to make clear that only
a God who was truly sovereign 1n relation to all mundane being and value had
ever been able to, or would ever be able to, inspire human awe or call forth a
truly universal trust 1n "him" and a love of the whole realm of being 1n "him,"
To have faith 1n God 1s first of all to make an objective affirmation of the
omnipresent transcendent greatness and inscrutable mystery of that being upon
*FGG, p. 123.
^Religion in the Making (New York: Meridian Books, 1960, 1926), p. 16.
Cited by Nlebuhr, FGG, pp. 123-124. It Is of some Interest to note that Nlebuhr
did not quote the first oft quoted part of Whitehead's definition: "Religion
1s what the Individual does with his own solitariness. It runs through three
stages, 1f It is evolved to its final satisfaction. It 1s the transition . . .
the companion." There 1s reason to doubt that he would have accepted 1t at all
without serious qualification. He criticized Kierkegaard roundly for similar
assertions. The existential question of faith for Nlebuhr "arises 1n Its most
passionate form not in our solitariness but 1n our fellowship." CC, p. 244.
3FGG, p. 123.
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whlch we and all else are absolutely dependent for our existence. When Niebuhr
says that God's love is "without ©notion, without favoritism" he means that the
greatness of God consists precisely 1n that love of all being. It Is this fact
which distinguishes 1t from the Inevitable partiality, provincialism and selfish¬
ness of our natural faith and love. So long as man regards the One who sovereign¬
ly elected him Into being as the enemy as actively hostile or simply Indifferent
to all that Issues from him, then so long too will man carry on all his activi¬
ties and make all his evaluations within a context of fear, self-love, and
despair. But 1f a man 1s enabled to trust In this One as good, then he under¬
stands that God 1s reconciled to him and he to God and he will make those evalua¬
tions and decisions which he must make 1n his common life within a context of
faith, hope and love and "1n constant anticipations of new unfoldlngs of worth
and meaning."^
But how 1s this transition effected? How does such faith come about?
After having stressed the universality of our natural religious enmity toward that
last power that dooms all we cherish to nothingness 1s Niebuhr now saying that
all men ought to have the contrary attitude of trust? Why should they? After
all has anything happened objectively 1n our situation that justifies or warrants
a change in our natural attitude of distrust? In reply Niebuhr makes an affir¬
mation and a denial. It 1s, he avers, simply a fact which must be recognized
that confessions of "radical faith" in the goodness of being have been and are
being made. He recognizes that it may be objected that no subjective (personal
or communal) confession that this Is so is 1n Itself sufficient justification
that objectively It 1s so. But he 1s convinced that this objection is not
2Ibid., p. 124
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really Important, The objector assumes that he 1s putting forward his objection
from a morally and religiously neutral point of view. This assumption 1s false:
there Is no such point of view, and this objection 1s really raised "on the basis
of another faith than faith In this God."* On the other hand Nlebuhr denies that
"this faith 1n the last power 1s something men ought to have. We say only this,
that 1t 1s the end of the road of faith, that 1t Is unassailable, and that when
2
men receive 1t they receive a great gift." These words clearly mark the non-
apologetic and consistently confessional character of Nlebuhr's theology. "How
1s such faith possible?" The first thing that must be said 1s that those who
do exercise this trust are conscious that they can only confess that they re¬
ceived 1t as "a great gift" and that once received "1t 1s unassailable."
It 1s important once again to notice the form of the question Nlebuhr
has posed. He does not ask or seek to answer the question "Vlhy should we have
such faith?" To answer this question 1s Immediately to launch Into the apolo¬
getic task of trying to provide a theoretical justification for an event that
1s wholly non-theoretical 1n nature. It 1s just as inappropriate and Impossible
to provide a theoretical justification for the "faith event" after It has occurred
as it 1s to try to produce faith by means of theoretical reasoning. However
this does not mean that this event happens to any self "without the struggle of
3
his reason." Only those who deny the function of practical reasoning will want
to deqy that it 1s only by the exercise of our practical reason that we can dls-
4
cover the Inadequacy of our gods and be "driven to despair in life's meaning."
Nor 1s this transition effected without spiritual Insight and moral struggle.
hbld. 2Ib1d., p. 125.
3Ib1d., p. 124. 4Ibid.
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By "spiritual Insight" Nlebuhr means those essentially spontaneous Intuitions
whose occurrence cannot be predicted or produced simply by taking thought. By
"moral struggle" he has 1n mind the recognition that the fundamental moral prob¬
lem 1s the problem of freedom where freedom 1s not defined as liberty of choice
between alternatives but as the problem of achieving liberation from bondage to
self-centered desires. This 1s, of course, consistent with his rejection of the
intellectual1st view of man's mind as fundamentally theoretical where the "will"
1s that faculty or power which actualizes the prior proposals of the Intellect.
On Nlebuhr's activist view the fundamental moral problem 1s not the Intellectual
problem of deciding what the good life 1s or of deciding what the right means
of attaining 1t are. Rather, 1t 1s that egocentric predicament 1n which every¬
thing that a man loves or values 1s loved or valued within the context of his
own self-interest rather than for Its own sake. The reception of the gift of
faith does not occur without that moral struggle which ends 1n the recognition
that the set or direction of the human will 1s so unyielding 1n Its self-interest
that even the acquisition of moral virtues or obedience to moral rules become
the occasion for an unworthy pride of virtue.^
Radically monotheistic faith Is never either received or exercised by
any Individual apart from a continuous struggle for rational and moral integrity.
However for "most men" something else 1s involved—
the concrete meeting with other men who have received this faith,
and the concrete meeting with Jesus Christ. There may be other
ways, but this Is the usual way for us, that we confront 1n the
event of Jesus Christ the presence of that last power which brings
to apparent nothingness the life of the most loyal man. Here we
Hhe writings of Tolstoi particularly expressed for Nlebuhr the profound
rational, moral and spiritual struggle that precedes and accompanies the exer¬
cise of radically ncnothelstlc faith. For his reflections on this aspect of
Tolstoi see RMWC, pp. 18-21; MR, p. 77.
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confront the slayer, and here we become aware that this slayer
1s the Hfeglver. He does not put to shame those who trust 1n
hlrnj
The least satisfactory aspect of this essay judged from the point of view of
the larger corpus of Nlebuhr's theological work 1s evident at this point. In
these words he does little more than mention that a relationship exists between
the reception of monotheistic faith and "the event of Jesus Christ" as witness
to and normative for knowledge of God 1n the Church. In The Meaning of Revela¬
tion he made a serious attempt to grapple with the thorny Issues Involved 1n the
complex question of the relation between the revelation of God and historical
events and the relation between past events which are revelatory of God and
2
present religious experience.
In the final paragraphs of this essay Nlebuhr addresses himself very
briefly to the consequences that may be expected to follow from the lives of
those who have received the gift of faith. In company with most twentieth
century Protestant theologians Nlebuhr finds 1t necessary to point out that
faith cannot be secured as a possession In the form of a creed or a moral code.
Creeds and codes are Important, but they are derivative expressions of faith
and therefore belief 1n creeds or obedience to moral codes cannot be Identified
with the exercise of faith Itself. The reason for this Is twofold. First, as
has been made clear earlier, faith for Nlebuhr 1s a practical (non-theoretic)
historically mediated supreme valuation apart from which there 1s no basis for
theoretical talk about God or his will for man. Second, faith Is Irreduclbly
and singularly a relation between persons. Radical faith In God provides "a
basis for all thinking, but . . . 1t Is not Itself a thought; 1t 1s the reliance
'fGG, pp. 124-125. ^Cf. Infra pp. 218-228.
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of a person on a person."^ This faith is properly called "radical" because 1t
goes to the roots of the existence of every self possessed of faith and requires
nothing less than the continuous transformation of Its Intellectual and moral
life. Intellectually this means that when any self trusts In God as the center
of all being and value it Is free to accept all relative beings "at his hand for
2
nurture and for understanding," It frees us Intellectually to inquire into
any and all subjects of human Interest without prejudice or fear. There cannot
any longer be areas of Inquiry which are either too holy or too dangerous to be
the objects of human curiosity, rather "all knowledge becomes reverent and all
3
being open to Inquiry."
"The moral consequences of faith 1n God 1s the universal love of all
4
being in him." Morally faith in God helps us to understand that on the one
hand the value of all finite beings 1s relative never absolute (as Is true of
all kinds of polytheism); on the other hand their relativity does not make any
finite being valueless. Whatever 1s, Is good. This is not to deny that in a
given relationship one particular being may be bad-for rather than good-for
another being but 1t 1s to deny that that being 1s as a consequence, rendered
worthless. Human Ignorance, error, and perversity* are moral realities which
must be taken into account 1n any morality which seeks to come to grips with
the actualities of human existence. But they are not, on Nlebuhr's view the
finally deterrainitlve realities. That reality 1s God himself 1n relation to whan
all that is has existence, and all that Is has value or 1s valued. Or to put 1t






consclously Protestant a theologian as Niebuhr, are entirely omitted from his
essay—human error, ignorance and perversity, are only made possible by the grace
of God the Creator and are only made effaceable by the grace of God the RedeemerJ
Summary
In this essay, "Faith 1n Gods and 1n God," Niebuhr has provided a suc¬
cinct account of his understanding of how God 1s known and a brief Indication of
the consequences that may be expected to follow for human thought and conduct.
He began by declaring that for the Protestant theologian 1t 1s not a theoretical,
but a practical problem. Following the lead provided by Kant he accepted the
neat separation between knowledge of sense and knowledge of value and limited
all knowledge of God strictly to the latter. This resulted 1n the Identification
of faith with practical reason or with value-knowledge. All knowledge of God
must then be a species of value knowledge and 1t can have nothing at all to do
with Intellectually formulated beliefs or revealed doctrines about God. God may
be an object, but he 1s not an object of thought. Faith 1j* God 1s wholly Indepen¬
dent of all metaphysical Ideas of supematurally revealed truths about God. God
1s known 1n value-experience, or not at all. It 1s then both Impossible and
unnecessary to present any proofs for the existence of God. In this way theol¬
ogy 1s freed from the apologetic difficulty of proving or providing evidence for
the truth of the basic theological proposition. It 1s for this reason that
Niebuhr argues that theology must be "confessional," that 1s, non-apologet1c
1
In view of the fact that Niebuhr consistently maintained 1n his regular
Yale lectures on Christian ethics that our response to God 1s always a response
to his activity 1n all creaturely events as the One sovereign Creator, Judge
and Redeemer, It 1s surprising that so Uttle of this more overtly theological
language Is to be found In his principal published essays and books.
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theology.
After describing his understanding of the subjective attitude of faith
Niebuhr turned to a phenomenologlcal description of the various objects of faith.
Such objects are properly called "gods" insofar as they are relied on or trusted
in by any self for meaning or value. These finite gods cannot however sustain
the constitutive need of every self for "continuous meaning and value." They are,
like the self, finite beings and they are brought to their end by that same power
or reality which is the source and end of all that exists. In the face of this
power, the enemy of those beings upon which it has relied for meaning and value,
the self is driven to despair of life's meaning. The end of natural religion
is the realization that that power which brings all determinate beings into
existence is either hostile or indifferent toward the individuality and value
i
of each. Dut an accurate phenomenological analysis of man's religious situation
cannot stop with a description of natural religion. Precisely within this situa¬
tion there has emerged a radically different form of human faith which can only
be seen as a great reversal of our natural faith. Niebuhr does not call this
2
faith "supernatural" but he does say that its "incarnation" in human history and
in personal experience is inexplicable, absurd even.
What is the absurd thing that comes into our moral history as
existential selves, but the conviction mediated by a life, a
death, and a miracle beyond understanding, that the source and
ground, the government of and end of all things—the power we
(in our distrust and disloyalty) call fate and chance—is faith¬
ful. utterly trustworthy, utterly loyal to all that issues from
it?3
For the Christian the exercise of a radically monotheistic faith is made possible






Church and witnessed to in its Scripture and creeds). This event is the
"incarnation" in Jesus Christ of radical trust and loyalty to the One he called
"Father" and the faithfulness of the Father in raising him from the dead. It
is through this "event" (though Christians are in no position to say only
through this event) that Christians come to understand that God is reconciled
to them and they to God. At the same time they also are given to understand
that their alienation from, distrust of, and disloyalty to their neighbors and
to all created being 1s occasioned by that deeper distrust and disloyalty to
Being as good, that 1s, as able and willing to bestow and to maintain the worth
of all that issues from it.
There are at least two major issues in the account of how God is
known, given by Niebuhr in this essay, that need to be discussed in more de¬
tail in relation to the whole corpus of his writings. They may be posed as
questions. First, "What role does the constitutive human need to know that life
is worth living play 1n Niebuhr's understanding of how God is known?" Second,
"What does it mean to say that God is known by 'revelation' and what signifi¬
cance does Jesus Christ have for Niebuhr's understanding of how God 1s known?"
My purpose will be to analyze Niebuhr's answer to each of these questions and
to point out some difficulties which seem to me to be present 1n the answers
he gave.
God and the Meaning of Human Existence
It cannot have escaped notice what a large part the notion that man has
a constitutive need to know that he has value, to know that his life is worth
-202-
Hvinq, plays In Niebuhr's explanation of our knowledge of God. He does not,
so far as I can discover, put this forward as an empirical generalization about
all men based on extensive questioning of other persons. Rather, 1t 1s accepted
as true on the basis of a phenomenologlcal analysis of human existence. Nlebuhr
has also emphasized that this need 1s not simply psychological 1f this means that
it is relative to the passing desires or inclinations of any self, so that it
would be possible for a self not to desire or want to be valued. The need to
know that life 1s worth living, that 1t has value, 1s constitutive of human
existence as such.
As long as a man lives he must believe in something for the sake of
which he lives; without belief 1n something that makes life worth
living man cannot exist. . . . The faith that life is worth livina
and the definite reference of life's meaning to specific beinos or
values 1s as inescapable a part of human existence as the activity
of reason. It is no less true that man 1s a believino animal in
this sense than that he 1s a rational animal. Without such faith
men might exist, but not as selves.'
The psychological fact that at a particular moment an Individual did not admit
to being conscious of such a need could in no way count as evidence against the
truth of this judament. It should also be clear that Nlebuhr is not saying that
only certain peculiarly relioious or morally sensitive persons concern them¬
selves with searching for the meaning of life, rather he is lading down as an
objective truth that the need to know that life is worth living is given with
life itself. A phenomenologlcal analysis of human self-existence reveals the
presence of this fundamental need of every self to know not merely that its life
has meaning, but that it is made meaningful and worthy by some being upon which
it relies. In "Value Theory and Theology" Niebuhr specifically describes this
1MR, pp. 77-78 (italics added). Cf. VTT, pp. 113-115; RMWC, p. 16; FGG,
pp. 118-119.
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need as "religious1n "Faith 1n Gods and 1n God" he argues that 1t matters
little whether we call this need "religious" or not. The essential point Is to
recognize that "faith that life Is worth living, as the reference of life to a
source of meaning and value, as the practice of adoration and worship, 1t 1s
coinnon to all men. For no man lives without living for some purpose, for the
glorification of some god, for the advancement of sane cause.
Nlebuhr cannot, and does not, of course, leave the matter here. It may
be a point of little consequence whether this need 1s called religious or merely
a human faith, but 1f It 1s, 1t will remain so, only so long as the question of
the ontologlcal status of those beings which are the objects of faith Is Ignored.
If I have understood the argument presented In "Faith 1n Gods and 1n God "
correctly, Nlebuhr has argued that this need to know that life 1s worth living
cannot be fully satisfied by any value relation or relations that the self sus¬
tains with finite beings. We may discriminate between the ontologlcal status of
these beings which function as objects of faith but so long as they are "finite
In time as 1n space" they "are unable to save us from the ultimate frustration
2
of meaningless existence."
There Is a very Important point 1n all this which must be examined fur¬
ther. Nlebuhr has denied that his approach to the problem of God can 1n any
sense be construed as an argument (Including a moral argument) for the existence
of God. But It should be recognized, I think, that when he says that no finite
object 1s fully adequate to the requirements of the constitutive human need for
meaning and value, then he has, quite Independently of any revealed truth,
Identified a need which could only be fulfilled by some sort of reality other
VGG, p. 118 (Italics added). 2Ib1d., p. 120.
-204-
than contingent beings*' Whether or 1n what sense this reality should be called
"God" remains an open question. That Nlebuhr's argument entails the Idea that
every self 1s so constituted that Its life has meaning or 1s worthwhile only 1n
relation to some cosmic reality which bestows upon It transcendent purpose or
value, Is not open to question. He 1s saying that If life Is to be meaningful
or worthwhile 1t will be so only 1n relation to some being or center of value
2
which "exists universally or can be the object of a universal faith." Nlebuhr
cannot be accused of employing the familiar apologetic strategy of claiming that
the meaningfulness or the worthwhlleness of life depends upon theological beliefs
because for him the problem of God Is a problem of faith rather than belief.
However, something like that tactic does seem to be involved because he Is say¬
ing that only a trans-finite reality could satisfy the need for meaning and
value which 1s Intrinsic to the nature of man.
The Important role which this universal anthropological Judgment plays
1n Nlebuhr's theology 1s clearly evident wherever he addressed himself to the
3
problems of religious eplstemology. This Is especially true of his early pro¬
grammatic essay, "Value Theory and Theology (1937), and his full dress discussion
of how God 1s known In The Meaning of Revelation, which appeared four years
later. Earlier 1n Chapter II the former essay was discussed for the purpose of
Vhe vague locution "some sort of reality" 1s used deliberately at this
point for two reasons. First, because the line of Inquiry presently being
undertaken does not require any greater specificity. Second, and more Impor¬
tantly, It deliberately avoids specifying the ontologlcal status of this "other"
so as not to prejudice a later discussion of Nlebuhr's lack of clarity on
precisely this point.
2FGG, p. 120.
3VTT, pp. 110-116; MR, pp. 22-38, 175-191; FGG, pp. 114-126; RMWC,
pp. 24-37.
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showing Nlebuhr's dissatisfaction with the kind of value theory which had been
employed 1n much liberal Protestant theology since Kant. These value theologies
shared a common assumption which Mlebuhr believed had to be rejected 1f the ab¬
solute priority of the being and value of God over all human or creaturely being
and value was to be maintained. They assumed that prior to God's revelation of
himself and of man's experience of faith 1n him, that 1t was not only possible
but necessary for the ralnd to be 1n possession of absolute values which are 1n
some way determinative of what could count as knowledge of God. Some declared
1) these values Identical with God; others 2) argued that they required the
postulate of God; still others 3) believed that values were the sole valid
criteria by which experience of God could be distinguished from experience of
other kinds of reality.'
These difficulties did not lead Nlebuhr to advocate the abandonment of
value-theory; on the contrary he was critical of other "new tendencies" 1n theol¬
ogy which did demand that the valuations! approach to religious knowledge be
given up. "They make revelation their starting point, but by dealing with it
as though 1t were a bolt out of the blue and by refusing to relate 1t to the
value cognitions of men, they fall to give an understanding of the process where-
2
by revelation Is received." If theology 1s to maintain itself as a distinctive
discipline 1t must set forth a religious eplstemology, and Nlebuhr was convinced
that given the present state of philosophical knowledge this could best be
accomplished by showing that all knowledge of God 1s a type of value knowledge
or valuation. The following lengthy passage 1s cited because 1t shows Nlebuhr's
'VTT, pp. 93-95, 99, 101-103, 108, 110-113.
2Ib1d., pp. 110-111. Cf. SSD, pp. 275-278.
3Ib1d.. pp. 101-112.
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coinplete endorsement of the view that knowledge of God is wholly confined with¬
in the limits of practical reason.
The enduring contribution of empirical theology, from Schleiermacher
to Macintosh, lies in Its insistence on the fact that knowledge of
God is available only 1n religious [faith] relation to him. In
emphasizing this point modern theology has not only made explicit
an Interest which was Implicit in the Reformation doctrine of
salvation by faith alone, but has developed 1t 1n new and Impor¬
tant directions. For while the Reformation contended against the
fallacy of salvation by works, the new development was a reaction
against the fallacies of salvation by belief, as In traditionalism,
and of salvation by reason In rationalism. Religious knowledge
has been shown to be unique, and this uniqueness has been shown
to be due to the fact that 1t 1s a type of value knowledge or
valuation. ... The knowledge of God, 1t has been pointed out, is
not equivalent to the knowledge of doctrine or of a First Cause or
Designer. And its dissimilarity to theological or metaphysical
knowledge Is due not only to Its Immediacy—which may be questioned
—but to Its character as knowledge of a being having value of a
certain sort. Empirical theology has seen that religion is an
affair of valuation, analogous to morality and art. For as an
action or a character may be known by the psychologist or historian
without recognition of Its goodness ... so the being which
religion knows to be God may be known by philosophy, history or
natural science without knowledge of Its deity.
The problem with the value theologies of Schlelemacher, Rltschl and Macintosh—
to mention those which Niebuhr has criticized—was not their relational-
2
valuatlonal method, but their failure to follow It through consistently.
Schleiermacher, for example, properly acknowledged that there can be no think¬
ing or speaking about God except from the standpoint of a feeling of absolute
dependence upon him. But In Nlebuhr's judgment "he did not really take this
standpoint 1n his theology but made the feeling of absolute dependence his object,
3
so directing the attention of faith toward Itself rather than toward God."
Ibid., p. 112. Cf. H. . . one cannot speak of God and gods at all save
as valued beings or as values which cannot be apprehended save by a willing,
feeling, responding self." MR, p. 35.
2MR, pp. 27-37, VTT, pp. 93-110.
3MR» p. 27.
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This inversion of theological priorities should not, Niebuhr argued, be construed
as an inevitable consequence of the method itself. It occurred because these
theologians relinquished a single-minded interest in confessing to their own
and to the Christian community's faith 1n the absolute value of God for a double-
minded defense of the absolute value of other entities, such as Western culture,
human personality, or moral consciousness and faith 1n God as the necessary means
to the securing of these valuesJ The fatal flaw, which Niebuhr reiterates
again and again in "Value Theory and Theology," was the failure to recognize
that God alone has aDSolute value and that consequently there are no absolute
values that may be known prior to experience of God which qualify as adequate
criteria for distinguishing experience of God from experience of other kinds of
beings.
Theology would be much better served by a value-theory that would recog-
2
nize "the relativity of all values without prejudice to their objectivity."
Values are re 1ative because beings or selves possess value not 1n themselves, but
only 1n relation to the need of another. Values are objective because the
values relative to being are not determined by desire or consciousness of need
but by the constitution or nature of each being. Values are exclusively a
function of the relations between beings where each being either fulfills or
3
faiis to fulfill the needs of another being or beings. It is incumbent upon
Niebuhr now to show how this relational value theory is more adequate to the
requirements of any theology that wishes to maintain the priority and independence
^bic., pp. 27-40, esp. pp. 28, 32, 35f; VTT, pp. 97-103. For Schleier-
macher "the object of theology came to be, not God, but man's relation to God,
and divine activity was explained, not as a function of the Godhead, but as a
function of man's dependence cn the Godhead for the purpose of maintaining his
values as a person," VTT, p. 98.
21bic,., p. 113. 3Ibid.
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of the being and value of God to all human being and value.
On the basis of this theory, the important religious question is this:
"Which reality has those characteristics which are the foundation of the value
of deity, or which fulfill the human need for God?"^ Among the things which this
question assumes are 1) the belief that human beings are constituted to need God
and 2) that it is possible to identify what that need 1s. Our previous discus¬
sion has prepared us for Niebuhr's answer. It Is "the need for that which makes
life worth living which bestows meaning on life by revealing Itself as the final
2
source of life's being and value."
The task of theology from this point of view lies then in
the analysis of those characteristics by virtue of which a being
has the value of deity for man, the examination of the reasons
for the failure of religions which attach themselves to beings
which do not possess these characteristics adequately, and the
description of the ultimate being, which as the supremely real
and the source of all other being, is alone able by virtue of its
character to satisfy the human need for God.3
On the one hand Niebuhr affirms that God exists Independently of the creatures
constituted to need him, on the other hand he denies that it is possible to know
4
his value as God without reference to his relations to his creatures. But If
the deity-value of God 1s defined in terms of human need for him, does this not
make the satisfaction of this need the criterion by means of which we are enabled
to judge what Is or Is not God 1n experience? To ask this question Is, of
course, to turn Niebuhr's own criticism of earlier value theologies against his
own. Is 1t justified? I argue that 1t is justified, and that the corrections
1Ib1d., p. 114. 2Ib1d., p. 115.
3Ib1d., p. 116.
4Ibjd., p. 113. Cf. MR, pp. 188-190. "To say that God and faith belong
together is to maintain that no power could be apprehended as God save as its
value were made manifest," f^, p. 188.
-209-
which Niebuhr Introduced are not sufficient to save his own theory from the
anthropocentric predicament which he himself has described. Niebuhr thought
that he had avoided making human fulfillment a value prior to God's value by dis¬
allowing any knowledge of what counted as fulfillment of this need prior to ex¬
perience of God's revelation of himself. This move does not succeed. It does
guarantee that psychologically God's value cannot be known prior to experience
of him but this does not ensure that lin our experience of him we knew that his
value 1s prior to or Independent of any other value. Granted, we cannot know
what will satisfy human need prior to actual experience of God, but we do know
prior to this experience that only that being which 1s able to satisfy such a
need will have the value of deity. If this 1s so then 1t must follow 1) that
the value of God 1s known solely 1n relation to human need, 2) that this need
has been Identified prior to the experience of God, 3) that the human need to
know that life is worthwhile 1s a value which Is known prior to the value of
God, 4) that this need 1s the criterion by which we are able to judge which
among the available realities has the value of deity.1
Nlebuhr's value theory clea/ly asserts the logical priority of being
over value 1n the ordo essendl. The first principle of his relational theory 1s
that value 1s a function of the relation between beings. But he just as firmly
^Hans Fre1 has also pressed this point. He asks, "If the perfections
of God are known to us by virtue of their fulfillment of 'the human need for
God,' then do we not assimilate our knowledge of God to certain prior, Inde¬
pendent 'felt needs,' I.e., values, even 1f they are never hypostatlzed? When
one defines value 1n terms of relationships between beings and also speaks of a
unique valuatlonal religious knowledge, then the experience of religious need
or value would (1) imply God as the 'necessary postulate1 and (2) 'make values
the criteria by means of which the experience of divine reality 1s distinguished
from other experience'." F£, pp. 72-73. The difference between Frel's criticism
and mine 1s mainly one of deflniteness. He leaves open the question whether
these Inferences are correct or not; I argue that they are correct.
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denles the priority of being over value 1n the ordo cognoscendl. There 1s no
knowledge of the ding-an-sich and even when 1t Is knowledge of God which 1s
sought,the relationship between man and God 1s such that man Is not able to know
God as he exists In or for himself, nor 1s he able to know those moral qualities
which God has In or for himself. We may know only those values or valuations
which actually correspond to and satisfy the human need to know that life has
meaning and 1s worthwhile. "What 1s revealed In revelation 1s not a being as
such, but rather Its deity-value, not that It 1s, but that 1t 'loves us,' 'Judges
i
us,' that It makes life worth living." In our knowledge of God value takes
precedence over being. The "deity-value" apprehended by the believer cannot be
known to be Identical with the value which 6od has 1n himself but Is strictly
limited to that value which the Being we call God has for us. Or to put It more
concisely, the value of God 1s Identical with the value that he has 1n fulfilling
huraan need. It Is precisely this coincidence of the human need to be valued with
the presence of that Being that values all beings, human and otherwise, which
constitutes the content of God's revelation. If this 1s so 1t 1s not strictly
accurate to say that we ever know tod, rather what we know 1s that we are
acknowledged by tod, valued by him. On this view judgments about God would only
be possible as Inferences drawn from judgments about God's valuation of the
self. This would seem to be what Nlebuhr means by the use of the word "reflex-
Ively" 1n the following passage.
Religious experience Includes an evaluation on the part of man,
but primarily 1t expresses Itself In the judgment, 'This 1s the
being which values me or judges me, by relation to which I have
worth or possibility of worth,' while reflexlvely 1t Issues In
the judgment, 'This 1s the being of supreme Intrinsic value,
which corresponds to all my deepest needs.'"2
lVTT, p. 116. Of. MR, pp. 152-154.
2VTT, p. 115.
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It would appear that a theology which attempts to provide an explanation of
how we know God exclusively in terms of a relational theory of value must in
the end leave us without any knowledge of God that 1s not dependent 1n the final
analysis upon his relation to us. Nlebuhr has stressed the absolute ontologlcal
dependence of man upon God,but 1t 1s evident that 1n our knowledge of God his
value as God 1s dependent upon his relation to man.
Some questions might be asked at this point, Wi^y 1s Nlebuhr so sure
that he has correctly Identified the basic need of man? Even 1f 1t 1s agreed
that he has identified a basic human need, why should 1t be assumed, as Nlebuhr
does, that only a relationship with God can adequately fulfill this need? Per¬
haps It cannot be fulfilled 1n any complete or finally satisfying manner at all
as all nihilists would argue. Finally, some Christian thelsts may ask 1f 1t 1s
really possible for man to have any knowledge of his true needs prior to revela¬
tion. Nlebuhr does say that an Immediate consequence of God's revelation of
himself 1s the transformation and transvaluation of all our natural understand¬
ing of what God 1s like,' but he does not seem to have considered the possibility
that this same revelation may also call Into question any prior self-understand¬
ing of the true meaning of human existence.
God and the Meaning of Revelation
In his account of how God 1s known In "Faith 1n Gods and In God,"
Niebuhr not only tied knowledge of God very closely to the human need to know
that life 1s worth living, but also to the Idea of revelation (though the word
1s not used) In or through Jesus Christ. Revelation 1s the only way 1n which
God may be known. This 1s so, Nlebuhr believed, not simply because human minds
'MR, pp. 175-191.
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cannct attain knowledge of God by their own power (though that 1s true) or be¬
cause the object known in revelation is a "self," or like a self, and not an
object of thought (though that too is true), but precisely because as the divine
and sovereign Self he 1s known in an act of self-disclosure,or not at all J
Niebuhr has argued that man, quite apart from revelation, may experience an
existential encounter with Being as that "last power" which brings to nothing
all his gods but if Being is apprehended as God, that Is, as good to and for
2
man and all contingent beings, then this 1s a miraculous gift, 1t 1s revelation.
He readily confessed that this view of how God is known was deeply rooted in
personal religious experience. Speaking of his own basic religious convictions
he asserteu that faith in the sovereignty of God for him entailed
the understanding that trust in the ground of being is a miraculous
gift. How it is possible to rely on God as inconquerably loving
pp. 134-147; RtfWC, pp. 44-47.
2
Niebuhr has employed various terms to refer to that ultimate reality
upon which all finite being is absolutely dependent. In Radical Monotheism and
Western Culture he uses the terns "being itself," "the principTe of being,"7'" and
",rbe1ngn interchangeably. Cf. pp. 32, 33 and 38 respectively. In "Faith in Gods
and in God" the terms "last being" and "last power" are used synonymously. Cf.
p. 123. The term "the power" by itself or combined with modifiers such as "ulti¬
mate" "creative," "universal," et. al., is used almost exclusively in The Responsible
Self. Cf. pp. 119f, 123-125, 141f, 175-177. Niebuhr 1n this essay seems to
favor this terra "power" over "being" perhaps because it connotes the Idea of
action whereas being dees not. Cf. p. 119. Beyond this he may have come to re¬
gard the terra "being" as too closely associated with an essential1st ontology
which he rejected. The term "God" for Niebuhr refers to the unity of ultimate
being or power and ultimate goodness. Cf. MR, p. 188. In Radical Monotheism
and Western Culture the terms "principle of being" and "principle of value" are
used to Indicate that God 1s not to be identified with "being" and "value." A
distinction must be marked between the being and value of God and the being and
value of all contingent reality. Cf. p. 33. The term "god" for Niebuhr means
any object of faith, but radical monotheistic faith is trust in and loyalty to
Being as God. That is , that unity of power and goodness upon which all finite
beings are absolutely dependent for their being and value. Finally, by far the
most frequently used term employed by Niebuhr is the venerable notion of "the
One." Apparently Niebuhr did not see any logical difficulties involved in des¬
cribing God literally by means of these abstract impersonal terms and equally
literally with concrete personal terms such as "First Person" and "faithful
self." Cf. RHWC, pp. 41-47.
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and redeeming, to have confidence 1n him as purposive person
working towards the glorification of his creation and of himself
1n his works, to say to the great "It:" "Our Father who art 1n
heaven"—this remains the miraculous gift. ... So far as I
could see and can now see that miracle has been wrought among
us by and through Jesus Christ. 1 do not have the evidence which
allows me to say that the miracle of faith 1n God is worked only
by Jesus Christ and that it 1s never given by men outside the
sphere of his working, though I may say that where I note Its -j
presence I posit the presence also of something like Jesus Christ.
It must also be recognized that other men have encountered Being as evil
rather than good, as an Indifferent or malevolent power who is the enemy of all
human beings and values. For them the word "God," 1f 1t is used at all, means
"a power that is jealous of its rights, that 1s suspicious of its creation,
that is as ready to deny 1t, to condemn 1t to destruction ... as to affirm,
2
maintain and bless It." If it is asked why some men apprehend God as evil and
others as good, no answer can be given. No objective standard can be found
either through reason, experience or revelation that can settle* conclusively
which of these perceptions of the ultimate character of Being 1s true and which
1s false. All that the Christian can do is to confess that through the revela¬
tion of God in Christ he has learned to trust in Being as good, that 1s, as
3
God. because this is so the person to whom this gift of faith has been given
can never say that other men ought to exercise this faith or tnat they ought
4
to love God. It is a gift of God and to those to whom it is not given it
cannot be required. Trie revelation in Jesus Christ is normative only for the
^"Reformation: Continuing Imperative," pp. 248f; Cf. CC, pp. 254f.
2
RS, p. 119. Nlebuhr often quoted Bertrand Russell's, A Free Man's
Worship, as a confession of such distrust of Belnq. Cf. CC, p. 115: FGG, d.
T227iS, p. 140.
3RMWC, p. 38.
4FGG, p. 125; Cf. RS, p. 130f.
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Christlan community. Christian theology "must ask what revelation means for
Christians rather than what it ought to mean for all men, everywhere and at all
times. And it can pursue Its inquiry only by recalling the story of Christian
life ana by analyzing what Christians see from their limited point of view in
history and faith.There can be no apologetic use of the revelation which
Christians have received: the witness of the Christian community must be wholly
confessional in word and deed.
Nlebuhr advanced three reasons why it is necessary for a theology
2
based upon revelation to be exclusively confessional in form. The first is
clearly the most decisive in his own thinking: It 1s the almost inconquerable
tendency of men to cease to rely wholly on the free grace of God and to seek to
justify their faith as superior to others. When this is done--and Niebuhr believed
that it was the besetting sin of both orthodox and liberal theologies, Protes¬
tant and Catholic—faith as a subjective attitude, the Scriptures or theologi¬
cal formulations of faith, the Christian community itself and so on, rather
than God Himself become the primary object of faith. All apologetic claims for
the universal truth of Christian beliefs Niebuhr seems to imply would directly
contradict the Idea of faith in God as wholly a gift of God. Such apologetic
use of revelation depends upon the erroneous Idea that revelation means the dis¬
closure of truths about God which can be possessed as universal truths rather
•j
than as a personal encounter with God himself.
It is clear, however, that this non-propositional view of revelation,
which Nlebuhr recognized was not compatible with the creedal formulation of the
early church or of Protestantism,4 is determined by the acceptance of certain
p. 42. Cf. pp. 17f, 38-40, 176f.




universal truths about the limitations of human rationality, namely, the two
eplstemological principles discussed 1n the previous chapter. With respect to
the first principle—the distinction between theoretical and practical reason-
It 1s necessary to recognize that all knowledge of God 1s faith (practical)
knowledge. Theoretical knowledge about the nature or will of God expressible
1n propositional form such as 1s possible of phenomenal objects within space
and time 1s denied. Knowledge of God 1s therefore relative in the sense that
1t is limited to what can be known of God In terms of personal value relations.
There is no knowledge of God outside of the relationship of faith 1n him.
Only within the living relation of active faith 1n God 1s the character of God
revealed.
A second limitation 1s placed upon our knowledge of God by the recogni¬
tion of the historical relativity of all human knowledge both from the side of
2
the subject and the object. But Mlebuhr did not believe that the acceptance
of historical relativism entailed the sort of subjectivism which denies that
the object known exists independently of the consciousness of the subject. "It
1s not apparent that one who knows that his concepts are not universal must also
doubt that they are concepts of the universal, or that one who understands how
all his experience is historically mediated must believe that nothing Is mediated
3
through history. The human mind cannot transcend Its particular historical
standpoint nor can the Christian believer ever transcend his relative standpoint
within the Christian community and declare that his view of the universal (I.e.
God) 1s a universal view (I.e., true for all men everywhere and at all times).
1Ib1d., pp. 22-38. 2Ib1d., p. 13.
3Ibid., pp. 18f (Italics added).
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There 1s no fixed non-historical standpoint from which God may be known as he
1s 1n himself. All metaphysical or moral approaches to the knowledge of God
which assume such a non-h1stor1cal view are 1n error. For Nlebuhr there Is one
universal God but he 1s never known except from within a particular historical
community.
I cannot think about God's relation to man 1n the abstract. The
historical qualification of my relation to him 1s Inescapable.
I cannot presume to think as a Jew or a Mohammedan would think
about God, though I can recognize that they are thinking about
the same God about whom I think. Nor can I presume to rise above
those specific relations to God 1n which I have been placed so
as to think simply and thelstlcally about God. There Is no such
being, or source of being, surely as a Christian God; but there
is a Christian relation to God and I cannot abstract from that,
as no Jew.or Mohammedan can abstract from a Jewish or Muslim
relation.'
In all knowledge of God the object known is one and universal, but the stand¬
points from which he may be known are many and relative to particular historical
situations. This view of religious knowledge 1s saved from a vicious subjec¬
tivism, Nlebuhr believed, when it 1s recognized 1) that the Independent reality
of the object 1s not denied and, 2) that 1t 1s possible within the historic
Christian community for individuals to share 1n the same revelation of God and
for each to subject their thinking and speaking about God to an ongoing
RS, pp. 44f. This passage Is Interesting 1n two other respects besides
Its emphatic endorsement of the relativity of all knowledge of God. First,
Nlebuhr seems to accept the view that the "same God" that Christians know through
his revelation In Jesus Christ is known by Jews and Mohammedans through other
revelations Interior to their own histories. A second point made seems to be
Inconsistent with this for Nlebuhr claims that he knows that "they are thinking
about the same God" about whom he Is thinking. But on what grounds does he knew
this 1f all his knowledge of God 1s relative to the Christian relation to God?
Does this not Imply that he 1s In possession of a more synthetic view (a univer¬
sal view?) that transcends these particular relations to God and knows them all
to be relations to the "same God?" He was a more circumspect relativist on this
point 1n The Meaning of Revelation. "We can speak of revelation only 1n con¬
nection wTtiT our own hTstory without affirming or denying Its reality in the
history of other communities Into whose Inner life we cannot penetrate without
abandoning ourselves or our communities." Ibid., p. 82.
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corroboration and correction by their fellow believers, past and present.
Every view of the universal from the finite standpoint of the
Individual 1n such a society Is subject to the test of experience
on the part of companions who look from the same standpoint 1n
the same direction as well as to the test of consistency with
the principles and concepts that have grown out of past experience
In the same community.
Present personal encounter with God in Christ 1s a necessary but not a sufficient
condition for knowledge of God. Apart from the corroborative witness of fellow-
knowers, past and present, the Individual believer 1s at the mercy of either
o
his imagination or the purely "private and nystlc assurance which 1s not sub-
ject to the criticism of [the] community^
It must be asked, however, whether a theory of verification which 1s
confined to the community of faith or an historical relativism which only allows
for the possibility that something 1s mediated through history are really suf¬
ficient to distinguish "objective relativism" from eplstemlc subjectivism. If
all that "objective relativism" means 1s that In the face of the historical
relativity of all knowledge the objectivity of the object 1s affirmed by a sheer
act of faith, then this 1s not sufficient to guarantee that within the knowledge
relation the mind really possesses positive knowledge of those characteristics
which belong to God 1n distinction from other objects. Falling this, "objective
relativism" would indicate that there 1s an object, but that what 1s known would
4
be wholly relative to the consciousness of the subject.
The Christian believer 1s committed then, according to Nlebuhr, to
%, pp 20f, cf. pp. 136, 141f; CC, pp. 245f.
2CC, p. 245. 3MR. p. 141.
*Ib1d., pp. 19f.
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recognlzlng that from his limited point of view 1n history and faith he may only
"ask what revelation means for Christians rather than what 1t ought to mean for
all men, everywhere and at all times."'' But 1f Christian faith 1s based on the
revelation of God In Jesus Christ and if all knowledge of God 1s historically
apprehended, then, Nlebuhr argued, it is necessary to solve two distinct yet
related problems. First, how 1s 1t possible to understand all past events as
1n principle wholly explicable 1n terms of their relations to antecedent events
and at the same time believe that in or through some of these events God 1s
7 3
revealed?c In short, "How can revelation mean both history and God?" Second,
how can the revelation of God be a present reality 1f 1t 1s Identified with the
4
occurrence of certain past events? Niebuhr attempted to solve both problems
5
1n terms of a distinction between two types of history. More precisely defined,
1t Is an eplstemological distinction between two v/ays of knowing the same his¬
torical reality. Employing his version of the Kantian distinction between
theoretical and practical reason he differentiated between external or observed
history and Internal or lived history.6 It 1s Important to recognize that this
perspectlval view of historical events presupposes and Is largely a methodologi¬
cal extension of the objectively relatlvlstic standpoint previously described.
In external history the knower assumes the standpoint of a disinterested
observer of events who seeks to understand and describe past happenings 1n
abstraction from all particular value commitments of selves, his own and others.
In external history the knower cannot give a disinterested account of the same
^Ibid., p. 42, cf. pp. 59f, 63, 74-76; CC, p. x; RS, pp. 95-100.
2Ibid., pp. 54-56. 3Ib1d., p. 59.
4Ib1d., pp. 56-59. 5Ib1d., pp. 59-90.
6Ib1d., pp. 59-73, cf. pp. v111, 73, 76.
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events because his own life and value commitments as a person have been de¬
cisively qualified by these very events.1 The data of external history are
Impersonal discrete entitles such as Ideas, Interests, and things: The data
of Internal history on the other hand are not "elusive atoms of matter or
2
thought but equally elusive selves" and values. The former results 1n a des-
3
crlptlve knowledge, the latter a normative one.
Each perspective also employs different concepts of value, time and
{ 4
society. For the objective historian the value of an event Is determined by
the effect it has on subsequent events; for the confessional historian the value
of an event 1s Its worth for selves. The former Ignores events which have no
effect on other events; the latter does not recall events which have no rele¬
vance to the value or destiny of selves. In external history time is understood
quantitatively as a series of discrete Impersonal moments; 1n Internal history
time 1s understood duratively In terms of consciousness. Finally, human society
for the external knower 1s viewed as an aggregate of atomic Individuals, an
intricate organization made up of various and often conflicting Instincts,
beliefs, customs, laws, etc.; for the Internal knower society 1s a community
of persons who are united by a common memory and common loyalties.
The most Important of these concepts for Nlebuhr's purposes 1s undoubt-
ably the notion of time associated with Inner history. It will be helpful to
have his full description of It before us.
In internal history . . . our time is our duration. What Is
past is not gone; It abides 1n us as our memory; what 1s future






here 1s organic or It 1s social, so that past and future
associate with each other In the present. Time In our history
1s not another dimension of the external space world 1n which
we live, but a dimension of our life and of our community's
being. We are not In this time but 1t 1s In us. , . . Such
time 1s not a number but a living, a.stream of consciousness,
a flow of feeling, thought and will.'
Two points are significant here. First, time 1s defined In relation to an Inner
consciousness of events. Second, past events may be recalled through memory
and become the content of a present consciousness. The past survives 1n the
2
present as our memory. It 1s, as we shall see, precisely the continuity pro¬
vided by the shared memories within the community of faith that serves to estab¬
lish the revelatory event as a present reality for successive generations.
Granting for the moment that this distinction 1s a defensible one, how
does 1t help Niebuhr to solve the two problems posed earlier? "The two-aspect
theory allows us to understand how revelation can be In history and yet not be
identifiable with miraculous events as visible to an external observer and how
events that are revelatory 1n our history, sources of unconquerable certainty
*
for us, can yet be analyzed In profane fashion by the observer. It Is an
Ibid., p. 69 (Italics added). Nlebuhr^ls directly Influenced here by
Henri Bergson's notion of time as duration (duree). a notion central to the
philosophy of Bergson, Hiebuhr follows Bergson 'in distinguishing between 1)
time that occurs In natural science, that time thought of as * succession of
extended (spatlallzed) discrete units, and 2) time that we experience directly
as "duration," that 1s, as a directly Intuited non-spatial stream of conscious¬
ness in which past, present, and future flow Into each other. The latter 1s
"real" time. Physical time 1s an abstraction accomplished by the Intellect
for wholly practical purposes. Nlabuhr gave general acknowledgment to the
Influence of Bergson 1n the preface to The Meaning of Revelation. Cf. p. x.
Bergs^on's discussion of time 1s found first and principally In Essal sur les
donnees Immedlates de la conscience (1889), translated into English byT.TT
Pogson as Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness
(New York: The MacmHlan Co., 1910). _
2
Nlebuhr does not 1n this passage say as clearly as he should have that
it 1s not past events themselves, surely, that are recalled but some Intellig¬
ible representations of them.
3MR, p. 82.
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error which has occasioned much unnecessary conflict with the explanation of
events offered by the natural and social sciences when revelation has been located
in external rather than Internal history.^ The "two-aspect theory" 1s diamet¬
rically opposed to traditional supernatural 1 sin. According to Niebuhr, the
supernatural1st sees certain events 1n external history as wholly discontinuous
with other events and not subject to the same type of explanation which he
2
accepts for the vast majority of other events. This error is compounded by
another, namely, the assumption that both of these ontologically different
kinds of events can be apprehended by the theoretical reason from some non-
3
historical point of view. On the supernatural 1st model there are two different
kinds of reality, the one secular, the other sacred, each apprehensible from the
same perspective; on the two-aspect theory the same historical reality is appre-
4
hended differently from two different points of view. On Miebuhr's view
revelation does not refer to an event in the world of objects externally re¬
garded, rather, It refers to an event in the lives of selves 1n community who
recall "the critical point in their own lifetime when they became aware of them-
5
selves in a new way as they came to know the self on whom they were dependent."
He did not make Inner history synonymous with revelation but only with that
part of it which involves a relationship with Jesus Christ.
Revelation means for us that part of our inner history which
illuminates the rest of it and which is itself intelligible.
Sometimes when we read a difficult book, seeking to follow a
difficult argument, we come across a luminous sentence from which
we can go forward and backward and so attain some understanding




4lb1d., pp. 73-76, 81-84.
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of the whole. Revelation 1s like that. In his Religion 1n
the Making Professor Whitehead has written such Illuminating
sentences and one of them 1s this: "Rational religion appeals
to the direct Intuition of special occasions, and to the elucida¬
tory power of Its concepts for all occasions." The special
occasion to which we appeal In the Christian Church 1s called
Jesus Christ, 1n whom we see the righteousness of God, his power
and wisdom. But from that special occasion we also derive the
concepts which make possible the elucidation of all the events
of our history.'
Hlebuhr realized that the question was bound to arise as to whether 1t
was possible to make out any Intelligible relation between these two modes of
2
historical cognition. Given the limitations Imposed by his starting point 1n
religious and historical relativity he rightly concluded that he could not with¬
out being inconsistent propose some speculative "metaphysical or meta-hlstorlcal
3
solution to the problem of dualism." It 1s not possible either to absorb In¬
ternal history Into external history or transcend both perspectives and gain a
4
knowledge of history which would unite them both 1n a higher synthesis. Nor
1s 1t possible to move by way of thought from an external view to an Internal
view. An objective Inquiry Into the life of Jesus will never lead to the knowledge
of him as the Christ who 1s Lord. "Only a decision of the self, a leap of faith,
a metanola or revolution of the mind can lead from observation to participation
5
and from observed to lived history." Niebuhr's formulation of a final specula¬
tive proposal which he rejected 1s, I think, highly ambiguous 1f not meaningless.
"It may be thought," he observed, "that the problem of the relation of Inner and
outer history can be solved by a determination of what the events, visible 1n
1Ib1d., p. 93. 2Ib1d., pp. 81-90.
3Ib1d., p. 84. 4Ib1d., pp. 83f.
5Ib1d., p. 83; Cf., CC, p. 233.
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two aspects really are 1n themselves. But the Idea of events-1n~themselves
like that of th1ngs-1n-themselves Is an exceedingly difficult one."^ The knowl¬
edge of th1ngs-1n-themselves is, of course, not just a "difficult one" but
given his acceptance of historical relativism 1t 1s by definition an Impossible
one. But the notion "events-ln-themselves" seems to me to be logically odd and
not at all symmetrical with the notion "th1ngs-1n-themselves." Why? Because
the notion of events-1n-themselves presupposes the relflcation of the concept
"event." An "event" 1n ordinary discourse 1s not a thing but an exclusively
temporal concept which denotes some change which things undergo. It 1s, of
course, open to anyone to stipulate that the word will mean something different
in a given context but I understand Nlebuhr here to be trading 1n minted coinage.
In his discussion of the relation between Internal and external history
Niebuhr concluded that since no theoretical solution to their relation was pos¬
sible the dualism must be affirmed as a paradox, "another form of the two-world
2
thinking 1n which Christianity 1s forever involved." The two-aspect theory of
history too, formally considered, Involves the same paradoxically related duality
that 1s to be found throughout Christian theology. "In all this," he concluded,
"we have only repeated the paradox of Chalcedonlan Chrlstology and of the two-
3
world ethics of Christianity." But the paradox in Chalcedonlan Chrlstology,
4
as Nlebuhr well knew, was ontologlcal, not simply eplstemologlcal. The paradox
for Nlebuhr 1s not the unity of two ontologlcally distinct "natures," God and
man, In the one "person" Jesus Christ, but the paradoxical unity of two epls-
temologlcally distinct modes of apprehending the same historical person Jesus




4Ib1d., p. 81; Cf. CC, p. 254.
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questlons about the aselty of God or the being or value of man In and for himself,
so he was also bound to reject the Chalcedonlan Christology as an Instance of
that "exaltation of differences of understanding Into differences of being" that
raises more problems than it solves,' And Insofar as this doctrine has been
traditionally associated with belief In a virgin birth of Jesus, 1t conflicts
with Nlebuhr's strictures against the Identification of the revelation of God
p
1n Jesus Christ with the occurrence of nature-miracles.
It should be recognized, however, that he does not dispense with mira¬
cles entirely. True, it 1s no longer possible to Isolate an event 1n external
history from Its causal antecedents and declare It a miraculous work of God;
but it 1s still possible and necessary to understand the revelation of God as
a miracle. However, the locus of the miracle 1s not now external to consclous-
3
ness but precisely within consciousness Itself.
But Nlebuhr has not, to my knowledge, explained why nature-miracles of
the kind recorded 1n the Gospels should be rejected 1f psychological-miracles
occurring 1n "Inner history," that Is, the consciousness of believers who
recall the "Christ-event," are accepted. If, as he asserts, the revelation of
God 1n Jesus Christ 1s a wholly inexplicable "surd" 1n our apprehension of the
meaning of history, (which nevertheless results 1n the complete transformation
of our natural religious distrust of God), then 1t would seem to be an event
4
which Is wholly discontinuous with any preceding or succeeding events. If this
'ibid.. Cf. PCM, p. 112f; RS, p. 60. 2Ib1d., p. 175.
3
CC» p. 254; "Reformation: Continuing Imperative," pp. 248f.
^"To metaphysical thinking the irrational thing 1s the Incarnation of
the Infinite, the temporal1z1ng of the absolute. But this 1s not the absurdity
to our existential, subjective, decision-making thought. What 1s Irrational
here 1s the creation of faith in the faithfulness of God by the crucifixion, the
betrayal of Jesus Christ, who was utterly loyal to him." CC, p. 254.
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1s so, 1t 1s a miracle. But It may be wondered why the special difficulties
which made 1t Impossible for Niebuhr to accept nature-miracles would not also
apply to psychological-miracles. Perhaps a case could be made for accepting
the latter and rejecting the former, but he did not make It.
Given the total separation between these two modes of historical cog¬
nition Niebuhr was understandably concerned with the problem of their relation.
Having concluded that there was no "speculative" solution to the dualism, he
proposed a "practical solution." The inconsistencies which this "practical
solution" to their relation entail have been well canvassed by Professor Van
2
Austin Harvey, so there is no need to treat them further here. But the problem
of the relation between them 1s not to my mind as Important as the prior question
of the validity of the distinction Itself. Niebuhr has argued that these two
histories are two irreduclbly different perspectives on the same historical
reality. But if these two kinds of historical cognition are wholly distinct,
and If there 1s no other perspective than these two, then It Is hard to see how
Niebuhr knows that the object cognized 1n each case 1s the san« object. On the
one hand he declares that only "God . . . knows 1t [the event] at the same time
and 1n one act from within as well as from without;" on the other hand, he
asserts that though men "are confined to a double and partial knowledge" It Is
3
"not knowledge of a double reality." The former assertion, given Nlebuhr's
relativism, must be regarded as pure postulatlon; the latter assertion cannot
fairly be regarded as anything more than simply an assertion.
]m, pp. 84-90.
2
The Historian and the Believer; The Morality of Historical Knowl¬




From the point of view of the practicing historian the distinction 1s,
1
as Professor Harvey has pointed out, too simple. "There are not just two
possible perspectives on any given event or constellation of events but a plu-
2
rallty of them." It may well be asked 1f any historian has succeeded or
could succeed In writing history from the point of view of "external history"
as Nlebuhr has defined 1t. For example, Is 1t possible to give an account of
past events without making value judgments about the character or actions of
people,not simply 1n terms of their effect on subsequent events (external his¬
tory^ but also 1n terms of their moral worth as measured against either the
standards accepted by the historical figures described or those of the historian
himself?
It 1s necessary now to forsake the role of critic and turn again to
exposition. Nlebuhr has argued that by carefully distinguishing between Internal
and external history and by declaring revelation to be an event 1n the Internal
history of the Christian community he had shown how revelation could mean both
historical event and presence of God. A more precise answer to the second prob¬
lem posed earlier—how can revelation mean both a past event and a present
reality—must now be given. The solution here Is to be found, Nlebuhr believed,
1n the temporal mediation of the past revelatory event through the "memory" of
the community of faith. The "memory" of the community 1s principally the memory
of Individual members of the community who personally affirm 1n the present the
4
past revelatory event. But this 1s never accomplished apart from the Scriptures
Hhe Historian and the Believer, p. 238.
2Ib1d., p. 240.
3MR, pp. 59-63, 68-73, 89-93, 125-128.
4Ib1d., pp. 124-126.
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and sacraments. While Scripture cannot be Identified with the memory of the
community 1t 1s the objective "embodiment" of the witness of that first community
which was constituted as a community by Its faith 1n the God revealed 1n Jesus
ChrlstJ Revelation cannot be sustained as a present reality unless the commun¬
ity continuously refreshes and corrects Its memory of the past revelatory event
2
through careful study and Interpretation of the Scriptures. The New Testament
Is a record of the experiences which established the primitive community.
While 1t 1s not Itself revelation. It 1s an 1nd1spens1ble mediator of revela¬
tion Insofar as 1t continuously questions and 1s questioned by the same historic
3
community "out of which the record came." It 1s this continuous dialogue with¬
in the historic community which constitutes Its living tradition.
We know tradition now not only 1n the form of social rigidities
resistant to change but as the dynamic structure of modifiable
habit without which men do not live as men. ... We know tradition
as a living social process constantly changing, constantly 1n need
of criticism, but constant also as the continuing memory, value
system and habit structure of a society . . . the Church has begun
to pay new attention to Its tradition. It sees 1t not as a dead
thing once and for all given for Its acceptance and rejection,
but as living history constantly being renewed, rethought and
re-searched for meanings relevant to existing men.
The authority of Scripture and tradition cannot be separated 1n the continuing
life of the community. Scripture embodies "the memory, value system, and habit
structure" of the original community; tradition 1s that continuing "living his¬
tory constantly being renewed, rethought and re-searched for meanings relevant
to existing men." Present revelatory experience then 1s made possible through
the mefnory of the historic community which recalls the revelation of God 1n
hbld., pp. 89f, 109f, 148; PCM, pp. 44, 87, 119-121; CC, p. 13.
2CC, p. 13; PCM, pp. 119f.
3MR, p. 51. 4PCM, p. 88.
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Jesus Christ through such "means of grace" as Scripture and sacrament.^
The primary purpose of the preceding discussion has been to Isolate and
analyse the formal ep1steraolog1cal problems which Nlebuhr believed were Involved
1n any claim to know that God 1s revealed 1n history. He rejected the Idea that
his attempt to resolve these problems was Impelled by an apologetic Interest 1n
demonstrating the truth of Christian claims to know God. On the contrary, the
problematic relation of revelation and history was occasioned by a new self-
knowledge of the relativity of all historical knowledge within the contemporary
community of faith. The resolution of these problems must be understood to be
nothing more than a necessary clarification of the self-understanding of Chris¬
tian believers. By means of the "two-aspect theory" of history Nlebuhr believed
that he had solved the formal problem of the locus of revelation 1n history.
The word "revelation" 1n the Christian community's language Indicates an event
In Its Inner history 1n which God 1s known. The determination of the locus of
revelation Is a necessary yet preliminary step toward the final goal of explica¬
ting the content of revelation.
In his description of the revelatory event and the fundamental convictions
about God which are mediated through this event, Nlebuhr first points out that
his description of the believer's existential standpoint and his argument that
the revelatory event 1s apprehended solely from the point of view of practical
2
reason makes it necessary for the revelation of God to be a personal revelation.
All knowledge of God for Nlebuhr 1s, as we have seen, practical knowledge and
his definition of practical knowledge 1s restricted to the valuations of selves.
^R, pp. 154, 177.
2Ib1d., pp. 142-147; RMWC, pp. 42-48.
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The most Important fact about the whole approach to revelation
to which we are committed by the acceptance of our existential
situation, of the point of view of faith living In history, 1s
that we must think and speak In terms of persons. In our
history we deal with selves not with concepts. Our unlversals
here are not eternal objects Ingredient 1n events but eternal
persons active 1n particular occasions; our axioms 1n this
participating knowledge are not self-evident convictions about
the relations of such objects but certainties about fundamental
Indestructible relations between persons.'
The God-man relation 1s both irreduclbly valuatlonal and personal or existential.
It 1s a direct confrontation between the divine and human self. In Nlebuhr's
understanding of revelation the object known, God, must if he 1s to be known at
all by man, reveal himself as a person. He wishes 1t to be clearly understood
that while this 1s so, 1t does not mean that the personhood of God 1s to be
Identified with our conceptions of human personhood or even with the person of
2
Jesus. The central certainty given to the Christian community 1n the revelatory
moment 1s not that Jesus was the greatest of persons or that human selves have
Infinite value. Such statements may be made but only on the basis of a prior
certainty about the Infinite self 1n relation to whom all finite selves have
value. Revelation 1s an I-Thou encounter, but It differs from all I-Thou en¬
counters between finite selves. When we are encountered by the divine self we
know ourselves to be known from beginning to end by the "eternal knower" and
to be valued by the "universal valuer."4
When we say revelation we point to something 1n the historical
event more fundamental and more certain than Jesus or the self.
Revelation means God, God who discloses himself to us through
our as our knower, our author, our judge and our only
savlui.
Ibid., p. 143. 2Ib1d., pp. 147-151.
3Ib1d., p. 151. 4Ib1d., p. 153. Cf. p. 38.
5Ib1d., pp. 151f.
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Revelatlon means that 1n our common history the fate which
lowers over us as persons In our communities reveals Itself to
be a person 1n community with us.1
Nlebuhr believed that this view of revelation entailed the denial of the sort
of specific knowledge about the nature or will of God that can be formulated 1n
propositions. "What this means for us cannot be expressed 1n the Impersonal way
of creeds or other propositions but only 1n responsive acts of a personal charac¬
ter. We acknowledge revelation by no third person proposition, such as that
there Is a God but only In the direct confession of the heart, 'Thou art ny
God.'"2
ln Radical Monotheism and Western Culture (1960) Nlebuhr presents a
slightly different view of the revelatory event from that given 1n The Meaning
of Revelation (1941). They are primarily differences of emphasis arising from
the fact that 1n the former he 1s not exclusively concerned with the meaning of
revelation, or with the relation of revelation to history, but with the meaning
of faith."' He Is particularly concerned to describe radically monotheistic faith
and to distinguish it from the two primary forms of cultural faith—polytheism
and henothelsm.4 He does not forsake the view that God 1s revealed 1n historical
events but his focus 1s not now restricted to a Christo-centric interpretation
of the meaning of revelation. The crucial chapter In which these matters are
discussed 1s entitled "Radical Faith—Incarnate and Revealed in History."5 He
has given very carefully formulated definitions of what he means by "radical
faith" and "incarnation." The word "faith" 1n the phrase "radical faith"6 means
1Ib1d., p. 153.
2Ib1d., pp. 153f. Cf. pp. 155-159, 172-174, 177, 182; RMWC, p. 42.
3RMWC, Ch. I. 4Ib1d., Chs. II and III.
5Ib1d., Ch. III.
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both trust (confidence) and loyalty (fidelity) and the definition of "radical
faith" Is given 1n tenns of the trfadlc structure of existence which for Nlebuhr
defines man's be1ng-1n-the-world. The self exists at every moment In response-
relations with God and other selves and the moral quality of Its responses to
the actions of others upon 1t 1s determined by Its Interpretation of the charac¬
ter of that power or being upon which 1t 1s absolutely dependent.* The defini¬
tion of "radical faith" must encompass this complex relational structure. It 1s
a form of human faith, that 1s, of the confidence and fidelity
without which men do not live. It may, but need not, be expressed
1n verbalized beliefs. When the confidence 1s so put Into words
the resultant assertion 1s not that there 1s a God but that Being
1s God, or better that the principle of being, the source of all
things and the power by which they exist, 1s good, as good for
them and good to them. ... As loyalty such radical faith 1s
decision for and commitment to the One beyond all the many as
head and center of the realm of being: its cause, the universe of
being, elicits and requires fidelity.2
The term "Incarnation" 1s used by Nlebuhr to refer to the embodiment or actual
expression of "radical faith" 1n a total human life. It 1s "the concrete ex¬
pression 1n a total human life of radical trust 1n the One and of universal
3
loyalty to the realm of being." Radical faith first appearedjalbeit "ambiguously"
In the life of Israel.^ It 1s ambiguously Incarnate among the Hebrews because
their history 1s marked by a continuous struggle between radical faith and a
social henotheism where Yaweh 1s worshipped 1n the Interest of the greater glory
*RS, Ch. 4; RMWC, pp. 32-34, 47f. "The Triad of Faith," pp. 6-12.
2RMWC, p. 38.
3Ib1d., p. 40, cf.. pp. 32, 39-42.
4
Mindful of the state of uncertainty 1n modern historical research Into
the origins of Hebrew religion Nlebuhr does not attempt to fix the date of first
emergence of radical monotheism In the history of Israel. He Is confident that
1t had appeared by the time of the great anonymous author of Second Isaiah.
Cf., RMWC, pp. 31 and esp. p. 43, n. 3.
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and security of the nation. Jesus Christ, Nlebuhr avers, embodies this radical
faith "to an even greater degree than 1n Israel. The greatness of his confi¬
dence 1n the Lord of heaven and earth as fatherly In goodness toward all his
creatures, the consistency of his loyalty to the realm of being, seem unqualified
by distrust or by competing loyalty."^ His trust 1n God and fidelity to God as
wholly faithful to him and to all creatures was so single-minded, and his fidel¬
ity to the whole realm of being was so consistently displayed 1n his words and
2
deeds, that Christians have felt Impelled to refer to him as "son of God."
How, then, does Nlebuhr understand the relation between these Incarna¬
tions of radical faith and revelation? Revelation 1s an event that 1s at once
a demonstration of loyalty which calls forth confidence 1n Being as wholly good
and a disclosure of a cause which calls forth loyalty to God and to the whole
realm of being to which God Is loyal.
Though the word 1s used with other meanings 1n other contexts,
In this context revelation specifies those events 1n which radical
faith was elicited. In relation to faith, revelation does not
mean the 1mpartat1on of certain truths, for propositions do not
1n themselves establish confidence or challenge loyalty. The
event that calls forth faith as confidence 1s a demonstration
of loyalty and the event that calls forth faith as loyalty 1s
some disclosure of a cause.3
According to Nlebuhr, 1t 1s precisely this view of the relation of revelation
and faith that 1s consistently witnessed to 1n both the Old and New Testament.4
In the Biblical accounts of the revelation of God which elicited radically
1Ib1d., p. 42.
2Ib1d. Cf. PCM,p. 32; CC, pp. 15-29; RS, pp. 163-167. The possibility
that Jesus may either have directly affirmed his own deity or have accepted
such ascription from others 1s not seriously considered by Nlebuhr.
3Ib1d. Cf. "The Triad of Faith," pp. 9-12.
4Ib1d., pp. 42-44.
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monothelstlc faith 1n the experience and actions of Moses, the prophets and
Jesus Christ, at least three common themes may be discerned. First, God 1s
being Itself, that 1s, the valuing or redeeming power In the world 1s ontologl-
cally Identical with the principle of being Itself. Second, Being 1s God, that
1s, the principle of being creates, maintains and re-establishes worth. Third,
those who trust 1n God are challenged to choose God's cause as their cause,
where God's cause 1s nothing less than loyalty to the whole realm of being that
he creates, maintains and redeems.1 It Is Important also to recognize that
these revelatory moments In which radical faith was called forth were not pecu¬
liarly religious 1n character, 1f by "religious" one means private visions or
ecstades, or Individual encounters with the holy, or answers to direct appeals
for supernatural assistance. Rather, Nlebuhr Insists that they occurred 1n the
midst of cultural or political crises, and they were fully revelatory of God only
Insofar as they "were experienced as demonstrations of a presence that was pre-
?
sent In every situation."
While 1n Radical Monotheism and Western Culture Nlebuhr does use what
Hans Fre1 has termed the "practical-abstractive"^ language characteristic of his
relational theory of value, It should not be concluded that he at any time con¬
ceived of God as an Impersonal force or transcendent power or that he thought 1t
possible to speak of God's being apart from his personhood. Nlebuhr lays down
as "the cornerstone" of his theology of radical monotheism "that the one God who
1Ib1d., pp. 43f.
2
Ibid., p. 44. In The Responsible Self 1t 1s this understanding of reve¬
lation and fa1th that 1s presupposed by Nlebuhr when he suggests that the con¬
ceptual scheme of responsibility 1s more congruent with, or better able to give




1s Being 1s an 'I,' or like an 'I,' who 1s faithful as only selves are faith¬
ful."1 Thus, for Nlebuhr, radical faith 1s established 1n or 1s received by
the believer when he, as an historically conditioned self, confronts the divine
Self, each 1n their Irreducible and untranscendable otherness and their Indis¬
soluble relatedness. As we have had occasion to remark earlier, for Nlebuhr,
the complex Interrelation of selves each 1n their Irreducible otherness yet
Indissoluble relatedness 1s the fundamental situation 1n which man exists.
All our experiencing and experimenting, our thinking and com¬
municating goes on within a complex Interaction of Irreducible
"I's" and "Thou's". ... No matter how much we concentrate on
common objects, this 1s the concentration of subjects who ack¬
nowledge the presence of other subjects, of thinkers rather than
thoughts, experiences rather than experienced.2
It Is then In terms of this primordial existential situation that the revelation
of God must be understood. Both 1n The Weaning of Revelation and Radical
Monotheism and Western Culture Nlebuhr Insists that because this 1s the case
revelation cannot be construed as a relation between the mind and Ideas or pro¬
positions about God. It refers to that encounter 1n which Being 1s disclosed
3
to human selves as a Person wholly unique 1n his existence and perfections.
What this means for us cannot be expressed 1n the Impersonal way
of creeds or other propositions but only in responsive acts of a
personal character. We acknowledge revelation by no third person
proposition, such as that there 1s a God, but only 1n the direct
confession of the heart, "Thou art my God." . . . Revelation as the
self-disclosure of the Infinite person 1s realized In us only
through the faith which 1s a personal act of commitment, of con¬
fidence and trust, not a belief about the nature of things.4
To say that God makes himself known as First Person 1s to say that
revelation means less the disclosure of the essence of objective
]RMWC, p. 45. 2Ib1d.
3MR, pp. 143, 183-191; RMWC, pp. 45-47.
4MR, pp. 153f.
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being to minds that the demonstration to selves of, faithful
truthful being. What we try to point to with the aid of con¬
ceptual terms as principle of being or as the One beyond the
many is acknowledged by selves as "Thou."'
Niebuhr acknowledged the fact that his definition of revelation as
2
"divine self-disclosure" raises many questions. The proposed definition must
face, and attempt to resolve, two important closely related issues.
. . . We must ask ourselves whether the revelation of God as person
is not so mystic an event that it becomes wholly separate from and
irrelevant to our discursive knowledge and to our moral standards.
A second question arises in many forms, but perhaps most frequently
as the question about the meaning of the word God in this connec¬
tion. If we say that revelation means divine self-disclosure we
seem to infer that we can recognize God in revelation, which implies
a previous knowledge of him. . . . Must we not go back of this self-
disclosure to some previous knowledge of God, to an original or a
general revelation, or to some ideal of God, some value-concept or
other demand of reason through which we are enabled to recognize
the historical event as a realization of the Ideal?3
It 1s clear, from the questions themselves, that he was acutely conscious
of the perennial dilemma that has challenged all serious thinking about knowl-
4
edge of God. How is it possible, in our thinking and speaking about God, to
^RMWC, pp. 46f (italics added). Given the sharp dualism which Niebuhr
has made between theoretical and practical knowledge he cannot, strictly
speaking, allow that "revelation means less the disclosure ..." but must say
that "revelation does not result in the disclosure . . ." or some similar
decisive negation.
2
MR, p. 155. RMWC, p. 44. The most perceptive and detailed treatment
of the principal difficulties arising out of this aspect of Niebuhr's thought
that have come to my attention are to be found 1n the following essays: Hans
Frei's "The Theology of H. Richard Niebuhr," (1957) is still unsurpassed es¬
pecially on Niebuhr's doctrine of revelation and doctrine of God. FE, pp. 68-
87 and 94-104 respectively; John B. Cobb, Living Options in Protestant Theology
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1962), pp. 296-300. Cobb's treatment




Hans Frei has placed all succeeding interpreters of Niebuhr's thought
permanently in his debt. This is especially true of his profound and incisive
exposition and critique of Niebuhr's theological method. Cf. "The Theology of
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avoid anthropomorphism on the one hand and agnosticism on the other? In the
previous section I have argued that Nlebuhr's employment of a relational rather
than an absolute theory of value was not by Itself sufficient to save his own
concept of God from the same anthropomorphism that he had argued was the In¬
evitable consequence of all absolute value theologies. In the relational theory
of value, the value of any being or self 1s wholly dependent upon Its relations
to other beings or selves. Ontoloqlcally value depends upon being. But 1n our
knowledge of the Infinite being we call "God" we are, according to Niebuhr,
wholly confined to a knowledge of the value that is realized 1n the revelatory
moment of direct confrontation with him, where the "deity-value" of being
itself exactly corresponds to and satisfies the constitutive human need to know
that life is worth living. In The Meaning of Revelation and later writings
Niebuhr integrates the notion of value relativity Into a more complex approach
to religious knowledge which seeks to take account of both the historicity of
the revelation of God in Christ and the historical and existential situation of
H. Richard Niebuhr," FE, po. 65-94. Frei argues that Nlebuhr's "objective"
or "thec-centric relativism," far from resolving the "anthropomorphism-agnosti¬
cism" dilemma, or being a viable alternative immune to either horn of the
dilemma, actually represents an unstable compromise that falls prey to both.
When the relational aspect is stressed by Niebuhr, the content of our knowledge
of God becomes anthropomorphic. When he has the objectivity and initiative of
God in view he so stresses the uniqueness and untranscendable otherness of God
that knowledge of God is emptied of all content. Ibid., pp. 71-75 and 81-87.
While Frei does not, and should not have been expected to have developed a
theological method that would avoid these difficulties, he does drop hints that
it would He 1n the direction of a combination of a substance metaphyslc, and
a realist epistemology coupled with some doctrine of analogical predication.
Cf. Ibid., pp. 71f, n. 15, 82f, 102. That this approach would succeed any
better than Niebuhr's must remain in doubt. All analogical predication that
purports to be informative about the immanent characteristics of deity depends
upon the idea that there exists some properties possessed by finite and infinite
being that are identical. But it is precisely this ontological assumption that
has been rejected by many contemporary philosophers and theologians on both
logical and theological grounds.
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the believer, the recipient of revelation.^ While his emphasis on the Irreduc¬
ible selfhood of God and man—evident in writings after "Value Theory and
Theology" (1937)—marks a turn toward a more explicit existentialist mode of
thought, his definition of revelation as the self-disclosure of being Itself as
"Infinite person,"2 or "First person,"3 remains a purely relational one. But
the move from a predominant reliance upon "the practical-abstractive" language
of value theory to "the practical-concrete" language of historical and social
existentialism cannot be allowed to obscure the fact that "both as a valuatlon-
4
al thinker and as an Existentialist, Niebuhr remains relational 1n his thought."
Both are ant1-metaphysical in the sense that they reject any possibility of
attaining knowledge of God as he exists in and for himself. All knowledge of
God 1s contingent upon a relationship of confrontation with him in the Immediacy
of personal experience where the content of revelation 1s limited to and coin¬
cides with the believer's faith, that the power or being which cast him into
existence as just this particular self, Is Itself a Person who knows and values
him.® If this 1s the case then even the terms "self" and "person" are relation¬
al1 and 1t 1s difficult to see how Niebuhr can justify his belief 1n the objec¬
tive personhood of God. Furthermore, here we encounter again a problem which
we had occasion to point out In connection with Niebuhr's understanding of man
as a "social self."6 Can the selfhood of man or God be defined solely 1n terms
of Its relations. If God is a person, must he not be a singular subject of ex¬
perience whose existence 1s ontologically and logically prior to any and all
particular relations actual or possible? Indeed It 1s hard to see how the
1MR, Chs. I and II; CC, Ch 7; RMWC, pp. 44-48; RS, Chs 2-4.
2MR, p. 154. 3RMWC, pp. 46-48.
*Hans Fre1, "The Theology of H. Richard Niebuhr," F£, p. 85.
5MR, p. 153; RMWC, p. 47; RS, pp. 124-126, 143, 175-178.
6Infra, p. 102f.
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concept of relativity or relatedness Itself could retain any meaning 1f the
entitles related are themselves functions of relations.
Nlebuhr, as we have seen, clearly recognized the anthropomorphic Impli¬
cations of a consistently relational and valuatlonal approach to knowledge of
God. He was confident, however, that anthropomorphism could be avoided 1f the
otherness and uniqueness of the personhood of God over against all finite person-
hood was also consistently maintained. His acceptance of the existentialist
claim that faith arises only 1n a relationship between two selves commits him
to affirming that 1n the revelatory moment the believer 1s not related to some
ultimate abstract unitary concept or value, but Is actually confronted with the
divine Self. It 1s precisely at this point that the "personal encounter" theory
itself encounters the other horn of the dilemma, agnosticism. To the extent
that Nlebuhr emphasized the absolute uniqueness of God's personhood, just to
that extent he found 1t difficult, 1f not Impossible, to specify positively
1
either the perfections or will of God. The revelatory moment does not yield
any positive knowledge of the attributes of this unique Self. It Is a moment
1n our Inner history when we know ourselves to be known, judged and valued. On
this definition of revelation 1t 1s clear that the believer receives a new
self-understanding of his own worth 1n a benevolent universe: 1t is less clear
2
he gains any positive apprehension of the distinctive character of God. But
It 1s as well to note here that Important theological and philosophi¬
cal objections can be raised against Nlebuhr's use of the terms "person" or
"self" in reference to God. While the doctrine of the Trinity has Its own dif¬
ficulties, the traditional Christian view has always been that the uniqueness
and unity of God 1s to be expressed 1n three distinguishable, yet Inseparable
"persons," Father, Son and Holy Spirit. In view of this, 1t would seem less
problematic to affirm that the reality of God must Include all distinctively
personal perfections. Nlebuhr believed that an "objectively relatlvlstic"
theology must refrain from making ary metaphysical assertions about God as
Internally related to himself as three hypostases (persona) In one ousla
(substantial. The self-revelation of God 1n Jesus thrlst only provides knowl-
edge of the moral and relational attributes of God.
2MR, pp. 187-191, pp. 146f.
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if this "encounter" does not furnish the believer with any clear knowledge of
those qualities which properly belong to the personhood of God, in what sense
can he be said to know God at all? Niebuhr had no difficulty maintaining that
God is deus absconditus; he had much more difficulty clearly setting forth in
what sense he is also deus revelatus. Most theologians have agreed that the
being of God is never fully revealed in our knowing of him but Niebuhr would
seem to have made God unknowable in any significant sense, such that we can
properly speak and communicate with others about what he 1s or is not like, or
what his will for his creatures is or is not. But as Niebuhr himself realized,
it is precisely specific knowledge of the nature and will of God that is essen¬
tial to any theological ethic, especially the conversionlst ethic which he
espoused. The description he has given of the continuous conversion of all our
natural ideas of deity, initiated by the revelation of God, is much more a
description of what we are to be converted from, and much less a concrete des¬
cription of what we are to be converted toJ
A critic, sympathetic to this explanation of how God 1s known may find
himself forced to raise questions about the "personal-encounter" model other
than those which Niebuhr himself raised. There are to my mind, two problens
with this view that are even more troublesome than those Niebuhr addressed him¬
self to. First, there is the question of the legitimacy of the encounter model
itself. Theologians who employ this model assume that there does exist a "vital
2
analogy" between ordinary relations between persons and the relation between
^R, pp. 175-191.
2
Ronald W. Hepburn, Christianity and Paradox: Critical Studies in
Twentieth Century Theology (London: Watts, 1958), p. 30. Professor Hepburn's
essay contains a very careful and damaging critique of the "personal-encounter"
model. Cf. Ibid., pp. 24-59.
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a person and God. Is this assumption justified or justifiable? Second, there
Is the problem of the veracity of any claim to have actually encountered God.
Granted Niebuhr's description of the revelatory moment, 1s 1t possible to dis¬
tinguish a "real" encounter with God from Illusory or self-Induced states of
consciousness?
With respect to the first problem, it should be recognized, I would ar¬
gue, that the explanatory power of the "personal-encounter" model 1s limited
to and controlled by the kind of understanding a theologian has of human per¬
sonal relations. Nlebuhr maintains that "selves are known In act or not at
all."* In order to know another self, the knower 1s wholly dependent upon the
decision of the other to reveal himself. "Loving and hating selves must reveal
2
themselves—penetrate through the mask of eyes and bodies; ..." To know
another 1s first to know that you are known, valued or dlsvalued by that self.
So, too, God the Infinite self is known only through that self-activity which
makes the recipient conscious of himself as known and loved by him. Nlebuhr
does not, however, give sufficient attention to the Important role that "the
mask of eyes and bodies" play In our ordinary knowledge of other persons. He
does not deny that knowledge of another person (1n the sense of Intimate
acquaintance with him) depends upon specific knowledge about that person (1n
the sense of a complex assortment of information about him). Yet he does not
give any evidence of having asked himself whether it is possible or even con¬
ceivable that there could be any knowledge of another person at all where be¬
havioral knowledge of his bodily appearance, gesture, speech, and so forth, were
wholly absent. But reliance upon such empirical considerations is obviously





the validity of the distinction between bodies and minds or to Insist that all
knowledge of other persons is identical with a knowledge of observed bodily be¬
havior. It is only to ask this question: If, in our ordinary knowledge of
other persons we can never have knowledge of their hidden inner life apart from
behavioral knowledge, then, 1s 1t really possible to maintain that there is any
analogy between human relations and divine-human relations? This is not a
question about the effectiveness of the analogy but about Its legitimacy. It
1s to ask whether in view of this lack, there can be any analogy at all.
A further difficulty with the "personal-encounter" model arises over
the problem of whether it is possible to distinguish "real" encounters from
illusory ones. In our ordinary encounters with say, Peter or Mary, we know what
it is to be mistaken about their true character or personality. We come to
realize—again, not apart from the mediation of some deed or word of theirs—
that our previous knowledge of them was to a greater or lesser degree erron¬
eous. We find ourselves saying, "I had no idea Peter was so deceitful," or
I had always thought of Mary as timid, but her spirited defence of Peter. . ."
Here, too, it is some bodily manifestation of theirs which was a necessary, if
not a sufficient condition, of any correction 1n our interpretation of them as
persons. As Niebuhr himself has observed, "In the face of some emergency a man
may act so as to reveal a quality undisclosed before. Through that revelatory
moment his friend is enabled to understand past actions which had been obscure
1
and to prophesy the future behavior of the revealer." dust so: yet it 1s
also true of all mundane personal relations that the "act" always involves some
sort of observable behavior. But again, the means by which we discover such
mistakes in our interpretation of the true character or personality of another
^bid., p. 129.
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is simply not available 1n any encounter with God; and, in the absence of any
other sort of testing procedure there would appear to be no nay of distin¬
guishing between a genuine encounter with God and the Illusory products of our
own emotions or "will to believe."
Now the point here is not to demand that Niebuhr's encounter theory
satisfy a criterion of verification that by definition declares illusory any
claim to have experience of an existent that cannot be sensed. The problem
with the "personal-encounter" model 1s not that it fails to satisfy the veri¬
fication principle of radical empiricism, but rather that Niebuhr does not
explain how this model can, on its own terms, provide a criterion for distin¬
guishing reality from illusion in religious experience.
The Transformation of Natural Religion and Horaiity
Radical monotheism and transformation or conversion are the two funda¬
mental structural principles in Niebuhr's theology. It Is also clear that
they are correlative principles. Trust in, and loyalty to being as God is
the miraculous gift that Christians have received through Jesus Christ. Trans¬
formation or conversion means that as a consequence of having received this
radical faith all human thinking and valuing, all the self's roles and relations,
are immediately caught up in a continuous process of reformation and redirection
toward the One Cod. Monotheistic faith is both passive and active; 1t is a
passive state of trust in being as good to and for the self and the whole realm
of being, it is an active response of commitment or of loyalty to God and to
God's cause—the whole realm or commonwealtb of contingent beings which he
creates and loves. The transformation of human life both Individually and
socially centrally involves the "incarnation" of this radical faith
-243-
■Jntensively and extensively in "all the realms and offices 1n which self
acts."1 To "Incarnate" radical faith in all the self's roles and relations
1s to become a responsible self.
The radical faith becomes incarnate Insofar as every reaction
to every event becomes a response in loyalty and confidence to
the One who Is present in all such events. The First Person
encountered in the temple is also the First Person encountered
in the political arena, or 1n the market place, or among the
hungry and plague-ridden. No action directed toward human com¬
panions or toward other nations or toward animals but 1s also
directed toward the One who is their creator and savior.2
By means of these two principles Nlebuhr sought to show that the ques¬
tion of faith, that 1s, the question of our ultimate trust and loyalty is the
central issue 1n ethics. Beyond all the rules that we may devise for guiding
social behavior; beyond the question of a natural or a revealed moral law;
beyond all discussions of the virtues and vices which form or deform our
moral character is the question of "the center of value" 1n relation to which
3
we define good and evil, right and wrong. In our ordinary moral experience we
"move among many relative systems of good and evil and make many specific
responses" but the relative evaluations expressed in them "are shaped, guided,
4
and formed by the understanding of good and evil [we] have upon the whole."
One Important consequence of the coming of radical faith 1s the trans¬
formation of the human self in all its roles and relations. It is impossible
for a self to have moral Integrity, that 1s, to be a truly responsible self,
unless and until, all Its responses to finite beings are qualified or conditioned
by Its response to the One faithful and trustworthy God present 1n all events.3
]RMWC, p. 48. 2Ib1d.
3RS, pp. 123-126; RMWC, pp. 33-37; CV (1960), pp. 110-113.
4RS, p. 124.
5RS, pp. 121-126, 137-145; RMWC, pp. 47f; MR, p. 78.
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Tq respond to the ultimate action 1n all responses to finite
actions means to seek one Integrity of self amidst all the in¬
tegrities of scientific, political, economic, educational and
other cultural activities; It means to be one responding self
amidst all the responses of the roles be1ng~played, because there
Is present to the self the One other beyond all the finite
systems of nature and society.'
The self that lives In Ignorance of the fact that the One power upon which 1t
is absolutely dependent 1s good to the self and all that exists, cannot act as
a responsible self, one self 1n all Its responses to the actions of the many
upon 1t. Niebuhr does not deny that a partial unity can be attained 1n our
social roles. Han has been highly successful in interpreting the many actions
upon him as systems which display certain constancies 1n their actions toward
the self; but they remain a multiplicity of systems. Over against these mani¬
fold agencies the self remains manifold.
In my responsiveness and responsibility to the many I am
Irresponsible to the One beyond the many; I am Irresponsible
as a self, however responsible the natural, the political, the
domestic, the biological complexes 1n me may be 1n relation
to the system of nature, or to the closed societies of nation,
church, family or profession, or to the closed society of life
Itself.3
For Niebuhr; the unity of the self as a moral being 1s possible only 1n relation
4
to a unity that 1s beyond all finite beings and finite systems of value. To
attain unity as one self responding to the one God present 1n all events 1s to
have attained salvation.
It 1s necessary to tread carefully here because Hlebuhr 1s not saying
that God 1s present only to that self who has radical faith. God 1s present
to every self he has created 1n two ways. First, he 1s present as that power
upon which the self 1s absolutely dependent as just this contingent self.
1 2
RS, p. 123 (Italics added). Ibid., p. 137.
3IMd., pp. 137f. 4Ib1d., p. 122.
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Second, he 1s present to each self 1n all the actions of finite beings upon It.
In theological language we must say that each self 1s at every moment related
to God as the Creator and Sustalner of all that exists. Man the sinner, the
worshipper of false gods, may recognize 1n the failure of his gods one action
In all the actions upon him and his response of distrust defines his sin. The
consequence of his doing so—and this 1s a crucial point in Nlebuhr's ethics-
Is that he must trust 1n beings whose power and value are less than universal:
He must do so because 1t 1s not possible to exist as a self without trust 1n
and loyalty to some being (or beings) as the source of life's value. As soon
as this turn 1s made man Inevitably divides the one realm of being, all of whom
are valued by God, "into the good and the evil, Into friends who will assist
us to maintain ourselves awhile and foes intent on our reduction to beings of no
significance or to nothingness."^ All the selfishness and pride manifested 1n
our personal relations with others and the Indifference, hatred and outright
hostility, manifested 1n the relations between communities, nations and not
least, religions, have their root in this ultimate distrust of being as good
and In disloyalty to the cause, the whole realm of being, to which God is loyal.
The problem of man's sinfulness must be understood as a fundamental
perversion of his own being which 1s occasioned by his ultimate trust 1n finite
2
beings. Radical monotheistic faith affirms that whatever 1s, 1s good because
'ibid., p. 140. Cf. RMWC, p. 34.
2
In his essay, "Man the Slrmer," Journal of Religion XV (1935), 272-280,
Nlebuhr has presented a concise and Incisive account of n1 jfunderstandlng of human
sinfulness. The doctrine of sin Is an Important element 1n Nlebuhr's thought
but 1t 1s always subordinate to and 1s only Intelligible In terras of the sover¬
eignty of God and man's dependence upon him. "Evangelical ethics 1s God-
centered, not s1n-centered. When our fundamental orientation In I1f^ Is that
of persons who live vis a vis our own sinful selves rather than vis a. vis God,
the spirit of EvangeTTcaT etfiics takes flight no less surely than when we live
In the contemplation of our own righteousness." "Evangelical and Protestant
Ethics," p. 222.
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God made 1t and sustains 1t, but this does not mean that whatever 1s, 1s right.*
Throughout Nlebuhr's writings there Is a remarkable consistency with respect
to his doctrine of sin. S1n, for Nlebuhr, 1s first and foremost distrust 1n
o
God and disloyalty to him and to the whole realm of being which he has created.
On the one hand sin 1s the absence of right loyalty, the failure to worship
the one true God who 1s "the only trustworthy and wholly lovable reality;" on
the other hand 1t 1s false loyalty, loyalty to something other than God. Loy-
3
alty to a false god at once entails rebellion against God. Even loyalty to
4
such "henothelsms" as humanism, naturalism, or vitalism, are false centers of
value because "each excludes some realm of being from the sphere of value;
each 1s claimed by a cause less Inclusive than the realm of being in Its whole-
„Sness."
This general understanding of s1n afforded Nlebuhr a basis from which
to explore its consequences 1n the Individual and social experience of man. In
The Meaning of Revelation Niebuhr portrays the natural mind of man as controlled
In Its self-understanding and 1n Its Interpretation of its relationship with
others, by false Images, "the evil Imaginations of the heart."6 We recall that
1RMWC, p. 38; RS, p. 125.
2,,Man the Sinner," pp. 276-278. Cf. "The Triad of Faith," p. 12.
3Ib1d., pp. 276f.
4
Radical Monotheism and Western Culture Niebuhr distinguishes
"henothelsm" from "polytheism" as two forms of Idolatry or natural religious
forms of faith. "... Monotheism, as value dependence and as loyalty to One
beyond all the marjy 1s 1n constant conflict among us with ... a pluralism
which has many objects of devotion [polytheism] and a social faith that has one
object, which Is, however, only one among the many [henothelsm]." Ibid., p. 24.
5Ib1d., p. 37.
6MR, pp. 99-102, 113, 122-124.
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for Nlebuhr both the theoretical and the practical reason employ Images 1n the
necessary task of Interpreting the data of experience. The practical reason
deals with the meanings and values which arise 1n personal relationships. Its
Images are therefore exclusively personal. The Important question for either
kind of reasoning is not whether it will use images or not, but whether 1t em¬
ploys true or false images. The practical reason apart from revelation employs
false images whose evil character is clearly seen 1n the destructive consequences
which ensue for the self and Its coniminlties. Examples of evil images are
"those feelings of superiority or inferiority which blight the lives of men."1
Such stereotyped images as capitalists, communists, foreigner, the depraved
race, are also employed by men to interpret their soda! discontent. The evil
2
image which 1s used above all others 1s egotism. Egotism in the Imagination
is defined as "the tendency of the person to impute to all other selves the
3
same interest In itself which it feels." This Image makes 1t impossible for
selves as Individuals or groups to understand the sorrows, much less forgive
the sins of other selves. Egotism results 1n a moral solipsism.
These images of an animistic and self-centered world . . . are
unable to make sense out of our history and our fate.. . .Evil
and selfhood are left nysterles. Solipsism in thought and action
or Irrational pluralism 1n theory and practice are the consequences.
The Impoverishment and alienation of the self, as well as the des¬
truction of others. Issues from the reasoning of the heart that
uses evil imaginations.4
The inhumanity of man to man, his exploitation of animals and the natural
world, his abuse of his own body, are some of the moral consequences that result
5
from the use of evil images in the interpretation of moral experience.
1Jb1d, P- 99■ 2Ib1d., pp. lOlf; Cf. RMWC, pp. 28f; FGG, p. 119.
3Ib1d., p. 101. 4Ib1d., p. 102.
5"Man the Sinner," p. 279.
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A further consequence of sin Is the Impotence of man to save himself
from his disloyalty and rebellion. It 1s Important to notice that for Nlebuhr
"moral evils" are a consequence of sin and not strictly speaking a part of the
definition of sin Itself. He rejects as "morallsm" the view that sin "means
that men occasionally become disloyal to God or that their disloyalty 1s real
only Insofar as they consciously choose to be disloyal; it means rather that
those to whom God 1s wholly loyal and who are by nature wholly dependent upon
him are 1n active rebellion against him."^ The idea that men are blameworthy
for this disloyalty only 1n those cases where they are "consciously and willingly
disloyal" is rejected on two counts: First, because Christianity is less con¬
cerned with "assessing the blame" and more concerned with "the fact and the
cure;" second,because this "idea" entails a "dubious doctrine of freedom.
The starting-point of the doctrine of sin is not man's freedom but man's depend¬
ence; freedom accounts for the fact that man can be and is disloyal, not for
2
the fact that he ought to be loyal." To say that "the starting-point of the
doctrine of sin 1s not man's freedom but his dependence" means, for Niebuhr,
that the "will," that 1s roan as a self, is always committed either to God or
to some false god.
Objectively, this means that God or a false god 1s a "center of value"
3
and,as such,it is "the standard of morality, presupposed by morality." All
moral judgments are objectively relatlvistlc, that is, the moral concepts
which are employed 1n them are neither absolute nor psychologically relative.
Moral terms like "good" and "evil," "right"and "wrong" take on meaning only




Itself a moral value but 1s "the standard of morality."
The source of that standard 1s always religion not morality.
It depends upon what man finds to be wholly worshipful, Intrinsi¬
cally valuable—1n other words upon the nature of his god or
gods. The "chief good" of man 1s not the object but the pre¬
supposition of his moral choices, and his possession of a chief
good 1s the presupposition of all moral judgments which he or
another passes upon h1ra.'
Subjectively, this means that man's will 1s never uncommitted to some god or
value-center. More crucially, Nlebuhr asserts, that when the will 1s committed
to a false god 1t 1s Impossible for man to transfer his trust and loyalty to
God by exercising his will since 1t 1s precisely his will which Is cofurritted
to the false god.
Moral1sro which makes the human free will the source of all good
and evil cannot understand this Impotence. Its savior 1s the
will; every problem 1s solved by an appeal to the will. But
there Is no such thing as a free will 1n this sense. The will
Is always committed or 1t 1s no will at all. It 1s either
committed to God or to one of the gods.2
Every willed action, therefore, 1s simply another manifestation of this loyalty
to false gods and a further evidence of disloyalty to God. This doctrine of
sin 1s, Nlebuhr believed, fully consonant with his doctrine of the freedom
and grace of God because,1f man 1s ever to know and love the One beyond all
the many finite gods, 1t will be possible only because God gives him the free¬
dom to trust and to love him. Nlebuhr did not hesitate to follow Luther and
Calvin and especially Jonathan Edwards 1n embracing the doctrine of "divine
3
determinism."
hbld., p. 275. 2Ib1d., p. 279.
3KGA, p. 175. "Faith, the root-virtue whence all actions draw their
goodness, 1s for Luther completely the gift of God. It 1s not something under
man's control so that he can will to trust as perhaps he can will to believe
a proposition about God," CE, p. 241. For similar views attributed to Calvin
and Edwards, cf. CE, pp. 270f and pp. 387f, respectively.
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True to his whole approach to theology Niebuhr deals with sin 1n terms
of man's value experience and Its Interpretation by the practical reason.
Thus, he does not raise or discuss the problem of evil as a theoretical question
about how 1t 1s possible to reconcile belief in a sovereign and good God who
creates a universe that is good, with belief in the reality of evil. He would
doubtless have considered any demand that he ought to have done so as equiva¬
lent to the demand that he provide arguments for the existence of God. Both
the problem of God and the problem of evil are practical problems, problems
which may be resolved not by argument but only in personal experience of
revelation and faith. They are problems of faith, not of belief, as he under¬
stood these terms.
One of the three basic theological principles informing Niebuhr's
ethics is the fall of man from created goodness, and his subsequent bondage to
false gods and evil imaginations of the heart that manifest themselves 1n
perverse and corrupt actions. His every action is now motivated by self-
interest and all other beings are judged good or evil insofar as they serve
to fulfill or frustrate man's perceived needs or desires. Though free from
external compulsion man is not free not to love himself. This is not to deny
that he cannot be more or less "enlightened" insofar as he recognizes the
relative value which other beings have for others than the self, or yet his
own relative value-for others. But such relative value is always ultimately
measured in terms of his own self-interest. Egotism is the ruling image in
the heart of man the sinner, and he is incapable by his own efforts to free
himself from bondage to his own self-interest. But it is one measure of the
sovereign greatness and love of God that he is faithful and loyal to man the
disloyal and discloses himself to man as the one who values and loves him for
his own sake.
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To say that God makes himself known as First Person 1s to say
that revelation means . . . the demonstration to selves of faith¬
ful, truthful being. ... God 1s steadfast self, keeping his
word, "faithful 1n all his doings and just 1n all his ways."
This principle of person-like Integrity 1s fundamental 1n a
revelation that Is an event which elicits the confidence of
selves to their ultimate environment and calls.upon them as
free selves to decide for the universal cause.1
Through revelation man 1s freed from bondage to himself and from trust In and
loyalty to false gods.
Theocentrlc ethics 1s at once an ethic of freedom. "Where faith 1n
God 1s present the self 1s free from concern for Itself. It has not achieved
freedom from self concern, but has been set free by God through the gift of
faith In him. It 1s able to accept Itself as the forgiven self. . . This
freedom from bondage to self 1s Inseparable from a freedom from reliance on
cultural values, those social gods upon whom selves rely to give meaning and
3
value to their Individual and social existence. Trust 1n God as the only
absolute center of value frees man to see all cultural values and laws as
having only a relative claim upon him. With the gift of faith 1n God the
possibility of freedom from these kinds of bondage arises as a promise and 1s
made actual 1n those moments *n which, with repentance, true faith 1n God 1s
exercised.
This freedom 1s not only freedom from but freedom to. The self 1s
set free to respond with Imaginativeness and creativity 1n every personal and
social situation. Niebuhr Indicated that he believed this aspect of Christian
ethics had not been analyzed adequately and 1t 1s clear that he saw his own
Wc, pp. 46-47.
2
"Evangelical and Protestant Ethics," p. 224.
3Ibid., pp. 225f.
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work as an attempt to supply this lack building on the foundation laid 1n
Scripture and tradition.*
3M Meaning of Revelation Nlebuhr has described the way 1n which the
Image of God as faithful self, Insofar as 1t replaces the evil imaginations of
the heart,enables the self to Interpret all the events of the past, present, and
future as events In which the creative, sustaining, and redeeming activity of
God 1n Christ 1s always present.* Revelation 1s that event 1n which the self 1s
given a new Image by means of which 1t 1s enabled progressively to reinterpret
all the events of Its Individual and social existence as related 1n a meaningful
universe. Revelation initiates a process 1n which our self-understanding 1s
transformed and all Its actions as a moral agent are unified by being redirected
toward that absolute unity of power and goodness, God. "Whatever else revela¬
tion means 1t does mean an event in our history which brings rationality and
wholeness Into the confused Joys and sorrows of personal existence and allows
3
us to discern order 1n the brawl of communal histories." The revelatory event
makes all past events meaningful by first helping the self to understand the
events of its own remembered past. Not only so, but 1t 1s enabled to remember
and acknowledge follies and sins which 1t had repressed and tried to forget as
its own, and to accept forgiveness for them. Beyond this again, 1t enables the
self to appropriate as Its own the past of all human communities.
To remember all that 1s 1n our past and so In our present Is to
achieve unity as a self. To remember the human past as our own
^Ibid., pp 226f. Nlebuhr acknowledged three sources as particularly
Important in Informing his own understanding of faith In God and Its consequences
for human freedom. They were Paul's Epistle to the Romans, Luther's, Treatise
on Christian Liberty and Jonathan Edward's, The Nature of"True Virtue.
2MR, pp. 109-132.
3Ib1d., p. 109; Cf. RMWC, pp. 47f; RS, pp. 125f.
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past 1s to achieve community with mankind. Such conversion of the
memory 1s an Important, Indispenslble part of the soul's conversion.
The "past" Niebuhr refers to here 1s, of course, that enduring past of selves
and their communities (Internal history) that 1s known to practical reason
and not the serial past of events (external history) known to theoretical reason.
The "conversion of the memory" 1s not therefore a single event but/4because the
past Is Infinite and because sin enters anew 1n repeated efforts to separate
ourselves from God and our fellow-men through the separation of our past from
them" 1t 1s a continuing process of being converted. In traditional theologi¬
cal language It Is sanctlflcation.
The continuing conversion of the individual believer has Its social
counterpart In the necessary and continuing reformation and reunion of the
4
Church. "Our Christian churches are like ourselves, Just human entitles on
5
which God has taken mercy and which he 1s converting to himself." Niebuhr
had never believed that the reunion of the churches depended upon achieving
uniformity of doctrines and liturgies, or of politics or codes of ethics; just
as he had never believed that their differences on these matters were the cru¬
cial factors dividing them.6 In his earlier writings he had argued for the
Independence of the Church and protested against Idolatrous attachment of the
^Ibld., p. 117. 2Ib1d.. pp. 59-73.
3
Ibid., p. 118. "The Hidden Church and the Churches 1n Sight," Religion
1n Life, XTT1946), pp. 116f.
4Ib1d., pp. 118-120.
^'The Hidden Churches and the Churches 1n Sight," p. 117.
6SSt), Chapter 1. "What Holds Churches Together?", The Christian
Century, XLIII (1526), pp. 346-348.
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churches to cultural values and Ideologies. In his later work he still be¬
lieved that Idolatry was the besetting sin but that the idols were now within
2
the Church Itself. "If ny Protestantism led me 1n the past to protest against
the spirit of capitalism and of nationalism, of communism and technological
civilization, 1t now leads me to protest against the deification of Scriptures
3
and of the church." Among the many factors which Niebuhr analysed as respon¬
sible for devisiveness and fragmentation within the Christian Church, none was
more Insidious than the self-righteous and defensive attitude displayed by the
various traditions within the Church in holding defensively and unrepentantly
4
to an image of itself as the true church. He did not deny that differences
of doctrine, forms of worship, liturgies and so on were important, but agree¬
ment on these matters would not, he believed, result in a truly united Church
unless this self-centered and evil image was forsaken. The conversion of the
Church, as of the individual Christian, depends upon each party 1n the Church re¬
interpreting its past through the image of God-in-Christ and appropriating the
5
internal history of other groups as part of their own history.
Ultimately Niebuhr believed that if all the people of the world were to
become one people--what he in earlier writings referred to as "the synthesis
^"Toward the Independence of the Church," The Church Against the World
(Chicago and New York: Willett, Clark and Co., 1935), pp. 123-139. "The
Irreligion of Communist and Capitalist," Christian Century, XLVII (1930), pp.
1306-1307. "The Christian Evanqel and Social Culture," Reliqion in Life, VIII
(1939), pp. 44-48.
2RMWC, pp. 56-60; PCM, pp. 29f, 39-47.
3
"Reformation: Continuing Imperative," p. 250.
4"The Disorder of Man in the Church of God," in Man's Disorder and
God's Design; Vol. I: The Universal Church in God's Design (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1949), p. 83.
5MR, p. 119.
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of culture"^—it could only come about through this same process of reinterpre-
tation and appropriation of each group's past, through the adequate image of
2
the God who creates and values them all as one commonwealth.
The revelatory moment in which an image is given, which makes it
possible for the practical reason to bring intelligibility and unity into the
past history of selves, also makes the present actions and responses of selves
O
intelligible. The evil Images with which we sought to justify the goodness
of our past actions, and to Ignore or condemn the past actions of others, also
causes us to misinterpret our own present actions and the actions of others upon
us. Our interpretation of present actions are made in relation to some image we
have made of ourselves rather than the larger image given in revelation.4 A
particularly important Image for the interpreting of present deeds done and
suffered is the passion of Christ. Through this image we are able to discern
"the evidence of a pattern 1n which, by great travail of men and God, a work
of redemption goes on which is like the work of Christ."5 The lack of any clear
doctrine of atonement in Niebuhr's theology makes It difficult to know, with any
precision, what this analogy entails. He specifically rejected all theories
"that operate with the symbolism of laws and courts" but he did not develop any
£
clear alternative. This omission,is, I think, part of or a consequence of his
]SSD, pp. 266, 280.
2MR, pp. 120f. 3Ibid., pp. 121-130.
4Ibid., p. 123.
r
Ibid., pp. 124f. When it is remembered that this essay was published
in 1941 it is not surprising that Niebuhr regarded the problem of war as provid¬
ing a supreme test for a theology committed to a radically monotheistic inter¬
pretation of all events.
6RS, p. 131.
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fallure to sustain any consistent ChrlstologyJ
Finally, revelation also Illuminates the future because he who 1s pres¬
ent to us 1n the revelatory moment 1s the Lord of life and death. Through the
death and resurrection of Jesus we understand that our history and the history
of all men has a telos, "the resurrection of a new and other self, or a new
2
community, a reborn remnant." But It Is not a possibility Inherent 1n us,nor
does 1t come other than through judgment and death.
It should be pointed out here, too, that while Nlebuhr often refers to
the resurrection of Christ, he did not present any very clear account of how
he understood this "event." Given his general rejection of supernatural1sm and
nature-miracles he doubtless would have viewed any belief 1n bodlly resurrection
as part of the primitive mythology of supernatural1sm. "The resurrection 1s
not," he declared, "manifest to us 1n physical signs but 1n his continuing
3
Lordship." Of the resurrection of Jesus Christ "we may know no more than that
4
he lives and 1s powerful over us and among us. To any Inquiry about the onto-
loglcal status of the object of the pronoun "he," Nlebuhr doubtless would have
replied that such questions cannot arise 1n a theology that properly confines
Itself to what can be known about God or Christ within the limits of value
experience.
We have been following Nlebuhr's account of the transformation of human
Christ and Culture 1n the section entitled, "Toward a Definition of
Christ," Nlebuhr made a very promising start toward a Chrlstology approached
through a careful study of the virtues of Jesus as recorded 1n the Gospels.
Unfortunately, he did not develop this view further 1n subsequent writings but
reverted back to that exclusive emphasis on the work rather than the person
and work of Christ which 1s characteristic of his view In The Meaning of
Revelation.
2MR, p. 131. 3RS, p. 177.
4Ib1d., p. 143.
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Hfe and conduct (Individually and communally), that 1s made possible through
the revelation of God-1n Christ and the establishment within human experience
of a radically monotheistic faith. Revelation, Nlebuhr has argued, provides
the self as practical reasoner with an image by means of which It Is enabled
progressively to discern In the past (what we are), the present (what we do)
and the future (our potentiality) the presence of the one God present 1n all
eventsJ Only in relation to this one faithful and redeeming self present 1n
all events 1s 1t possible for the self to become one self, that Is, become a
truly moral self. Moral conduct as we have seen earlier Is not, for Nlebuhr,
a matter of the conformity of the self to moral rules (though 1t may know all
the rules) but 1t 1s a matter of radical faith 1n the one God becoming Incarnate?
1n all the self's roles and relations.
The radical faith becomes incarnate Insofar as every reaction to
every event becomes a response 1n loyalty and confidence to One
who 1s present 1n all such events. . . . The consistent ethics
of radical faith 1s not constituted by the attachment of certain
ethical rules to religious beliefs but by the requirement and
the empowerment to consistent action 1n all realms and offices
In which the self acts.*
Nlebuhr was not Ignorant of the fact that even 1n Protestant creeds and
theology "revelation" had meant something more than the self-disclosure of the
One creating, judging and redeeming God in all natural and historical events.
He recognized that "Protestant confessions of faith refer ... to truths and
3
moral laws which along with God himself are the content of revelation." For
Nlebuhr, revelation refers to the latter only. Just as he believed that Kantian
and subsequent neo-Kantian critiques of the limits of human rationality had made
^IR, p. 130. Cf. RS, pp. 125f. 2RMWC, p. 48.
3MR, p. 156.
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1t necessary to forsake any hope of theoretical knowledge about the nature of
God being mediated through revelation (but not the forsaking of some notion of
revelation), so he also believed that the criticism levelled by Idealist philo¬
sophers (again especially Kant), on the one hand, and various social scientists
on the other, made 1t necessary to forsake any Idea of specific moral laws or
rules about the will of God being given 1n revelation.' The standard creeds
are mistaken: "We recognize that they [moral laws] were written on our hearts
2
apart from revelation and on our statute books without the aid of Scriptures."
Having separated all knowledge of moral laws and values from the content of
revelation, Nlebuhr was left with the problem of explaining what sort of rela¬
tion did exist between cultural laws and values and the revelation of God. His
answer to this problem,too,1s worked out 1n terms of the principle of "trans-
formlsm."
The revelation of God not only effects a transformation 1n man's under¬
standing of his personal and social history, 1t also transforms his understanding
of the moral law, "The first change which the moral law undergoes with the aid
3
of revelation of God's person 1s 1n Its Imperativeness." While the laws which
we give ourselves or which are proposed to us by others may be evaded 1n various
ways through the revelation of God, we recognize the moral law as the demand of
'ibid., pp. 160-163. Nlebuhr recognizes that such critics not only
differ, but give contradictory accounts of the origin of moral laws, but he asserts
that "1t 1s not the task of confessional theology to try to reconcile the dif¬
ferences." Though as an "objective relativist" he ventures the opinion that
such Inquirers "are looking on the same process from divergent points of view
and that strife Is due to the confusion of views of the universal with universal
views . . Ibid., p. 162.
2Ib1d., p. 162,
3
Ibid., p. 165 (Italics added). Cf. "Evangelical and Protestant Ethics,"
p. 226.
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one from whom it is not possible to escape. We also begin to see 1) that our
transgressions against the laws our conscience acknowledges, or that our society
justly imposes upon us, are also transgressions against God himself: and 2)
that "the Imperative behind the law 1s the imperative of the faithful, earnest,
never-resting, eternal self."^ A second change in the moral law 1s the recog¬
nition that Its application 1s universalized and intensified. "If a man re¬
sponds to the demands of a universal God then the neighbors for whom he is
responsible are not only the members of the nation to which he belongs but the
2
raerabers of the total society over which God presides." And this total society
1s not restricted to rational beings but includes the living and the non-living
over which man exercises a relative and often violent lordship. What does
Nlebuhr mean when he claims that the revelation of God makes the application of
the moral law more intensive? It 1s intensified 1n the sense that before God
we recognize that we have always eiaployed the law 1n the service of self and
so have corrupted 1t.
No matter what standard of measurement we employed ... we used
these laws and measures as Interested men, who served a creature
rather than the creator. If we used pleasure as our standard for
measuring the good, 1t was our pleasure or my pleasure which was
preferred. If 1t was perfection then 1t was our perfection; 1f
prudence was employed It was always prudence 1n the service of a
larger or smaller self, ... It 1s always an interested morality,
a wishful.and Idolatrous and corrupted one which we employ apart
from God.
When the law we claim to live by thwarts our desires, we correct it and deceive
ourselves Into believing that no transgression has occurred. The same revelation
in which we receive the assurance that we are eternally loved and valued by
1IMd., pp. 165f.
2,!The Responsibility of the Church for Society," p. 116; Cf. MR, p. 167.
3Ib1d.. pp. 168-170. 4Ib1d.. pp. 168f.
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Sod also condemns us for corrupting all our moral laws and values. The third
and "greatest change" 1s "the conversion of the imperative Into an Indicative
and of the law whose content 1s love into a free love of God and man . .
This 1s Niebuhr's way of expressing the primacy of gospel over law.
It was Paul especially, among the New Testament writers, who under¬
stood most clearly that the gospel of the reconciliation of all men to God
accomplished by the life, death and resurrection of Christ meant that God's
primary relation to man is one of grace rather than law,and that the imperative
moral law (understood as code of conduct) can never by itself make any man
"good at the core." The root-virtue from which all actions draw their good¬
ness is faith, which was for Paul, as 1t was for Niebuhr, wholly a gift of
God. Because the Christian life is initiated by the unmerited grace of God,
Christian conduct cannot be understood at its profoundest level as obedience
to moral imperatives but as freedom to love God and neighbor for their own
sakes. When the will of God is given expression in the form of injunctions
that men ought or ought not to perform, consequences follow which only serve
to further define man's inability to love anything but himself. If such moral
injunctions do not goad man's self-will and tempt him to further transgression
of the law, then thqy intensify his consciousness of guilt and fear of death
so that he becomes self-absorbed and burdened with despair. In either case
the very imperative form of the law itself "presupposes the presence in man of
3
a desire contrary to the intention of the law." Only when confidence in God as
the One who delivers from all evil is received is man released from concern about
hbid., p. 170f.
3Ibid.
^CE, p. 41, cf. pp. 36-45.
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himself to respond with joyful, grateful, reverent and loyal love to God,
and to the neighbor toward whom God has shown the same compassion.
The transformation of ethics effected by the revelation of God-in-
Christ does not mean for Niebuhr, then, that the moral rules and virtues com¬
mon to a given culture are replaced or supplemented by a new and wholly dif-
2
ferent morality. It means neither the "republication" of an "original
edition" of the moral law in "definitive form," nor is it the impartation of
moral imperatives otherwise unknown, rather, it means "the beginning of a
revolutionary understanding and application of the moral law rather than the
3
giving of a new law." The coming of radically monotheistic faith does mean
that our ordinary cultural morality begins to undergo a transformation, for
it no longer functions as an elaborate mechanism for maintaining our own
existence and value at the expense of the existence and value of other persons
and things. Radical faith in God frees man from such anxious self concern to
be a responsible self.
"What then is love ? ... By love we mean at least these attitudes
and actions: rejoicing in the presence of the beloved, gratitude, reverence




An attempt will now be made to provide a brief concluding assessment of
the strengths and weaknesses of H. Richard fliebuhr's theological ethics. It
may also prove helpful to suggest some further lines of inquiry that might be
made into Niebuhr's own work or that appear to me to hold promise for advancing
the discipline of theological ethics.
The theological ethics of H. Richard Niebuhr exhibits three major
strengths that stand in marked contrast to most scholarship in Christian ethics
in the United States in the period 1930-1960. First, his attempts at clarifying
basic theological and philosophical issues in Christian ethics were not developed
out of an immediate concern with finding oractical solutions to urgent social
and moral problems, but rather they were directed toward the development of a
comprehensive theory of Christian moral experience and action. The predominant
concern of most American writers on Christian ethics in this period was to pro¬
vide counsel and guidance on the moral conduct of individuals and the public
policy of institutionsJ Miebuhr did not discount the importance of such con¬
cerns but in his own work he gave very little attention to them. If, as I have
contended, it is a weakness of his ethical theory that it does not provide general
normative principles for the guidance of human behavior, this is partly a result
of his belief that their rejection is necessarily entailed by a radically mono¬
theistic ethic, partly a consequence of his understanding of the limitations
^Cf. James M. Gustafson, "Christian Ethics," in Religion, edited by
Paul Ramsey (Englewood Cliffs, Hew Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.," 1965), p. 287.
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imposed on human thought by an historically relative point of view, and partly
too, a consequence of centering almost exclusive attention upon the intentional
quality of individual moral decisions.
Professor James M. Gustafson, Niebuhr's successor at Yale, has asserted
that in this period American scholars "have done little work in the history
of Christian ethics; they have done less on the relation of ethical thought to
biblical scholarship; only a few scholars have moved with ease between systema¬
tic theology and ethics, and too little work has been done on the relation of
theological ethics to philosophical ethics."1 A further measure of the breadth
and strength of Niebuhr's theological ethics is gained when his work 1s com¬
pared with this bill of particulars. Only in the second area, the relation of
ethical thought to biblical scholarship, is his contribution negligible. He was
certainly one among the "few scholars" who "moved with ease between systematic
theology and ethics," though this is more obviously true of his work on the
history of Christian ethics than it is of his attempt at providing a theological
foundation for a Christian ethic,3 or of his theory of human nature and action/'
It is with respect to the two remaining areas that his contribution to reli¬
gious ethics stands in greatest contrast to that of most of his peers in America.
It is important also to recognize that it was precisely these two areas that
were the predominant concerns of the ethical reflection typical of the academic
tradition in nineteenth-century Protestant theology that had influenced so
11bid.
2
Particularly The Kingdom of God in America and Christ and Culture.
3
Cf. Tire Meanino of Revelation and Radical Monotheism and Western
Culture.
4
The Responsible Self and Christ and Culture, Chapter 7.
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deeply the method and direction of Niebuhr's thought.^
His sociological and historical studies of the beliefs, teachings and
actions of Christians are certainly the best produced by a Christian moralist
in these decades in America. The keen perceptiveness he showed in recognizing,
describing and respecting "the multiformity and individuality of men and move¬
ments in Christian history" was complemented by an equally keen and constant
vision of the divine "context in which all these relativities of history make
sense.
With regard to the problem of the relation of theological to philosophi¬
cal ethics, Niebuhr was almost alone among prominent Protestant theological
moralists in recognizing the important gains to be realized by them as a result
of giving careful and sympathetic attention to the work of moral philosophers
of whatever school. If it is a true judgment that in this period "nowhere is
the extent of the gulf between philosophy and theology more noticeable than in
the field of morals,then Niebuhr stands out as one Christian moralist who con¬
sistently endeavored to bridge this "gulf." Absent from Niebuhr's writings,
too, is the sort of antipathy toward the thought of non-theistic moral philosophy
that characterizes the ethical writings of younger contemporaries in America
^Cf. Frei, FE, pp. 16-40. Especially is this true of Ernst Troeltsch's
work. The Social Sources of Denominational ism (1929) was directly inspired by,
among others, Troeltsch and Harnack, who were7 of course, two of the most out¬
standing late nineteenth century representatives of this tradition. Cf. SSD,
pp. vii, 8, 17.
*The Social Sources of Denominational ism (1929), The Kingdom of God: in
America (1937), CTTrist and Culture (1951), " The Protestant Hbvemelrt and Demo¬
cracy Tn the United States" "(1961 f.
3
CC, p. xii.
^A. P. F. Sell, "Christian Ethics and Moral Philosophy: Some Reflections




like Paul Lehman or Paul Ramsey. Whatever the specific weaknesses of his own
moral theory may be judged to contain, his catholic attitude toward all kinds
of moral inquiry served to counteract an all too prevalent tendency toward
cultural isolationism in Christian ethics.
While this assessment is true in a general way, a more accurate and
discriminating evaluation of his own contribution in this area may be arrived
at by comparing the scope, method and emphasis of his work with that of the
dominant contemporary Anglo-American tradition in moral philosophy. Most
contemporary moral philosophers have not concerned themselves primarily with
normative ethics, i.e., with seeking judgments about what is right or wrong,
good or bad, but with meta-ethics, i.e., with analyzing the meaning of moral
concepts and judgments and with the logic of their justification. While the
style and method of Niebuhr's ethics was much more strongly influenced by think¬
ers commonly called "existentialists" or "phenomenologists," he, too, concentrated
greater attention upon meta-ethical than upon normative ethics. He demonstrated,
especially in his later work, his awareness of the need for analyzing the mean¬
ing of key concepts in Christian ethical discourse. His inquiries into the
4 5
meaning of the concepts "faith" and "love," to take two examples, are report-
ive, that is, they are descriptions of what these terms ordinarily mean, or of
how they are commonly used in religious discourse. On the other hand, his
^Ethics in a Christian Context (London: SCM Press, 1962).
2
This is true only of Ramsey's early work, Basic Christian Ethics (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950) and not of later works such as Deeds and
Rules in Christian Ethics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967).
3
Frankena, "Moral Philosophy," 0£. cit., p. 347.
^Cf. "On the Nature of Faith" in Religious Experience and Truth, Sidney
Hook, editor (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1965), PP. 93-102.
5PCM, pp. 34-39.
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definitlon of "responsibility" is less reportive than it is reformative, that is,
it is a proposal about what the term should mean, or better, about how it ought
to be employed in view of his theory of the self as fundamentally a responsive
being. While it is true, as we have seen, that Niebuhr's chief interest was to
provide a phenomenological analysis of "faith," "love" or "responsibility"as
relational moral categories, he also recognized the importance of first getting
clear about the meaning of such terms as they are employed in our ordinary
moral discourseJ This procedure is clearly stated in the first paragraph of
his essay "On the Nature of Faith:" "... It is necessary to begin any inquiry
into 'faith' with an effort at semantic clarification and then proceed if
possible, toward phenomenological analysis. . ."2 While Niebuhr's work in this
area was limited, its significance lies in the fact that it does mark out a
direction in which much more work needs to be done by Christian moralists. A
detailed examination of the meaning and logical status of other Christian ethi¬
cal concepts must be carried out if theological ethics is to attain the greatest
3
possible clarity and precision.
The critical analysis of the relational theory of moral value and
action (presented in Chapters II and III) has pointed up a difficulty which
is, in my judgment, the chief weakness in Niebuhr's ethical theory. It will
be helpful to focus the problem again 1n the form of two questions. First, is
it possible, or how far is it possible, for a relational theory of this kind
to include criteria for determining how moral agents are to know what sort of
^"On the Nature of Faith," PCM, pp. 34-39; RS, pp. 27f.
2
"On the Nature of Faith," 0£. cit., p. 93.
3
The analysis of religious language provided by the Bishop of Durham,
Ian T. Ramsey, needs to be continued by theological moralists.
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values are morally good or bad, or what sort of actions are morally right or
wrong, or (to use Niebuhr's basic moral categories) morally "fitting" or
"unfitting?" Secondly, what is the place or function, if any, of general moral
rules in this relational theory of theological ethics?
At some points in his writings Niebuhr seems to embrace the view that
response to the presence of God in all events precludes any judgments upon
not only the absolute, but also the relative moral rightness or wrongness of
human actions, or the moral goodness or badness of the moral agent, his charac¬
ter, motives and so forth.^ Such an extreme position would entail the abandon¬
ment of all normative ethical theories and their elimination from the scope of
theological ethics. However, it may be fairer to his general intentions to
conclude that he does have a normative theory which may be called "act-responsi-
o
bilism. On this view the agent does and must make moral judgments. As an
"act-responsibilist" he will not do so using the traditional categories of right
3
and wrong, good and bad, but the categories of "fitting" and "unfitting."
With respect to the role of general rules in his ethics, he will maintain that
Supra-» PP« 57-71.
2
The distinction between "act" and "rule" theories in normative ethics
is widely observed among contemporary Anglo-American moral philosophers.
William Frankena in his brilliant review of teleological and deontological
theories allows that the "ethics of love" (agapism) may represent or require a
third type of normative theory, but that if it does, it will nevertheless find
it necessary to distinguish between "act" and "rule" versions of that theory.
Cf. Ethics (1963), pp. 42-45. If it is possible to set forth a Christian ethic
centering upon a basic concept other than "love" then it would allow for the
possibility of discussing Niebuhr's ethics in terms of "act responsibilism"
or "rule responsibilism." The only possible justification for the multiplica¬
tion of such barbarous technical terms would be to help the theorist to dis¬
tinguish clearly between each theory. With respect to basic theological concepts,
it is clear that "faith" understood as trust and loyalty has a more prominent
place than "love" in the theological language employed by Niebuhr.
3RS, pp. 60f.
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all judgments about what is "fitting" or "unfitting" are always particular
ones like "in situation X, Y is the fitting action for Z to do" rather than
general ones like "in every situation that is similar to X, Y is the 'fitting'
response for all human moral agents."
It is possible and desirable to distinguish further between a more
and a less severe stricture that may be placed on the employment of general
rules by "act" theorists, whether deontologists, teleologists, or responsibilists.
The more severe position maintains that each moral agent can and must decide
for himself in each situation what is the "fitting" thing to do without appeal
to any rules. A less severe view would allow that general rules are helpful
in determining what should be done in this or a later situation, but "act-
res pons ibil ism" cannot allow any general rule to determine by itself what
the fitting response is in a given situation.
Evidence may be adduced from Niebuhr's writings to support both of
these positions. But it is clear that if general rules play an} role at all
in his ethics they do so only in this latter sense. In the final analysis it
should be recognized that not only did he not concern himself with the role
of general rules for guiding human conduct, but that he did not give enough
attention to the problem of how anyone would know what sort of act would
qualify as a morally fitting as opposed to a morally unfitting act. He does
not do so because of his belief that the theoretical task of clarifying the
meaning of radically monotheistic faith, and the practical task of actually
possessing it is not simply a necessary condition, but is in fact the sufficient
condition of a radically monotheistic ethic. How did this come about es¬
pecially in view of the fact that in his very earliest essays he argued that
a theological ethic must provide moral principles for the guidance of human
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conduct?^ My suggestion is that the relational, valuation and existential
"encounter" view of divine revelation and human faith which he adopted in place
of a strictly valuational approach characteristic of much nineteenth century
liberal theology made it much more difficult, if not actually impossible, for
him to show what connection there could be between knowledge of God and the
making of moral judgments about the rightness or wrongness of our own or
others' actions.
If it is true, as I have argued, that Niebuhr is an "act" rather than
a "rule" theorist, this does not mean that his ethical theory is without an
ultimate normative principle. Moral actions necessarily entail judgments
(or an "interpretation" in Niebuhr's sense of that word) about what is right
or wrong, good or bad, "fitting" or "unfitting." A process of moral evaluation
is involved which necessarily makes reference to matters other than the facts
or events involved in the situation. The actor must decide what he ought to
do, not solely on the basis of what is in fact occurring, but on the basis of
some ultimate moral commitment(s), principle(s) or value(s). For example,
an act-utilitarian decides that he ought to do X in situation Y because X
alone will or (insofar as he is able to judge) is most likely to maximize
the greatest happiness for the greatest number of persons. An act-agapist
will ask himself what self-denying love requires in situation Y. In act-
responsibilism a moral agent decides to do X in situation Y because X is a
fitting response to God interpreted as the center of being and value; as the
power present in every situation upon whom all finite beings are absolutely
dependent for their existence and worth. The ethic of responsibility is a




to God as a transcendent normative point of reference.
If the interpretation of Niebuhr's theological ethics given in previous
chapters has been a fair and accurate one, then the major difficulty with his
theory is not that he does not propose an ultimate normative principle (radical
monotheism) in relation to which everything that is, is good, and in relation
to which all moral actions are to be judged fitting or unfitting, but rather
that he has failed to give a sufficiently clear and adequate answer to two
questions that are fundamental to any ethical theory that 1) derives its
normativeness from knowledge of God and that 2) claims that moral conduct can
and should be guided by such knowledge. First, how is the moral agent given
to know, or how does he come to know, what the character and purpose of God is?
Second, assuming that he has this knowledge and assuming further that he ought
to act in conformity to it, how is the moral agent to determine and be justi¬
fied in his determination that action A rather than action B is, in situation
Y, a fitting response to God?^
The answer Niebuhr has given to the first question lacks clarity
primarily at the point of the language he used to describe God. He attempted
to combine the concept of God as "faithful self" or "First Person" with notions
such as "Being itself," the "last" or "ultimate power," "the principle of
?
being and value," and the "One." The former predicates are particular and
^Niebuhr has summarized his ethic of responsibility in a succinct
formula: "God is acting in all actions upon you. So respond to all actions
upon you as to respond to his action," RS, p. 126. Two features of this formu¬
la are worth noting in relation to this second question. First, the second
sentence is not only in the imperative mood, but also assumes that the moral
agent ought to "respond to all actions . . . his action." Second, the formula
does not provide any criterion by means of which a moral agent might determine
what response or responses out of all possible responses would be a fitting
rather than an unfitting response to the action of God.
2
Supra, p. 212, n. 3.
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concrete, the latter are universal and abstract. The possibility of predicat¬
ing both sorts of locutions of God is an attractive one, but Niebuhr did not
provide any explanation for his use of these seemingly incompatible concepts.
In this context, too, it is appropriate to ask why Niebuhr did not
give attention to the logical relationship between these concepts and such
traditional theological predicates as "Creator," "Judge," "Father," or
"Redeemer." His failure to do so (and his sparing use of the latter) is sur¬
prising, especially in view of his emphasis on the personal character of the
revelation of God in the history of Israel and in Jesus Christ. Further
exploration of the logical status of the concepts Niebuhr used to speak of
God needs to be undertaken. Such an investigation would have its own in¬
trinsic value and may also throw light on a further difficulty in his doctrine
of God. It may help to resolve the question of how far his laudable desire
to preserve the unity and radical sovereignty of God moved him in the direc¬
tion of a monism that is logically incompatible with the distinctness and
inseparability of the three "persons," Father, Son and Holy Spirit.
To make the judgment that Niebuhr's answer to this first question is
inadequate is not to say that the main themes that he developed in his attempt
to provide an answer are unimportant. The contrary is true. The emphasis
he placed upon the unity and sovereignty of God as Creator, Judge and Redeemer
in all his relations to the human and natural world in opposition to every
idolatrous exaltation of this or that finite being, power or value, is of
first importance for any theistic ethic. His stress upon the interdependence
of every existent and the absolute dependence of each upon God for their exis¬
tence and value makes it impossible to confuse creature!iness with sinfulness,
or for any one being to treat any other as without value. Finally, his
phenornenological description of man as primarily a responsive being who must
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and does either respond to Being itself and to the whole realm of dependent
beings with trust and loyalty, or with distrust and disloyalty, focuses a
proper attention upon the social, historical and existential dimension of human
life.
The inadequacy of Niebuhr's understanding of knowledge of God is a
consequence of his intrepretation of revelation and faith in exclusively inter¬
personal and valuational terms. Reasons were given earlier for questioning
the adequacy of the "personal encounter" model of revelation.^ His interpre¬
tation of knowledge of God not only distinguishes sharply between belief in^
God (interpersonal trust and loyalty) and beliefs about God (statements about
the sort of being God is), but it wholly excludes the latter. The strength
of Niebuhr's account of religious faith is his probing and sophisticated analy¬
sis of interpersonal trust and loyalty; its weakness is his failure to do
justice to the intellectual content of faith in God, Is it possible to have
i
personal trust in and loyalty to God in the absence of any beliefs about
him? More seriously yet, is it possible to maintain a distinctively theis-
tic ethic and at the same time to deny that this distinctiveness depends upon
the truth of any beliefs about the existence and nature of God?
It is one measure of the continuity of the religious epistemology of
H. Richard Niebuhr with that of the great nineteenth century German liberal
theological tradition that "faith" was taken by him to specify essentially,
if not exclusively, a particular sort of value-judgment. It is this view of
faith, and the logically prior commitment to the correctness of a dualistic
neo-Kantian understanding of the function of "reason" that must be challenged
1 Supra, pp. 239-242.
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and thought through more thoroughly and comprehensively than has been attempted
here. This task is a necessary condition for the construction of a more
adequate theological ethic.
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